Hybrid threats

Hybrid threats can persist over long periods. In Ukraine, hybrid threats were present long before the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion, later evolving into hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats can also be used to influence elections well in advance of voting day and, through political power shifts, affect a country’s strategic interests and development.

Hybrid threats usually originate from a single actor, typically an authoritarian state or its proxies, whose aim is to increase influence globally, regionally, or nationally. By exploiting vulnerabilities in societies, they can affect social cohesion, widen divisions between groups, and undermine citizens’ trust in democratic institutions.

Increasing societal resilience to hybrid threats requires greater awareness among governmental and private actors, as well as civil society, of the nature of hybrid threats, coupled with vigilance against undue information influence from foreign actors and attempts to undermine rights and freedoms.

Capacity-building measures can include safeguarding the fundamental principles of democracy, protecting free and fair elections, educational initiatives to improve media literacy and understanding of the information environment, protecting critical infrastructure, and enhancing cooperation between democratic states to develop strategies and tools to counter hybrid threats.

Within the EU and NATO, research is emerging that can improve the ability to analyse vulnerabilities, anticipate risks, and implement measures to enhance resilience to hybrid threats. Vulnerabilities may exist across multiple societal domains and at international, national, and local levels.

Protecting Free and Fair Elections

Democracy is in decline globally, while authoritarian regimes are gaining ground. Free elections face numerous challenges, including conflicts, the politicisation of electoral processes, hybrid threats, and crises such as pandemics, natural disasters, and climate change.

Complex hybrid threats targeting electoral processes pose an increasing challenge to electoral integrity. Protecting free elections involves detecting and managing disruptions and implementing preventive measures well before voting occurs, not just during or after elections.

As with hybrid threats in general, it is necessary to identify vulnerabilities and capacities, assess potential consequences, and develop risk-reducing measures. This work requires continuous monitoring and adaptation as threats evolve. Democratic institutions and actors in FBA’s partner countries often require support. These include electoral authorities, security sectors, and other key election stakeholders.

FBA provides tailored training and advisory services to partners and actors in partner countries on developing greater resilience to hybrid threats. The training draws on research and models developed by the Hybrid Center of Excellence and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, for example analysing vulnerabilities and mitigating risks.

FBA also offers advice and training on planning and conducting elections in conflict-sensitive contexts, including strategies for identifying, preventing, and managing potential hybrid attacks and violent situations that may arise during elections.

FBA's Work

Research

FBA maintains research working groups and awards research funding to deepen knowledge of how practically applicable methods for building resilience to hybrid threats and protecting free elections can be further developed.

Personnel Contributions

FBA deploys civilian experts to international missions working to strengthen resilience against hybrid threats. FBA also contributes personnel to election observation missions in which the Swedish government has decided that Sweden should participate.