SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

FOLKE
BERNADOTTE
ACADEMY

CONTENTS:

In recent years, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become an important factor in international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation and the promotion of democracy.

Recognizing the importance of a holistic understanding of Security Sector Reform, Sweden established a national SSR Steering Committee, consisting of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice. Subsequently, an operational Contact Group on SSR was formed, with permanent representation from five governmental agencies active in areas of international peace and security: the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swedish National Defence College, the Swedish National Police, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

The Contact Group was mandated, inter alia, to conduct joint fact-finding and assessment efforts in countries where Sweden has an aim in supporting a national SSR process. To guide these efforts, this SSR assessment framework was developed drawing on international standards and best practices.

The framework is intended to facilitate information gathering and analysis in support of decision-making, programming, monitoring and evaluation. While primarily based on Swedish conditions, the framework may serve as an outline for assessments carried out by other governments, institutions and organizations. As such, the Folke Bernadotte Academy sees the framework as a living document, to be continuously updated and developed, and therefore encourages feedback on the material to improve future editions.

In today's globalised and highly interdependent world, sustainable peace, nationally and internationally, depends on joint efforts in promoting security and development. The SSR concept, with its holistic approach and focus on human security, provides a comprehensive framework to assist these efforts.

We hope that the framework can be of assistance in your efforts and we look forward to your comments.

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INTRODUCTION

Established in November 2007, the Swedish guidance document for Security Sector Reform (SSR) outlines the overall approach and priorities for Swedish actors' engagement in SSR processes in the coming years. The broad political document is adopted by all Government actors jointly.

The Government Communication on Sweden's Global Development Policy, launched in March 2008, highlights the importance of stability and security as a means for poverty reduction and international development cooperation. Unfortunately, the security sector is rather a source of instability than a guarantee for security and respect for human rights (Skr. 2007/08:89 p. 39). One concrete point for action, as stipulated by the Government's policy, is to contribute to the effectiveness and improvement of needs-assessments analysis for engagement in SSR processes (p 40).

Responding to the Swedish Government's ambition, as expressed by these and other documents, this assessment framework has been developed to serve as a guide for Swedish expert teams with a mandate to assess possible engagements in support of Security Sector Reform. The extensive work that the OECD/DAC has carried out on SSR (see reference list in Annex) is used as a basis, although other relevant documents and processes have been included as references as well. Some adjustments have been made to better meet the needs of Swedish actors, strategies and systems. The right of the individual to be free from fear is a guiding principle.

In February 2009, an interagency working group tested the assessment framework by a comprehensive assessment of the security and justice situation in Liberia. The focus of this framework is primarily designed for post-conflict countries/situations (see summary of the Swedish development aid priorities at: www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/66/07/365febc3.pdf). Naturally, the instruments presented can be used under other circumstances as well, if considered useful.

Although the idea of SSR has developed over the last couple of years into a useful concept that de-scribes an ideal way to merge stability, development and people-centered security, it is not a universal discipline that can be defined and institutionalised the same way in all situations. The UN Secretary General explains in his report *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, that "SSR offers a framework to assist national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing a shared vision of security" (§18: A/62/659-S/2008/39 - January 23, 2008). To understand the contextual factors of a given situation becomes the primary goal for anyone that wants to be involved in processes with the aim to enhance security, justice and development in post-conflict societies.

This is where the framework can serve as a reference for the assessment team and guide the work of identifying, collecting, analysing and reporting the right and relevant information, although the content and results will look different in each situation. With the current SSR strategy as a basis, the framework provides some instruments to use when analysing an environment and possible entry points for SSR - as well as the potential comparative advantages for a country like Sweden. A revision has been made since the first launch of the framework, based on the comprehensive work of establishing a common guiding framework for SSR assessments within the European Union as well as valuable input provided by other countries and national and international organizations. Further consultations with international organizations and other countries, national actors have provided valuable input. Some organisations, such as OECD DAC INCAF and ISSAT, are currently developing similar guiding frameworks.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The main purpose of the framework is to ensure that SSR assessment are carried out in a comprehensive manner in order to avoid sector fragmentation and to address Security Sector Reform from a wider societal perspective. The framework provides practical guidance on SSR assessments, with suggestions of sequence and content. It is based on international best practices, acknowledging some of the current issues and debates

in conducting assessments, and it incorporates recognized tools and methodologies for assessing SSR in third countries.

This assessment framework guides policy-makers and practitioners to analyse SSR:

Context – including the underlying causes for conflicts; factors of tension; overall set-up of governance framework in society; influence of local, regional and global contexts on domestic governance.

Actors and Institutions – stakeholders; both key players and excluded actors; their respective power, aut-hority and relative relations; their incentive to maintain status quo or for change.

Governance and accountability – the characteristics of relations between different sectors; between the state and its citizens; external non-state actors; transparency of the decision making, linkages within the security system.

This assessment framework is also to help identify how the civil sector/non state sector are providing their own security and justice.

SSR ASSESEMENTS SHOULD GENERALLY SEEK TO:

Conduct a basic analysis of the threats that may have an effect on the stability in the country

Analyse how poor and vulnerable groups experience and understand security and justice

Conduct a gap analysis of needs in relation to available resources and capacity

Identify how and which non state entities provide security and justice

Analyse the national or local vision of security and justice

Identify entry points for SSR programming support or determining potential areas for engagement

Identify opportunities for change and possible obstacles

Develop strategies for comprehensive SSR programming – even if focusing on specific sectors

Analyse the potential impact of SSR on conflict dynamics

Develop activities and materials needed for the implementation stage

Identify possible baselines for developing monitoring and evaluation criteria

Support to Security Sector Reform is an important area of Swedish policy for global development and international security. SSR should be considered to be in line with the Paris Declaration, which sets out international guidelines for raising the quality of aid. In this context, the framework aims to guide desk officers, programme planners and practitioners to analyse security and justice more systematically; considering governance and oversight issues and identifying threats to individuals. The assessment should result in recommendations on how SSR assistance can be delivered in a coordinated and complementary manner. Information and analytical input will require expertise from various sectors.

1.2 INTENDED USERS

With a general aim to conduct informed SSR analysis in third countries, this assessment framework is, more specifically, targeted for:

Desk Officers – Staff tasked with planning and designing an assessment; identifying entry-points, needs, and assessing the risks/benefits of SSR engagement with the goal of supporting long-term development strategies, including monitoring and evaluations.

Planners – Operational staff tasked with assessing and planning practical SSR support in a crisis response/ crisis management operation or peace building context, including monitoring and evaluation.

Technical Experts /Advisors – These experts can include military, police, rule of law, prisons, border, democratisation, development advisors, gender advisors or officers, tasked with looking at specific sectors and wanting to place this analysis within a wider system context.

1.3 HOW TO USE THE SSR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Each particular SSR assessment will have its specific objective, timing and available resources. Each situation will be unique and context specific. The framework parameters will give boundaries for how to carry out the assessment. This will also determine which tools and methods can be used. Different conditions will apply depending on the task. The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR describes different types of assessments (see table 3.1, page 46 of the Handbook) that can help guide the assessment team in defining the scope and content.

The selection of methods and analytical tools must be adapted to each assignment in accordance to its given criteria; its particular goals and objectives; the time and resources available and the capabilities of the organisation to eventually provide support to a SSR process. Keeping practical, operational and political constraints in mind throughout the assessment will help deliver achievable results.

THE FRAMEWORK

The assessment framework provides a selection of flexible resources and guidance for carrying out assessments, not a standardised formula

The framework and its specific tools are intended to be adapted to the needs and objectives of the assignment

The Assessment Framework provides guidance on options and specific tools based on suggested stages of the assessment process. These stages include:
• Planning
• Background Analysis
• In- Country Assessment
• Report and Recommendations

Each stage of SSR assessment contains different potential approaches, issues and processes to consider. While it may not be possible to conduct a SSR assessment according to the suggested stages, it is possible to pick and choose sections and/or tools relevant to the SSR task at hand.

1.4 USING THE TOOLS

No single tool can fulfil all purposes of an SSR assessment or provide a complete picture of the SSR context. A selection of tools is presented in the Assessment Framework. Each phase will have a suggested tool or methodology, which can be used during that stage of the SSR assessment. However, this does not mean that a specific tool is only useful at a set stage of the assessment process. The Matrix of Relevant Tools for SSR Assessment found in annex D provides an overview of available tools, indexes, and indicators. The matrix summarises whether the tool is better suited for a desk-study or for an in-depth analysis in-country. It also reviews whether the tool analyses specific sectors or adopts a wider contextual focus.

Considerations in planning	The Background Analysis Phase	In-Country Assesement Phase	Methodology and Design
• ToR & Scope • Added value • Assessment • Method Design • Type; Objective • Timing • Context aware • Ownership • Constraints	• Preparatory analysis • Contextual analysis • Actors mapping • Ownership of assessment	• Broad needs assessment • Sectors mapping • Identifying partners	• Methodological review • Triangulation • Risks and entry points • Recommendations • Identification of baseline/ benchmarks

Each stage of SSR assessment contains different potential approaches.

1.5 **SWEDEN'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON SSR**

The Swedish guiding document on SSR (5 November 2007) formulates a Swedish conceptual view of SSR and of Swedish SSR support. It is intended as a complement to other national policy documents in the area of peace support. Sweden's participation in SSR support to other countries is governed by a number of guiding principles.

One fundamental principle is that there must exist a political will and a national ownership for a successful SSR process. Sweden's staffing and financial contributions to SSR are also intended to support the development of security sectors with regard to respect for human rights, efficiency and quality, and democratic control and oversight. The aim of all SSR support is for the security sector to be permeated by a striving for democratic values, good governance, transparency and legal security.

Commitment to SSR is to be an integrated and cohesive part of a long-term Swedish policy for the country or region in question. Swedish SSR support shall, wherever possible, be linked to other peace-support and conflict prevention operations, as well as development cooperation, so as to enable the highest possible level of effectiveness.

Swedish SSR support is to be based on a broad needs analysis with regard to the different security threats that states and individuals face; it is to be implemented together with the partner country and possibly other supporting countries and organisations in an integrated way. Local ownership of the needs analysis and the reform process is fundamental to bringing about long-term and sustainable changes. Packages of measures must be tailored to meet the needs and wishes of individual countries.

Swedish SSR support should help build knowledge at the agency that deploys staff, and it should provide valuable Swedish insight into the current operation or organisation concerned.

SSR is a long-term process in which multilateral arrangements are to be favoured whenever proposals for SSR operations are prepared. For example, Sweden can support a UN, EU or Nato/PfP mission with a smaller contribution, or it can assume the command of a larger mission, which would mean a more long-term commitment. The role that Sweden is to play in a specific SSR mission is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Previous experience has shown that financial contributions and contributions of human resources are many times more effective if they are channelled through a multilateral mission. One concrete example is the EU's army reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

During the planning stage of missions and contributions, an evaluation of potential bilateral cooperation with other supporting countries must also be carried out.

The Swedish government's bill on a national strategy for participation in international peace and security operations convey that to achieve democratic oversight of the security sector, collective activities of both development cooperation actors and peacekeeping operations are required (2007/08:51). It is highly unlikely that a single government department alone will possess the full range of skills needed for a comprehensive strategy to support Security Sector Reform. At the time of making an initial assessment, capacity to make comprehensive political analysis – including identification of relevant actors - would be more relevant than possessing specific technical expertise.

CONSIDERATIONS AT THE PLANNING STAGE

Successful and useful SSR assessment will depend on the planning and preparation of the assessment design, but also on the expected results; where and how to implement the given available resources. Terms of reference and scope, added value of Sweden's potential involvement, types of expertise requirement, and general methodological issues will greatly affect the success of the SSR assessment process.

2.1 CONSIDERING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SCOPE

The need to conduct an assessment can emerge out of different factors. Depending on whether the assessment is done for the purpose of developing a broader country strategy, or as a part of a Swedish crisis response or crisis management intervention, to inform specific policy or program designs, or to monitor and evaluate them –will all lead to different approaches. Agreed terms of reference will set the parameters for the assessment, and will identify participating actors, their respective roles, goals and objectives of the assessment, and the intended use of the findings. It is important for the assessment team to get clarity on the purpose of the particular assessment from the very beginning.

Issues that need to be considered and clearly identified are outlined in the SSR Planning Checklist.

CHECKLIST 1 – SSR PLANNING

Are the objectives or rationale for the assessment agreed?	Are there specific objectives? Is the scope and limitations of what needs to be investigated clear?
Which partners, institutions, and agencies will be able to add value to this assessment?	Have you considered communicating, exchanging information with other Swedish agencies or institutions? If working with other partners/institutions, have roles and responsibilities been assigned? Who is the managing actor?
How much time is available to conduct the assessment?	Will this only be a desk study assessment? Is an assessment team to travel? Has a work plan been created? Have the next steps been identified?
Is the assessment feasible, and is it financially and economically viable?	Is it possible to carry out an in-field assessment with regard to the security situation in the whole country? Only the capital? Is the host/recipient country informed about the assessment? Are they on board? Who is? How will an assessment benefit whoever wants it? What type of assessment does the budget allow for? Are the available resources and cost implications clear?
Is there a clear understanding of what the expected results/outcome should be?	Who will be in lead of a full SSR assessment (agency/ institution/organisation) or provide input on certain issues/sectors (experts, consultants)? Will this result in a report? What are the expectations of its content and delivery?
Have risks associated with conducting an assessment been considered?	How will expectations generated by the assessment be addressed?
Existing lesson learned from similar assessment experiences? Linkages to relevant projects? Existing SSR assessments?	Have SSR assessments been conducted by others? When? Any tangible outcomes? If not, why not?

2.2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDED VALUE: SWEDEN'S SSR COMMITMENT

It may be difficult to fully assess the added value of Sweden's potential SSR support, however, initial questions can guide the analysis to ensure that Sweden's potential contributions are worthwhile, sustainable, cost efficient, and will follow the Do No Harm principle.

CHECKLIST 2 – SWEDEN´S SSR ENGAGEMENT	
What is Sweden already doing in-country?	What are the lessons learned from these experiences? Formal/ informal information? Different depending on agencies and organisations? Embassy/representation?
Which, if any, SSR programmes already exist?	Who is supporting what and for how long have they been there? How much money/resources has been invested? Which further funding plans exist? What are the results?
Does Sweden have a comparative advantage or expertise in any area?	How could Sweden contribute to existing programmes? Personnel, funding, exchange, education, advice?
Are there foreseeable negative consequences or possible problems in relation to Swedish support to the security sector, the country, or the region?	Will this support be in line with Swedish foreign policy objectives/development commitments? How could Sweden coordinate with relevant regional organisations?
Which other actors are engaged in SSR activities?	What is Sweden's added value in relation to these actors?

2.3 DESIGNING AN SSR ASSESSMENT – CONSIDERING METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

An SSR assessment should be designed in order to serve broad requirements, such as being able to deliver reports on context, appropriate programmes for implementation, priority areas, potential coordination mechanisms, and the identification of national actors willing to support reform efforts. It is important to acknowledge that assessments are usually conducted under imperfect conditions, and thus can only capture a snapshot of the situation.

The SSR assessment team should assemble as a group before initiating the work; this will not only serve team-building purposes but also assist the team in structuring the work, discussing different elements of the assessment, as well as providing an opportunity to raise concerns and potential challenges.

Issues to consider in designing and planning the assessment include:
• The type of SSR assessment
• The timing for carrying out a SSR assessment
• The type of country subject to the SSR assessment
• Local ownership in ongoing SSR engagement

2.4 TIMING FOR SSR ASSESSMENTS

Numerous factors can prompt the interest and the need for an assessment, including the development of a country strategy paper or the budgeting process and funding cycle. A request can also come directly from a third state, attempting to improve its delivery/provison of security and justice. Other reasons include recent political events, a new window of opportunities for support becomes available, or existing opportunity change. Other significant events such as the outbreak of war, a natural disaster, or a rise in crime can provoke the need to support the security sector. The completion of an existing program where a follow-on project is anticipated may also prompt the need to conduct an assessment.

It is important to keep in mind that there is no perfect time for carrying out SSR assessments. The objective is to provide a basis analysis from which further SSR engagement can be built. Issues to keep in mind include:
• The dynamic nature of security means that assessments quickly become outdated.
• While it may be difficult to conduct assessments in quickly changing or conflict prone environments, there may be certain elements that could be assessed.

2.5 SSR ASSESSMENTS IN HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT

A country in conflict is not a country in vacuum. Key determinants informing a SSR assessment can be found whether a country is experiencing armed conflict, or is performing a transition to democracy. Obviously a key consideration in order to engage in SSR analysis during a situation of conflict is that of conflict-sensitive approaches with a strong focus on "Do no harm". An assessment during a conflict stage will also weigh heavier on secondary sources, as travel to the country in question may prove difficult.

Without a functioning State or institutions, or in situations where the state is a party in a violent conflict, there may still be relevant aspects to consider while assessing potential SSR support. Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the country may be a major factor for insecurity. The situation for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) can be particularly precarious in a conflict situation. Information on ethnic/religious/gender dimensions of a conflict is relevant to assess sources of insecurity. The role of the private sector in delivering security may have had an impact on the context.

2.6 OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Local ownership of SSR processes and SSR responses are key considerations in successful donor assistance. The assessment should seek to identify to what extent relevant stakeholders support potential reform processes, or at least if there is a process in which these stakeholders have a say.

Assessing local ownership is difficult at the planning stage, since it does require consultative participation of key stakeholders. Government leadership as well as widespread civil society participation in the SSR process can be important ownership indicators. Issues to consider include:

• Transparency and accountability towards national stakeholders throughout the SSR assessment phase.

• Engagement with groups as diverse as possible and representatives of the society as a whole

• If stakeholders are left out of the consultations or implementation of the reform process, should Sweden work to support a wider constituency or not engage at all in biased intervention?

• Who are the bilateral actors? Which organisations are involved in ongoing SSR work? Who do they represent? Do they have legitimacy?

2.7 ASSESSMENT CONSTRAINTS IN SSR

Challenges and risks in relations to SSR assessments should be considered before undertaking such a process. Some of these challenges can be prevented; others are just important to be aware of before making general conclusions or developing programs.

POTENTIAL SSR ASSESSMENT CHALLENGES	
Complexity of the security sector	Security and justice institutions and actors can be difficult to recognise and may operate in very unfamiliar ways. Particularly assessing non-state security mechanisms may require more time and special expertise.
Following a Comprehensive Approach to SSR	While SSR principles aim for security and justice issues to be approached from a holistic and comprehensive manner, this may not be possible in an assessment and should be kept in mind. Timing, scope, and resources available may restrict such an approach.
Assessments will be incomplete/insufficient time	Assessments will rarely be both broad and deep. It is important to note that issues such as the terms of reference, or available time will mean that the results of the assessment are only the tip of the iceberg. Consider follow-on assessments to ensure that programmes remain relevant and to capture changing contexts.
Secrecy and Sensitivity of security	The secrecy of security information may hinder or delay the process of gathering information for assessment purposes.
Partner government expectations/outcomes	Partner governments or institutions may have funding or programming expectations following an assessment. Sharing thoughts and ambitions too openly can be problematic as well. Alternatively, local stakeholders may perceive the outcome of the assessment as threatening. Therefore managing partner expectations early on in the process may be useful.
General insecurity	The level/intensity of civil strife will have an impact on the assessment. This might make it impossible or more difficult to conduct an in-field assessment. Also, the perceived notion of insecurity might dissuade locals from participating in interviews or workshops.

POTENTIAL SSR ASSESSMENT CHALLENGES

Gathering local data	Gathering local information either in the desk–study phase or in–country, one should consider that: Media sources may not be accurate or may be censored Statistics tend to be highly unreliable, particularly for crime and justice indicators, especially considering that crimes are often underreported Initial impressions of existing issues may be symptoms rather than causes Local "representatives" are rarely representative of all the views in governments, communities, ethnic, or social groups.
Donor Bias	Assessments will be biased by preconceptions or assumptions of the governments, culture and value systems, or even specific donor interests. Team members must be aware of this and keep an open mind throughout the assessment process.
Expertise for SSR assessment	It is a challenge to find assessment specialists that can approach SSR from a wide system perspective. Therefore, the process of gathering experts to exchange information is crucial to obtain a comprehensive assessment.

BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

3.1 PREPARATORY ANALYSIS

The preparatory analysis will include initial research to prepare a background report on the country and support the preparation for an assessment trip. This process includes conducting a comprehensive desk study to grasp the overall security and justice context. As a general rule, assessments should always seek to address national policies or ongoing processes that would reflect on a national vision for security and SSR. Examples of questions for ensuring a people-centred perspective on security:

• Is there an existing National Security Strategy? Who was responsible for its creation?
• How have existing security policies been developed?
• What do these documents say about the rights to security and safety of individuals?
• Has there been a transparent process with broad participation and with no discrimination?
• Are authorities held accountable to national policies?

CHECKLIST 3 — EXISTING FRAMEWORKS RELEVANT TO THE SSR ASSESSMENT	
What are the legal and strategic frameworks that set the stage for an SSR assessment?	Relevant Peace Agreements Resolutions (UN Security Council, African Union Security Council etc)? Regional policies (AU, ASEAN, OAS etc)? Is there a national security strategy in place? If yes, when was it adopted and how did this development process take place?
Which information can be found where?	UD (MFA) including embassies Sida (HQ) and Sida offices in the field Other ministries (MoD, Justice etc) MUST Säpo RPS, RKP, Tullverket, KVV or other agencies with particular information Forumsyd and other relevant NGO's (Diaspora – careful, can provide biased information) Academic studies Other relevant institutions with geographical/political/economic experience UN reports (country reports, reports from the special rapporteurs etc), UPR reports of the Human Rights Council International/local NGOs

CHECKLIST 3 — EXISTING FRAMEWORKS RELEVANT TO THE SSR ASSESSMENT	
Is there an existing Poverty Reduction Strategy?	How has this been developed? Has there been a transparent process with broad participation and with no discrimination?
Does Sweden already have an existing country strategy for the specific country?	If so, what is said about SSR or SSR-related issues? How is Security Sector Reform relevant for the rights perspective and the perspective of the poor?
Is Sweden preparing a project cycle in another area of relevance for SSR?	Governance in sector operations Rule of Law Gender Regional
Is there a request for support from a national government? (Is the government legitimate?)	Can any actor within the particular country be involved in the fact-finding/assessment to ensure local/national ownership – without creating excessive expectations?
Is there a request for support from an international actor (bilateral donor or multilateral organisation)?	Does this narrow the scope of the assessment to specific sectors?
What other actors have been involved in SSR in this particular situation?	What does this mean for the Swedish SSR assessment? Entry points? Making existing plans redundant?
What are the known or upcoming engagements that could serve as entry points for a comprehensive SSR support?	UN engagement ESDP missions/EU Commission work? Swedish project cycles? Other bilateral projects/activities?

3.2 CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The main objectives of conducting contextual analysis are to: understand the context in which a support to SSR will be provided; understand the interaction between the intervention and the context and to; act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to minimize negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

CHECKLIST 4 – CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Political Analysis

What is the historical context of the country? In which development phase is the state?	Colonial rule/Long-standing democracy/Military rule/Autocratic Developing/rebuilding/fragile/post-conflict
What does the political structure or system look like?	Is the political system sufficiently stable to receive external support? What is the situation regarding corruption? What are the political trends? What is the composition of the ruling elite?
General capacity, responsiveness, and legitimacy to provide the public good and service of justice and safety? Is the government delivering (or causing insecurity)?	Which security threats do the state face? External: belligerent neighbours, regional context, international interests? Internal: ethnic tensions, warlords, organised crime, natural disasters, epidemics, widespread poverty or inequalities? What are the levels of Gender Based Violence? Are child soldiers an issue? How was the security architecture built? Is it protecting the rights of the individual? Is the government responsive to needs?

Conflict Dynamics

Who are the key stakeholders? The main conflicting parties? Visible power structures?	Would an SSR-process come in as a preventive measure, or as a post-conflict stabilisation measure?
How is formal and informal power and authority distributed in society?	Central/local level, elite groups/people in general, majorities/minorities, classes/races, ethnicities/ages/gender/clans/elders
Which are the major conflicts of interests related to power/powerlessness, politics of poverty and democratization processes?	What is the division of power and control over state security?
What can be said about the conflict dynamics within the Government itself?	How is the representation divided between the different governance structures, parliament, executive and legislative?
Distribution of land and other economic resources	Can the possibilities for livelihood be predicted?
Degree of political power centralised to a particular ethnic, religious or political group	
What is the role of women in political/social/economic life?	How are women organised? NGOs? Political structures?
Population's fear of insecurity	Has there been any statistics produced on level of crime and the types of crimes? Any gender dimensions on recorded violence? Are women or men particularly targeted in specific contexts?
What is the level of criminal activities in the country?	

CHECKLIST 4 – CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons	Type of weapons? Outspread arms trade as a source of power? Illicit trade with which countries? Legislation concearning civilian possession of small arms? Are there statistics available on the impact of arms?
International/regional aspects affecting the conflict situation	Potential spill-over effects from regional and/or internal conflicts in neighboring countries; refugees, armed groups etc.?
High population density in relation to resources	Urban vs. rural tensions?
Refugees and IDPs	Are there large numbers of displaced persons? What is the reason for displacement? What are their security concerns? Have their concerns been addressed?
What is the state's capacity to respond to grievances or complaints of human rights abuses or lack of protection of human rights?	Is their security situation improving or worsening? If yes, who is affected?
The rights of the individual	Has the country made some reservations? Is the country reporting? How is the country approaching the challenges reported?
Has the country ratified the main international conventions?	For example the UN Convention Against Tortue, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Are Human Rights an important component in the country's policy work and legal framework?	Is everyone entitled to Human Rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status? For reference, see; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and; the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity.
To what extent are Human Rights considered in the constitution and other legislation?	
Which threats towards national/territorial security can be mentioned?	Are certain groups affected differently? Are there rural and urban dimensions? Does the country have any problems with law and order problem or a national security problem? Are women and men vulnerable to different types of insecurity and injustice? Is there an armed violence problem? Are there foreign armed groups operating within the country?
What are the most frequent and serious types of insecurity and injustice?	Are statistics on sexual violence, gender-based violence or ethnic violence available? Is trafficking of human beings an issue? Is the availability of arms an issue? Illegitimate trade of some sort?

CHECKLIST 4 – CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Which other relevant issues can be mentioned that influence the situation of people-centred security?	Does a National Security Policy that encapsulates this vision exist? Is there an acceptance of civilian supremacy over the security forces? Can information be collected from existing surveys and statistics like the Human Development Index?
What are the general concerns of the population, their hopes and fears for the future in relation to security and justice?	Are there informal responses? Which main problems should an SSR strategy address? Who does the population look to for in protection and justice? Is there a rural and urban dimension to security and the resolution of disputes?
How do people cope with insecurity and injustice?	What is the prevalence of traditional justice and/or parallel structures?
What can be said about the situation in relation to non-discrimination and empowerment of the individual?	

Suggested analytical tools to use (Annex C):
• ABC triangle
• SWOT analysis
• Indexes measuring level of Governance, Rule of Law, Equality etc.
• FAST

3.3 ACTORS MAPPING

The main objective of conducting an actors mapping is to identify different stakeholders , their relationships, their control of power or the control of issues that are directly or indirectly impacting the delivery of security and justice. Therefore, the analysis would be looking at actors, needs, interests and positions.

3.4 OWNERSHIP OF SSR ASSESSMENTS

One main goal for all assessments should be to maximise local ownership and ensure the involement of local partners in the process. Understanding and addressing people's security perceptions and attitudes is critical for the success of any SSR intervention. Given the initial findings of contextual analysis and actors mapping it should be possible to identify actors that need to be approached. The population's own fear of insecurity/de-mands for security is an important factor in identifying threats and opportunities and thus supporting interven-tions that are people-centred and sustainable. The capa-city of the state to respond to grievances or complaints due to human rights abuses or lack of protection of human rights is also an important factor.

The relationship between different actors and their commitment to a process of change, of change, may make the involvement of local representatives during the assessment process. Balancing the need for ownership of the assessment process against the potential bias of having a local stakeholder involved must be carefully considered. Working together with local actors can help to ensure that the objective and approach of the propo-sed engagements are in line with the needs and concerns of the population.

CHECKLIST 5 – MAPPING THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Who are the relevant actors?	Main political/conflicting parties/influencing actors/other political actors not involved in conflict/civil society? NGO:s religious groups; traditional communities; media etc/business community; marginalised groups?
Can Sweden be placed in a relationship with these actors?	How would an intervention influence the conflict dynamics? Positively or negatively for whom? Which relationships could be used as entry points?
Given the political issues, which actors could influence or become drivers for change?	It is critical to analyse the democratic structure and culture of the political parties. Transparency, openness, participation and accountability are essential factors. Is there a separation of power within the democratic structure?
Is there an inclusive and coherent mechanism in place that can ensure the involvement of a wide range of actors in a national SSR-process? If so, is it legitimate?	
Are there stakeholders that are not part of the security/conflict analysis upon which a possible SSR process can have an impact?	
What are the relationships of power between different groups classified for example according to gender or ethni-city?	
Is there a need for a more comprehen-sive stakeholder assessment?	
On which level are the stakeholders active (influential)?	Are there sub-national dimensions to the conflict?
What are the relationships between the stakeholders?	How can these relationships be presented? Alliances? Close contacts? Broken relationships? Confrontation? Is there a gender divide in the distribution of power? How is the social fabric influenced by gender structures, ethnic structures, elite connections? The ones who hold power: why are they conside-red legitimate?
Which key issues between the parties/ stakeholders should be mentioned as obstacles or possible drivers for change?	
Which type of traditional/religious con-flict resolution/arbitration mechanisms can be mentioned?	What are the linkages between formal law and customary law and the structures-how do these linkages affect people in terms of gender, age, class and ethnicity?

Suggested analytical tools to use (Annex C):
• Actors mapping
• The Pyramid
These analytic tools are further explained in Annex C.

IN-COUNTRY ASSESSMENT PHASE

4.1 IN-COUNTRY ASSESSMENT ISSUES

The SSR assessment trip is not only to complement and add analysis to the background phase, but also to understand and distinguish which type of intervention would have a positive impact on the system level. Local knowledge and information will contribute to the understanding of the context.

BROAD SSR ISSUES	
Assessing the broad security and justice context • **What is the security and justice situation like?**	• Which types of security threats does the state face? Which types of threats do individuals face? (international/regional war, civil war, insurgency, petty crime, street gangs, organized crime, mob violence, arms and narcotics trafficking, HIV/AIDS, resource based conflicts?) • Is there/was there an internal conflict? What was its nature/root causes? • Are there regional tensions? Which role does this state have in stabilising or destabilising the region? • Who actually delivers security and justice? • Which actors in society actually have power and influence over security and justice issues? • What is the availability of small arms and/or other weapons?
Assessing the broad political context • **What does the political system/situation look like?**	• Which type of political system is in place? Is there confidence in this system and/or in the current government? • How are political decisions made? Who makes these decisions? What are the checks and balances? • Is the state functioning? Do administrative structures exist? Are rule of law agencies working? • What is the delivery capacity of the state? Are essential services being delivered? Is anyone else delivering 'public goods'? Is security provision considered a 'public good'?

BROAD SSR ISSUES	
Assessing the broad economic context • **What does the economic system/ situation look like?**	• Which economic resources exist? • How does the majority of citizens make a living? • How are economic resources distributed (in terms of groups of people, geographic areas, gender)? • Are there informal economies? • What is the level of corruption? • How would the economy react to rapid macroeconomic changes?
Assessing the broad social context • **What does society look like?**	• Are there some individuals/groups that are more influential in society, and/or over the general security and justice agenda? • Are there particular marginalised groups (due to gender, ethnicity, religion, societal class, economic disempowerment)? What is the balance of power? Are their security and justice needs being met? • Are there tensions between different social groups? • What are the country's demographics (youth vs. elderly, urban vs. rural, population density, literacy rates), and do these have any impact on security and justice?

4.2 MAPPING THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTORS

As the security and justice sector is vast, the terms of reference and the initial assessment plan can help prioritise the mapping effort. The various security and justice actors and institutions that could be considered include:

Core State Security Providers (mandated to use force)	• Armed Forces • Police • Gendarmeries • Paramilitary forces • Presidential guards • Intelligence and security services • Coast guards • Border guards • Customs authorities • Reserve or local security units

Other actors influencing the security and justice sector	• Informal and non-state security and justice actors (customary and traditional leaders, secret societies, neighbourhood watch groups, liberation armies, guerrilla armies, war lords, vigilante groups, criminal groups) • Political party militias • Private security and military companies • Civil society (in particular groups that have particular knowledge or influence over security and justice issues) • Think tanks, NGOs • Academic/research institutions • Media • Religious institutions

Security Management and Oversight Bodies:	• The executive (President, Prime Minister, Government) • Legislative (Parliament, House of Representatives) • Legislative Committees • National security advisory bodies • Ministries/Agencies (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, National Security) • Budget/audit office • Municipal or local governments • Customary and traditional authorities

Justice and Public Security Bodies:	• Ministries (Justice, Internal Affairs) • Judiciary • Criminal investigation units • Prosecution services • Military courts and tribunals • Prisons • Correctional services • Human rights commissions/ombudsperson • Public Complaints bodies • Customary and traditional justice systems

Analysing various sectors can reveal whether the roles and capabilities that are required of security providers are adequately defined and supported by financial, technical, and human resources. This process can also reveal the interest and potential for reform.

The assessment should link sectoral assessments with the understanding of the political context and identified prioritised areas relevant to SSR.

Five main themes can be broadly examined when assessing the security system or a specific sector:
1. Main stakeholders/actors
2. Normative/regulatory frameworks and culture/norms
3. Capacity and service delivery levels
4. Oversight and governance
5. Management, budget and resources

1. Identifying main stakeholders/actors	• Who is involved in this sector/institution? • How many people work in this sector? How many of them are uniformed? • What are the different subunits within this institution? • How many women are in this sector/institution? Do they have positions of authority? • What is the ethnic/religious/socio-economic composition of this sector/institution? • What is the relation between the actors in this sector and other security institutions, the executive, the legislative, the judiciary, or other influential groups in society? • Which other relationships does this sector have with foreign actors? • Who are the potential agents of change? Who in this sector would support a reform process? Which groups would oppose reforms?

2. Identifying normative/regulatory frameworks and culture/norms	• Are there clear legal and constitutional provisions with regard to the role and function of this specific sector? Are they enforceable? • What are the roles, missions and functions of this sector? • Is there a specific security strategy for this sector? (e.g. national security strategy, crime prevention, national defence) • Does this sector/institution have a code of conduct? • What is the chain of command? What is the hierarchy of this institution? • Is the mandate of this sector to protect the rights of the individual, or to protect the state? • Is the mandate of this specific sector clear in relation to other security and justice sectors? • Is this actor/institution apolitical? Does it have specific political interests or ties? • Is there respect for human rights? Are these incorporated into laws, training, or doctrine? • Does this institution possess the authority arrest criminals? • Are the rules and regulations governing the use of force codified in legislation or established policies? Does this sector follow these rules? Is there adherence to democratic principles?
3. Identifying capacity and service delivery levels	• Which capabilities does this sector/system possess and maintain to perform their stated mission? • Which specific actions is this actor engaged in? (internal/external security, peace operations, crime prevention, over–sight…) • How effectively is this actor able to do its job? (i.e. prevent crime) • Are the services provided by this sector accessible (in terms of location, affordability, timeliness, and cultural relevance) to ordinary citizens? • Does this sector operate according to the principles of human rights? • How are security/threats assessments identified? • Does this sector provide services taking into account the different needs of gender, ethnic groups, and minority groups? • Does this sector pose a threat to any other security or justice sector? • Are there measurable statistics available to account for the performance of this sector? • Does this sector cooperate or coordinate with other security or justice institutions?

4. Identifying oversight and governance	• What is the system of accountability? • Does this institution have internal codes of conduct, employee (including whistleblower) protections and systems in place to encourage internal reporting? • Are internal codes of conduct promulgated? If not, why? • Which relevant Ministries or agencies oversee this specific sector? • Does the legislative possess the competence and political will to effectively oversee budget and policy decisions? Does it possess sufficient resources (financial, human, material) to fulfil this role? • Is the oversight of this sector carried out at the national, provincial or county, and local level? • Is this sector regularly audited? • Is the formation and execution of policy priorities by this sector transparent and participatory? • Is there a system that allows the violation of rights and freedoms for the sake of security? (e.g. telephone intercepts and surveillance) • Are there regular defence and/or security review? Are civilian actors engaged? If so, how? • Are certain positions (i.e. management) in this sector filled by civilians or uniformed personnel? • What are the public attitudes towards this sector or institution? How legitimate is this sector (formal or informal) according to relevant stakeholders? • Do outside groups (NGOs, media, think-tanks) monitor this specific sector? Are they effective? Do they have access to resources and information? Are they qualified? Do they have sufficient space or political freedom to operate freely and express their opinions?

5. Identifying management, budget and resources	• What percentage of GDP is the budget for this security or justice sector? • Are there adequate financial, material, and human resources? Is this security sector properly equipped (e.g. weapons, uniforms, vehicles)? • Are there links between policy, planning, and the budget? Is the budget driven by a strategy? • How is this sector structured, managed and led? • What is the pay for this sector? Is it sufficient? Is it regular? • What is the degree of corruption in this sector/institution? • Are there off-budget finances to support a specific security sector? If so, how are they collected (e.g. hotel ownership, national lotteries, extortion) • Is this security sector subject to the same rules of budget oversight as other sectors? • How is the Human Resources function structured? Does it function well? • Is there a recruitment policy to ensure enrolment of women? Minority groups? • What are the systems of control of resources and equipment, staff management, unit logistics and individual or unit training? • Is this sector properly trained?

Additional Resources on assessing specific SSR sectors can be found in Annex A.

4.3 IDENTIFICATION OF SSR PARTNERS

The analysis will determine how Swedish policies and programs can complement and supplement existing SSR activities. When examining the various international and/or regional actors involved in SSR, the assessment can consider:
• All existing activities supported by Sweden should be identified (together with their partners).
• Bilateral stakeholders
• Multilateral stakeholders
• What is the relation of the identified actor to important political or influential actors or groups?
• What is the level of support, influence, or leverage held by this donor?

• What comparative advantage or expertise does this specific donor offer?
• What kind of success/impact has this donors' activities/ strategies already had?
• What kind of cooperation arrangements exist between Sweden and the actors concerned?

Suggested analytical tools to use (see Annex C):
• Octagon
• Stakeholder mapping
• Capacity Assessment
• PESTLE

1) SSR assistance programs are likely to be supported by a variety of actors, not only development agencies, but also by military groups and ministries of foreign affairs. The assessment team will have to consult with a wide array of counterparts to get a complete picture of the assistance context
2) This can include UN agencies (UNDP, UNDPKO, UNICEF, UNDOC, Mine Action, UNHCR), the World Bank, and relevant regional organisations

SSR ASSESSMENT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW

The main objective of a methodological review is to analyse and review the obtained information in order to identify existing gaps and key areas for consideration.

Certain areas may be identified where there is a need for follow-up visits or deeper assessments.

CHECKLIST 6 – REVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES	
Are all relevant actors covered in the assessment?	Are existing informal networks known and taken into account?
Was the gathered information adequate?	Is the assessment comprehensive enough? Are the needs of men, women, boys, girls, ethnic groups, minorities, rural versus urban populations appropriately addressed?
Has information been manipulated or wrongly portrayed?	Is there a risk that the analysis will be flawed based on biased sources of information? Can the information be triangulated?
Can any specific areas be identified where there is a need for a deeper assessment?	Which other actors are working on the perception of security and how can this data be collected?
Given the conflict mapping and actors analysis of important issues, which stakeholders are not yet included in the common security perception?	Can they be reached? Surveys? Workshops? Can other actors (NGOs, consultants) be assigned the task of collecting and analysing additional information?
Will there need to be a more in-depth follow-up?	Which areas are missing?
Has there been a way to ensure local/national ownership on SSR?	Have locals participated in the assessment? Have the views of the locals been reflected through surveys etc?
Can the information be verified/triangulated?	

5.2 TRIANGULATION

Triangulating collected information and impressions against stakeholders that have not been involved in the assessment process is a way to test the relevance of potential recommendations.

5.3 RISK ANALYSIS AND ENTRY POINTS

Having defined the end-goal for reform, conducting a risk analysis should clarify which next steps to undertake. External intervention may tilt the power relation and stability in the recipient country in a negative way or there may be other political risks associated with the engagement of external actors. The risks of supporting a SSR process should always be weighed against the risks for local beneficiaries.

The assessment of the capacity and commitment to SSR of local authorities can be complemented with and evaluated against a threats analysis. It can also be complemented with the analysis of international and regional aspects influencing the situation, and of whether a potential intervention will have negative or positive consequences. Within such a context, issues such as widespread criminal activities; access to SALW; high population density in relation to scarce resources; refugees and IDPs etc should also be considered.

CHECKLIST 7 – RISK, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGE	
Do partners recognise the need both to improve the effectiveness of the security system and to strengthen its governance and oversight?	
Is there a risk that external pressure for reform will influence power relations and stability in a negative way?	Certain functions might need to be left intact for the time being in order not to create more ambiguity and insecurity.
Which opportunities - drivers for change - can be identified that will help create a more stable environment in which a SSR process can be implemented?	Are there any opportunities to build on political commitments, dialogue and understanding of security issues that may result in an improved environment?
What seems to be the attitude towards change?	Amongst different actors and amongst different individuals within targeted organisations.
Would a SSR process contribute to reducing/closing capacity gaps between different security actors (i.e. courts, the police, prisons, ombudsmen-institutions)? What are the expectations of reform?	How would for example a particular strategy to train and enhance the capacity of the national police relate to the situation of the rest of the criminal justice and correction system?
Is there a certain region of the country where there is a particular need?	Where should the focus of the efforts be placed? Why?
Are there any concerns regarding the relationship between different sectors that would influence a particular strategy?	
Is the Government involved in political programmes/initiatives that could provide an entry point for SSR?	Is there a programme of decentralisation or civil service reform?

CHECKLIST 7 – RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Has the country been through a SSR process before?	What were the results? Is there currently a fatigue towards "external initiatives"? Has there been a follow-up to previous processes?
Given the conflict mapping and actors analysis of important issues, are there identified actors that need to be approached?	
What is the best way to reach these actors?	Statistical surveys/NGO-networks/International offices (OSCE etc)
What other international actors are present on the ground and active in SSR related matters?	Are the results from the assessment in line with ongoing thinking at the international level? How can the assessment tie into ongoing political processes in Brussels and New York?
Which arrangements can be made to ensure that potential engagement is harmonized and complementary to other international initiatives?	
Where/how is Sweden active?	Elsewhere in the region? Through other, non-state, actors?
Which capacities or expertise can Sweden provide?	
Which added value would an engagement in a SSR processes provide?	How do the proposals fit with ordinary country strategies and engagements of other actors on the ground? What is the timeline for engagement?
Will engagement be sustainable?	Which are the potential risks of engaging in SSR? National ownership? Weak national government? Vested interests in the security sector opposing the reform process?
Which impact (positive or negative) will international engagement have on the prospects of reform?	
Which actions need to be taken in order to engage different actors in the reform process?	

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Efforts should be made to make sure that the goals set by the Terms of Reference are met. To the extent that specific programming advice can be given, it should be tied to the recommendations, making them as operational as possible. Additionally, formulating expected outcomes of each recommendation would be a way of preparing the work to establish baseline and benchmark criteria, while also ensuring that proposed areas of support address real needs.

An assessment is always a snapshot of a particular situation at a given moment in time. This mean that results will "expire" and the sooner recommendations can be turned into practical activities, the more useful the assessment has been.

In relation to other international actors it is crucial to identify the added value of Swedish support and associated risks. The chart below provides a method to illustrate sectoral needs in relation to entry points for Swedish actors and a rough timeline for interventions but also of the donor structures, which will help manage expectations.

Stakeholders	Issues to consider:						
	Institution addressed in a national security strategy	Does have an elaborated strategic plan/reform plan	Oversight mecha-nisms in place	Capacity of administra-tive organisa-tion	Obtain direct or indirect SSR support/by what actors?	Possible entry points for Swedish actors	Timing for support
National Police Authority	Yes Key role	Yes		Weak admin structure			
Prison Service						Training on use of force	Nov 2009
Armed Forces					MoU between X and X country		
Coast Guards							
Courts							
Border Management							
Media							
Non Govern-mental Organisations							
Etc.							

5.5 IDENTIFICATION OF BASELINE/BENCHMARKING CRITERIA

A thorough analysis of the security situation, the needs of the general public, and institutional capacity of relevant security actors can serve as parameters of a baseline. Future goals and targets can be defined out of this baseline and indicators formulated to measure the fulfilment of each goal.

Supporting SSR processes is not exclusively about sustaining outcome in the traditional sense, but also to seek and sustain a process of change. The target and goals may not be measurable as they are not static, but part of a dynamic and evolutionary process. Considera-tions should be given to people's perception of security and their vision of a future reformed security sector.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

SWEDISH POLICY FRAMEWORKS

- "Svensk inriktning avseende säkerhetsektorreform (SSR)" (Swedish guidance document on Security Sector Reform) Regeringskansliets Promemoria 2007-11-05

- "Sveriges politik för global utveckling" (Government-Communication on the Global Development politics of Sweden) Policy 2008; Skr 2007/08:89

- "Ett fokuserat bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete" (Swedish priorities and focus on country strategies in development aid) available at: www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/66/07/365febc3.pdf)

- "Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet" (The

Swedish government bill on a national strategy for participation in international peace and security operations); skr. 2007/08:51

- "Nationellt ansvar och internationellt engagemang – En nationell strategi för att möta hotet från terrorism" (The Comprehensive Swedish strategy to combat terrorism); Skr. 2007/08:64

- Swedish National Police Board. Handbook for International Development Cooperation. Division for International Coordination. September 2008. Avaiable at http://www.polisen.se/en/English/Service/Publications/Hallare/Handbook-for-international-development/

MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS: DOCUMENTS AND HANDBOOKS

UNITED NATIONS
- Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict: Report of the UN Secretary-General (A/63/881–S/2009/304)

- UN Security Council Resolution on Women Peace and Conflict (S/RES/1325 (2000))

- In Larger Freedom - towards development, security and human rights for all: Report of the UN Secretary-General (A59/2005)

- Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the UN Secretary-General (A/62/659 – S/2008/39)

- Template of UN system capacity development tools: www.undg.org

OECD DAC
- OECD (2004). Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Available from: www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr

- OECD (2007). The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice. Available from: www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/ssr

- Training Module on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD 2007)

EUROPEAN UNION
- Guiding Framework for EU SSR Assessments (Nov 2009)

- European Security Strategy; A secure Europe in a better world (2003);

- EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform Council of the European Unions, Brussels, (13/10/2005, 12566/4/05 REV 4)

- A Concept for European Communit y Support for

Security Sector Reform Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, (24/05/2006, COM(2006) 153 final)

- Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform (2736th General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006)

AFRICAN UNION
- Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) (African Union Excecutive Council: EX. CL/274 (IX))

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) identifies nine core international human rights treaties (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/):

1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965)
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966)
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966)
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (18 December 1979)
5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984)
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989)
7. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (18 December 1990)
8. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (not yet into force)
9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Date of entry into force: 3 May 2008)

OTHER REFERENCES

- Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF: www.dcaf.ch

- The International Security Sector Advisory Team ISSAT: www.dcaf.ch/issat

- Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit; eds Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (DCAF, OECD/ODiHR, UN-INSTRAW 2008) http://www.dcaf.ch/gender-security-sector-reform/

- Gender Force: www.genderforce.se

- Human security report 2005, (Oxford University press, Inc)

- The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index)

- Stability Assessment Framework: designing Integrated Response for Security, Governance and Development (Clingendael Institute January 2005)

- Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System reform (Conference in the Hague 9-10 April 2008; the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Clingendael Institute)

- Working with Conflict; Skills and Strategies for Action; Fisher, Agdi at al. (Zed Books Ltd/Responding to conflict)

- Understanding and supporting SSR (DFID ISBN: 1 86192 473 9)

- Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (2007). "A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)." Available from: www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR_A_Beginners_Guide_ to_SSR_v2.pdf

- Coyle, Andrew. A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management: Handbook for Prison Staff. International Centre for Prison Studies. 2002. http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf2/fco_pdf_prisonreformhandbook

- Global Rights: www.globalrights.se

- FIDH – Fédération Int des Ligues des Droits de l´Homme (Paris): www.fidh.org

- Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights (Stockholm): www.humanrights.se

- ICHRP – International Council of Human Rights Policy (Versoix): www.ichrp.org

- OMCT – Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture (Geneva): www.omct.org

- APT – Association Against the Prevention of Torture: www.apt.org

- International Alert: www.international-alert.org

EXAMPLE OF STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS MATRIX

ANALYSIS MATRIX	
Stakeholder and basic characteristics	Example: Community organised vigilante groups, made up of young men, patrol the streets at night and deal with suspected criminals
Interests and how affect the situation /problem(s)	Dissatisfied with current police action
	Concerned with current security situation in the village
	Get tangible benefits of patrolling neighbourhood
Capacity and motivation to bring about change	Keen interest to safeguard community
	Keen interest to be recognized for service provided to the community
	Appear willing to cooperate with police
Possible action to address stakeholder interests	Support better dialogue with local police
	Identify/develop alternative income sources for the young men
	Work with communities to address security issues

ANALYTICAL TOOLS

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Mapping is a technique used to illustrate relevant actors, their respective relationships and important issues at stake. Drawing this essential information into a graph helps to create a better understanding of the situation, to clarify where the power lies and to identify openings for intervention or action. A conflict mapping should try to answer the following questions:

CONFLICT MAPPING

Who are the actors?

Main conflicting parties, but also other actors and stakeholders such as:
• Marginalised groups (could also be potential conflicting parties)
• Political parties not involved in the conflict
• Civil society (NGO:s, religious groups, traditional communities, media etc.)
• Business actors
• External actors (with a positive or negative influence)
• From a SSR perspective, do not forget to include actors that have a particular position within the security system although they are not an active party of the conflict, if there is one.
• The structure of the state and its different agencies/military etc.

This is particularly important when the aim is to understand entry points and needs for an overall SSR process. What control do the parties have over security functions of the state? Are any of these functions active parties of a conflict?

OTHER ACTORS INFLUENCING THE SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

What are the relationships between all these actors and how can these be presented on the map?

Alliances? Close contacts? Broken relationships? Confrontation?

Which key issues between the parties should be mentioned?

Which underlying causes can be found to the conflict? (Outspoken and hidden – can be illustrated as issues or kept as general information)

Division of power and control over state security

Distribution of land and other economic resources

Degree of political power centralised to a particular ethnic, religious or political group

Ideological debates

The Population's fear of insecurity

Widespread criminal activities

International/regional aspects affecting the conflict situation

High population density in relation to scarce resources

What is the country's historical context?

Colonial rule? Long-standing democracy? Military rule?

Where are you on the map? Which special qualifications and relationships can you use to influence the situation? Would external intervention (you) at this stage influence the situation negatively or positively?

MAPPING OF ACTORS AND ISSUES

Below is an example of how mapping can be illustrated. The strength of this method is that it visualises power relationships and possible entry points. Seeing SSR as a process, however, the surrounding circumstances are changing constantly and a snap shot of the situation does not necessarily reflect the dynamic environment. Therefore, this kind of mapping may need to be performed repeatedly over a longer period of time.

Example of a basic conflict map:

ACTOR C

ACTOR B

ACTOR F

ISSUE

ACTOR A

ACTOR E

ACTOR F

EXTERNAL ACTORS

Circles indicate parties involved in the situation; relative size = power in regard to the issue

Straight lines indicate links; fairly close relationships

Double connecting lines indicate an alliance

Arrows indicate the predominant direction of influence or activity

Dotted lines indicate informal or intermittent links

Double lines like a wall across single lines indicate a broken connection

Zig-zag lines indicate discord, conflict

Squares/rectangles indicate issues, topics or things other than people

Large shadows show external actors, which have influence but are not directly involved

Source: Working with conflict, skills and strategies for action. Fisher et al. 2007, Zed Books.

THE PYRAMID – MULTI LEVEL ANALYSIS

Not only does a security system involve different sectors, the sectors may also include actors at different levels of society. Engaging only in one sector or at one level in society is usually insufficient to bring about lasting change. Making a multi-level analysis of the context helps locate critical resource people who are strategically placed and embedded in networks that connect them vertically within the setting and horizontally in the overall situation. This approach can also make it easier to locate people who have the ability to work with counterparts across the lines of division. Such people can become key allies for working within the various levels as well as working simultaneously at all levels.

The pyramid is a graphic tool that shows different levels of stakeholders to help identify key actors at each level, in order to consider ways to build links between different levels and to decide which type of approaches or actions are appropriate at each level. With limited resources, this is also a way to decide where to focus one's energy.

A mapping can be done within the triangle structure to illustrate where the people who are in position either to make (1) or to influence (2) key decisions can be found, where the main exercise of power is visible (3) or where there are flows (4) of influence on attitudes or opinions. A similar triangle can also be made to illustrate the international community's engagement in the context. Presented side by side, relations between local/national networks and external actors can be compared.

Level 1: Top leadership
Military/political leaders
with high visibility, International,
organisations, Government officials

Level 2: Middle-range Leadership
Leaders respected in sectors Ethnic/
religious leaders, Academics/intellectuals,
Humanitarian leaders (NGO:s)

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership
Local leaders/Elders, NGO and community
workers, Officials, women's and youth groups,
Refugee camp leaders, Activists

AFFECTED POPULATION

Many

Source: Working with conflict, skills and strategies for action. Fisher et al. 2007. Zed Books

TRANSFORMATION-ORIENTED PEACE-BUILDING APPROACHES

 John Paul Lederach's approaches to building peace are demonstrated through the leaders at the three different levels of the pyramid; top, middle-range and grassroots leaderships. Each level requires a different focus. At the top level, the focus should be set at high-level negotiations between military or political leaders with high visibility. In a conflict perspective, this level is often led by a visible single mediator and aims to establish a cease-fire. From a SSR perspective, the focus would be to support the implementation of a political agreement while keeping the power balance between the parties.

The middle-range leadership level consists of commission-type of actors. Here, problem solving workshops and training in conflict resolution are more useful tools. The low-level leaders or grassroots leadership are according to Leaderach's model indigenous leaders, health officials or refugee camp leaders that would be part of a local peace commission. The mechanisms to support peace building would be psychosocial work in post-war trauma, prejudice reduction and dialogue and training.

At the top level, the audience for activities are fewer than at the grassroots-level where most of the affected population would be. Leaderach's main point is that peace can only be achieved from within a society, rather than from the involvement of external actors, and that identifying and supporting the forces that can transform a society, is a more effective way to build peace, than to focus on institutions alone.

In similar ways, looking at the political and security situation from a transformational point of view can be useful when trying to identify the type of process which would be needed to reach a level of perceived and actual security for the full population. Combining the conflict mapping with Leaderach's conflict transformation triangle helps in identifying not only which opportunities there are to work with different actors, but also identifying at which level those actors are influential and where there would be a need for change.

Source: John Paul Lederach: Building peace –
Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies,
US Institute for Peace, Washington 1997

MATRIX OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS (ANNEX C)

Tool	Main purpose/description	Suitable for Desk study	Suitable for Country Visit	Macro or Micro analysis	Specific Security Sector Examined / Relevancy to SSR	State, Sector or Individual Security Focus	Reference	Comments
Reference Tools for "Issues to Consider Before Assessment Phase"								
Rule of Law Index	To measure the quality of governance by perceptions of the incidence of crime, judicial quality and honesty and the enforceability of contracts.	✔		Macro	Can reveal level of rule of law situation regarding police, courts, crime and safety.	State	http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp	
Political Terror Scale	Index that rates level of state sanctioned political violence.	✔		Macro	Can reveal level of rule of law situation.	State	www.politicalviolencescale.org	
Strategic Corruption and Governance Index	Tool that analyses underlying root causes of weak governance and pressures for change.	✔		Macro	Over 212 countries listed in an updated index on 6 dimensions of governance.	State	http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp	Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
Illustrative Tools recommended for "Planning Assessment Phase"								
ABC Triangle	Conflict analysis using three main components; context, behaviour of actors involved, and the attitude of those actors.	✔		Both	Can identify both motivations of actors and a starting point for intervention in a conflict.	State/ Sector		
Actor Analysis	This tool helps to illustrate conflict, relevant actors, their respective relationships and issues at stake.	✔	✔	Both	Can help to create an illustrative overview of relevant security actors.	State/ Sector/ Individual	See page 37	Gives a picture of a situation at a given moment in time. May need to be updated regularly.

Tool	Description			Type	Notes	Level	Reference
PESTLE/PESTLESS	A generic 'orientation' tool giving context to what is happening and what effect it will eventually have on the inside of an organisation, project or process.	✓		Macro	PESTLESS encompasses Security and Stakeholders issues as well as the Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological, Legal and Environmental issues covered in PESTLE.	State	http://rapidbi.com/created/the-PESTLEanalysistool.html
The Pyramid – Multi-Level Analysis	Graphic stakeholder analysis tool. Identifies key actors at each level of society, considers ways to build links between different levels and decides which types of approaches or actions are appropriate at each level.	✓	✓	Both	Helps to understand at what level the intervention is taking place and locate critical resource people/allies in a conflict for working with other levels of stakeholders.	State/ Sector/ Individual	See page 38
Positions Interests Needs	Method to help understand the Positions, Interests and Needs of different stakeholders. By focusing on needs and how to find alternative drivers to meet those needs; interests and positions may change.	✓	✓	Micro	Helps answer questions concerning; visions on security; the kind of security governance stakeholders want; what the main elements of their interests are, and; which capacities they have to support or to hamper a process.	Individual	
Mapping of Stakeholders and Their Mandates	Matrix to map key security actors, their respective mandates (with selected focus areas) and to whom they answer within the governance system.	✓	✓	Micro	A matrix can be developed further depending on the context such as the Swedish SSR needs assessment framework.	Sector/ Individual	

MATRIX OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS (ANNEX C)

Illustrative Tools recommended for "Planning Assessment Phase"

Tool	Main purpose/description	Suitable for Desk sutdy	Suitable for Country Visit	Macro or Micro analysis	Specific Security Sector Examined / Relevancy to SSR	State, Sector or Individual Security Focus	Reference	Comments
The Octagon	Institutional analysis of existing resources in relation to problems, goals and the surrounding environment. It aims to analyse the environment in which the organisation is active in order to adapt strategies.		✔	Micro	Aims to analyse the environment in which the security institution or sector is working.	Sector/Individual	www.windevelop.se	Will require some engagement with the organisation/institution in question.
Principal Agent	Method for understanding needs, interests and positions of one's counter part. Helps ensure the provision of appropriate incentives to convince the agents to act in the way principals wish.	✔		Both	A broad and generalized method used mainly for planning purposes.	Sector/Individual		PA approaches may fail to predict correctly either (a) the reasons and the conditions under which political principals delegate powers to agents, or (b) the conditions under which agents enjoy autonomy and influence in politics.
SWOT	Framework to analyse internal Strengths and Weaknesses of an institution or a project and external Opportunities and Threats as influencing mechanisms.	✔	✔	Micro	Can help discover positive and negative potential for an SSR–process and identify actions to improve strengths or to adress weaknesses.	Sector/Individual		Good for simple strength and weakness assessment, but may not develop strategy for what to do next. May become overly simplified. May provoke simplified responses.

Tool	Description			Level	Security description	State, Sector or Individual Security Focus	Source	Limitations
Threats Analysis	Assessments of capacity and commitment within local authorities to be able to recognise threats to potential interventions.	✔	✔	Both	Can be complemented with identification of international and regional aspects influencing the situation: outspread criminal activities; access to small arms and light weapons; high population density in relation to scarce resources; refugees and IDPs etc.	State/Sector	State/Sector	Difficult when conducting reviews and assessments during ongoing conflict situations.
Donor Matrix	Matrix mapping the existing and potential donors and/or programmes helps decide who to take lead on what sectors.	✔		Macro	Mapping of Security Sector donors and/or programmes.	State	www.windevelop.se	Will require some engagement with the organisation/institution in question.
The Evaluation Web	An assessment of the impact of a project in a wider context of the particular situation.	✔			Looks at peace and security projects and programs and evaluates them in a broader context rather than in isolation.	Sector		
Logical Framework Approach	A project-planning tool providing different types of information about events: identifying, preparing, appraising, implementing, monitoring reviewing and evaluating.	✔		Both	Can be used to give a systematic analysis of the security situation, particularly key security problems, and of the options for addressing those problems.	Sector		Difficult not to overestimate objectives and remain flexible with multiple and diverse stakeholders and constant change.
Practical Tools								
FAST	Provides a method for contextual analysis of conflict. Can help identify both positive and negative intervening factors, risk assessments, early.	✔	✔	Both	Provides an overview of causes and development of conflict over time, as well as identifying positive intervening factors for peace-building initiatives.	Tailored to the needs of end-users	www.swisspeace.org/fast/	Methodology is complicated to use and time consuming.

MATRIX OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS (ANNEX C)

Tool	Main purpose/descrpition	Suiteable for Desk sutdy	Suiteable for Country Visit	Macro or Micro analysis	Specific Security Sector Examined / Relevancy to SSR	State, Sector or Individual Security Focus	Reference	Comments
Practical Tools								
UNDP Capacity Assessment	A "systematic" methodology to analyse which key capacities already exist and the additional capacities needed to reach development objectives.	✓	✓	Macro	Help understand the skills, experience and knowledge capacity needed for Security Sector agencies, lines, ministries etc. Follows on from a needs assessment to work on how to change.	Sector	http://www.undp.org/capacity/	
Local Governance Assessment Tool	Democratic governance assessments and indicators that emphasize (i) national ownership, (ii) capacity development and (iii) harmonisation with national development planning instruments.	✓	✓	Micro	Can measure specific areas or thematic issues in the Security Sector.	Sector	http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/flagship/democratic_governance_assessments.html	
DCAF/ INSTRAW Gender and SSR Toolkit Assessment	Checklists of issues to consider in relation to the different security and justice needs, priorities and capacities of men, women, girls and boys. It also gives examples of how to set up gendersensitive indicators.	✓		Both	Provides info on how to integrate gender issues in: SSR, Police, Defence, Justice, Penal, Border Management, Parliamentary Oversight of SS, National Security Policymaking, Civil Society Oversight, Private Military and Security companies, SSR AM&E, and gender training in SSR.	Sector	http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.	

Tool	Description			Level	Focus	Level of analysis	URL	Comments
OECD/DAC Handbook	Checklists of issues to consider and questions to ask relevant stakeholders when conducting an assessment of the democratic accountability of the security and justice system.	✔	✔	Macro	Provides guidance to operationalise the 2005 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance and closes the gap between policy and practice.	State/ Sector/ Indivi-dual	http://www.oecd.org/docum ent/6/0,3343,en_2649_3363 550_37417926_1_1_1_1,00. html	
Governance Assess-ment Handbook	Guiding framework for conducting general gover-nance sector analysis. Templates in which gover-nance and oversight issues of different actors can be illustrated and analysed.	✔	✔	Macro	It contains several templates in which governance and oversight issues of different actors in Security Sector can be illustrated and analysed.	State		An example of program planning cycles recommended by the European Commission.
Community Security Tools	Survey toolkits that can be tailored to understand security and justice concerns amongst the general popula-tion and capture the bottom-up aspects.	✔	✔	Micro	Focused on people's perception of security or attitudes towards security providers.			These survey tools are time consuming, it is suggested that available community tools and resources be used where possible.
Trends Analysis		✔		Both	SAF uses 12 indicators to assess trends in increasing or decreasing instability and conflict potential. SAF can be applied by any organisa-tion working in fragile environments.	State/ Sector	http://www.clingendael.nl/ cscp/	

MATRIX OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS (ANNEX C)

Tool	Main purpose/description	Suitable for Desk sutdy	Suitable for Country Visit	Macro or Micro analysis	Specific Security Sector Examined / Relevancy to SSR	State, Sector or Individual Security Focus	Reference	Comments
Practical Tools								
Benefits/ Harms Handbook	Profile, impact and decision tools to help development actors take responsibility for impacts of their work on people's human rights situation. Provides framework for monitoring potential negative or unintended impacts, as well as ways to mitigate these.	✓	✓	Micro	The methodology is based on three categories of human rights and impacts, one of which is security rights and impacts (e.g. right to life, liberty, security of person, movement, freedom from torture, forced displacement, degrading treatment, sexual assault, arbitrary arrest).	Individual	http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwt. nsf/db900SID/NVEA-5ULK9F?OpenDocument	Needs organisational commitment to make the analysis work.
Check-lists	Provides guidance on how to develop recommendations (see OECD/DAC Handbook).	✓		Macro	Most relevant to desk officers, diplomats and development operations. Early warning and conflict analysis.	State		
Logical Framework Approach	A project planning tool providing different types of information about events: identifying, preparing, appraising, implementing, monitoring, reviewing and evaluating.	✓		Both	Can be used to give a systematic analysis of the security situation, particularly key security problems, and of the options for addressing those problems.	Sector		Difficult to not overestimate objectives and remain flexible with multiple and diverse stakeholders and constant change.

CREAM	CREAM principles reveal that if performance indicators are not Clear, Relevant, Economic, Adequate, and Monitorable, formal indicators will be less useful.	✔	✔	Both	The World Bank advocates the CREAM principles in Key Performance Indicators to develop clear and unambiguous Performance Management Frameworks.	Sector	
SMART	The S.M.A.R.T. method sets objectives that are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-based.	✔	✔	Both	SMART can be used to design and communicate SSR objectives for donors and other stakeholders.	Sector	
Most Significant Change	A project-planning tool for evaluating participatory projects that have diverse outcomes and multiple stakeholders.	✔	✔	Both	Involves the collection of significant change stories emanating from SSR projects in field, and the systematic selection of the most significant of these stories by panels of designated stakeholders.	Sector	http://www.clearhorizon.com.au

The security and justice system is defined by the OECD-DAC as including all those institutions, groups, organisations and individuals — both state and non-state — that have a stake in security and justice provision. The DAC Guidelines on SSR state that the security system includes:

• **Core security actors:** armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).

• **Management and oversight bodies:** the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

• **Justice and the rule of law:** judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.

• **Non-statutory security forces:** liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, political party militias
(OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD 2007)

SSR ACTIVITIES THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

Security system management and reform
Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system, thereby improving democratic governance and civilian control. Technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme. Budgetary actions taken in order to improve democratic control of defence funding and as part of public expenditure management programmes would be eligible — unlike, for example, providing technical co-operation to the army to introduce a new payroll system.

Civilian conflict prevention and peace building
Support for civilian activities related to peace building, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange; assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that the latter is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. This includes support to NGOs and other civil society organisations, the media, universities and research institutions. It excludes training in military skills. Assistance to the defence ministry or the armed forces, as they are part of government and not civil society, is excluded.

Child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation)
Technical co-operation provided to government — and assistance to civil society organisations — to support and apply legislation designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to demobilise, disarm, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDRRR) child soldiers. Assistance to improve educational or employment opportunities for children so as to discourage their recruitment as soldiers and to build capacity (including advocacy) within civilian government and civil society to prevent children from becoming soldiers is eligible. On the other hand, support to the armed forces themselves is not eligible. Assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces is excluded.

Public sector financial management
Strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public expenditure management; improving financial management systems; tax assessment procedures; budget drafting; field auditing; measures against waste, fraud and corruption.

Legal and judicial development

Constitutional development, legal drafting; institutional strengthening of legal and judicial systems; legal training and education; legal advice and services; crime prevention.

Government administration

Systems of government including parliament, local government, decentralisation; civil service and civil service reform. Includes general services by government (or commissioned by government) not elsewhere specified, e.g. police, fire protection and administrative buildings. This does not include work on defence/military capacity-related issues.

Strengthening civil society

Community participation and development; co-operatives; grass roots organisations; development of other participatory planning and decision-making procedures and institutions.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Development of laws, regulations and administrative procedures for the control and reduction of weapons proliferation; development of institutional structures for policy guidance, research and monitoring; public awareness campaigns on SALW; promotion of regional co-operation and information exchange on SALW programmes; weapons collection and destruction. Funding of action to seize arms by force is excluded. Engagement in weapons collection and destruction programmes by military personnel is excluded.

SSR ACTIVITIES THAT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

Aspects of military reform

Assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces is excluded.

Aspects of police reform

Training of police in routine civil policing functions can be claimed as ODA, but not training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities.

Counter-terrorism and training on counter-subversion

Assistance that contributes to increased capacity on counter-terrorism is not included; however, activity that increases the oversight capacity of institutions, such as the parliament or external oversight institutions, could be included.

ABBBREVIATIONS:

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CRCT	Crisis Response Coordinating Team
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR(RR)	Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration, (Repatriation and Resettlement)
ECOWAS	The Economic Community Of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FBA	Folke Bernadotteacademy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HOM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
INCAF	The International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INSTRAW	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ISS	Intelligence and Security Service
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
KVV	Kriminalvårdsverket (Swedish Prison and Probation Service)
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member States
MUST	Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten (Swedish Military Intelligence Units)
NATO/PFP	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation/Partnership for Peace
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PESTLE	Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal and Environmental
PSC	Private Security Companies
RKP	Rikskriminalpolisen (Swedish National Criminal Police)
RPS	Rikspolisstyrelsen (Swedish National Police)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SITCEN	EU Situation Centre
SSR	Security Sector Reform
Säpo	Säkerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Police)
SWEDENC	Sweden Commission
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (Analysis)
ToR	Terms of Reference
UD	Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPR	The Universal Periodic Review (Of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)

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