Reintegration Around the World:
Insights from the DDR Program Dataset (DDRPD), 1953– 2020 WRITTEN BY **OLIVER KAPLAN**


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FBA Research Briefs

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For this brief, the editorial board consisted of Niklas Hultin, Senior Researcher; Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, Senior Specialist on Armed Groups and Peace Processes; and Agnes Torstensson, DDR Desk Officer at FBA. The views and opinions expressed in the briefs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the FBA.

Introduction

SINCE THE 1950S, DISARMAMENT, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs have been implemented worldwide. These programs have been used both during wars and after peace agreements to transition ex-combatants from civil conflict back into mainstream society. Since the 1980s, international organizations, donors, and national governments have increasingly viewed these programs as essential for promoting durable peace and preventing conflict recurrence. DDR also represents a central approach for countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE). However, policymakers and analysts have been hamstrung in their attempts to understand what lessons are transferable from one DDR setting to another. While between 1945 and 2009 more than half of all civil wars were followed by an additional war,[1] there is little evidence about whether DDR programs can contribute to limiting the risk of war recurrence. Research on the effectiveness of DDR programs has grown,[2] but with little aggregation and comparison of data on DDR programming, there is still limited understanding of the relative contribution of such programming to the prevention of conflict recurrence.

DDR Programs and Processes, 1953-2020

There have been 149 DDR programs and processes across 54 countries since 1953, with many concentrated in Africa and Asia.
Source: DDRPD.

This research brief presents the construction and initial results of the first comprehensive, global, country-level dataset on the implementation of DDR programs, the DDR Program Dataset (DDRPD), 1953–2020.[3] The data identifies 149 DDR programs in 54 countries, with expenditures totaling more than US$6 billion. The DDRPD dataset builds on previous data collection efforts,[4] though existing cross-national studies of DDR programs include little comparative information on the similarities and differences of program features across countries. This research brief highlights key characteristics and patterns of these programs.[5]

Most scholarly studies on DDR programs focus on single cases, which often have contradictory findings.[6] Some of these studies have found that DDR programs were critical components of successful peacebuilding processes,[7] while others find no statistical evidence that ex-combat-ants who participate in DDR programs are more likely to integrate socially and economically into civilian communities.[8] For example, a case study of the DDR program in Tajikistan finds that the program may have prevented remobilization but at the cost of undermining democratization in that country.[9] A separate study shows that DDR efforts in Afghanistan may have actually contributed to Taliban remobilization.[10]

In short, existing studies suggest that DDR may shape lasting peace in some cases but not others. Yet lacking comparative data, analysts and practitioners have been challenged to distinguish between contextual and programmatic explanations of DDR effectiveness. The DDRPD can be used to assess the external validity of single-country studies of DDR and whether findings travel from one setting to another. The dataset also overcomes the key challenge of dispersed documentation.

Unlike areas such as peacekeeping, where documentation and activity reports are centralized by the United Nations (UN) and case characteristics are often clearly denoted in standardized authorizing mandates, DDR programs are implemented by a multiplicity of actors and institutions, with varied approaches and guidance. This dataset centralizes information by collecting and aggregating source materials from a wide variety of actors, including the UN and its constituent organizations, e.g. the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the World Bank; African Union; the Organization of American States; the European Union; national governments and academic scholars.

DDR Programs, 1953–2020

The number of new DDR programs started in a given year increased beginning in the 1990s through the mid-2000s. Source: DDRPD.

Research Findings:
The DDRPD and Global Trends in DDR

THE DDRPD DATA and indicators are based on the largest centralized collection of source material in existence. They were primarily generated from the descriptions of programs and activities contained in implementation, monitoring, and evaluation documents.[11] The dataset relies less on initial DDR agreements, peace agreements, or other planning documents that started or envisioned DDR interventions, since early plans can be vague on details, are not available for non-peace agreement settings, and are not always implemented according to plan. The documents include reports from international institutions such as the World Bank and UN agencies (e.g., DPO, IOM, UNDP) as well as national government program reports, some of which are only available in local languages.

The DDRPD adopts an expansive definition of DDR programs to include interventions related to violent conflict settings where DDR-related activities are implemented by a variety of actors – beyond international organizations – to help combatants transition out of war and their combatant groups (at least one element of disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration). This definition differs from the definition of DDR as outlined in the UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which differentiates between DDR programs and DDR-related tools and reintegration support that are implemented before, during and after DDR programs as complementary measures, as well as when the pre-conditions for DDR programs do not exist.[12] The dataset contains a total of 149 DDR programs in 54 countries administered over the

Colombia's Office of Rehabilitation and Aid (1953–1957):
The Earliest DDR Program

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1946 and 1957 in Colombia is known as La Violencia, a violent political conflict stemming from clashes between liberals and conservatives. An estimated 200,000 lives were lost and more than 800,000 people were displaced. Colombia's first DDR experience – perhaps the world's earliest though not referred to as such – took place immediately following a coup during this period in which General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power and became president in 1953. Rojas Pinilla declared a national effort to restore public order, beginning with laws passed in 1953 that, among other things, provided government aid as well as amnesty, pardons, and the demobilization of armed groups responsible for recent violent crimes (both the liberal guerrillas and traditionally conservative groups including state-sanctioned armed forces, police, and paramilitary groups such as those known as Chulavitas and Pajaros). The government created the Office of Rehabilitation and Aid, whose mandate included facilitating the restitution of lost lands and property.

More than 3,500 individuals were demobilized, with the guerrillas of the eastern Llanos (plains) region being the most amicable to the arrangements, turning in their arms in September 1953. Although many of the liberal guerrillas took part in the demobilization and disarmament process, most of the autodefensas campesinas under the influence of the Communist Party did not. Conflict and violence continued, and in 1955 the military government engaged in operations against communist groups and other groups that had not demobilized. Attacks on the communist autodefensas of Sumapaz and eastern Tolima in the Guerra de Villarrica signaled to guerrillas elsewhere in the country that they were better off not turning in their arms. Ultimately, with growing economic and social inequalities and broken promises to the demobilized, the hopes of peace and rehabilitation were unattainable. Rojas Pinilla resigned in 1957, leaving to his successors a number of dispersed guerilla groups and vast territories affected by the escalation of violence.

course of 67 years. This is nearly triple the previous count of around 60 programs since the late 1980s.[13] These programs are found across a diverse set of contexts, with many programs in Africa and Asia, and an increasing number of programs beginning in the 1990s as a series of new armed conflicts broke out and then concluded. The programs are also found in locations where the international community is engaged to varying degrees as well as where it is largely absent, including in the contexts of UN Special Political Missions, in so-called non-mission settings (where there is no UN peace operation), and where peace operations and peacekeeping of various forms are underway.[14] The programs are also found in contexts with peace agreements that enumerate the specific terms of DDR programs as well as settings without formal agreements or where conflict is ongoing. As previous data collection projects only identified 34 DDR cases in contexts with comprehensive peace agreements (18 percent of conflicts), the DDRPD greatly contributes to our understanding of these non-agreement and ongoing conflict experiences.[15]

The data can be aggregated and analyzed in several ways, including by country, program, or global statistics, as well as across time periods. The dataset contains 648 observations when including all the programs across all years. There are 308 indicators for the DDR program elements of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; contextual features; and DDR outcomes (however, many of the observations are missing values). The data seeks to capture what was done programmatically and what services and resources were provided, as opposed to mere commitments for reintegration made on paper.

China People's Liberation Army, 1954–1958: The Largest DDR Program?

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA) case is an example of security sector reform in the form of DDR and reintegration of veterans. It is also one of the oldest and largest cases of DDR, involving an estimated 2.5 million soldiers. Under Mao Zedong, the communist People's Liberation Army (the Red Army) rebel group fought against and defeated the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang) of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949; Chinese Communist Revolution). Kai-shek's government and forces fled to Taiwan, and Mao and the PLA assumed power and established the People's Republic of China in October 1949, effectively transitioning from being an armed rebel force to a government military. In the early 1950s, after the end of the Korean War, China entered a period of relative domestic and international calm, but in 1953 the country faced a budget crisis, making it necessary to downsize the military. The primary downsizing and reforms took place from 1954 through 1958, though veteran reintegration continued into the 1960s. The military reform consisted of reorganizing the ranks, halting growth in forces, and reducing the number of PLA soldiers from 5 million to 2.5 million. (The Common Program, China's provisional constitution from 1949 to 1954, suggests a reduction of 1.3 million soldiers within two years.) Many of the demobilized soldiers were transferred to political tasks, as "officers … were expected to take leadership responsibilities as political administrative cadres into the Chinese Communist Party".[16] Some veterans voiced frustration and engaged in political protests in the 1960s with the onset of the rapid social change embodied by the so-called Cultural Revolution, but there were few internal security concerns.

The History of DDR

The DDRPD captures a long and varied history of DDR, starting with the demobilization and reinsertion of the liberal militias in Colombia in 1953 after the first bout of the La Violencia conflict and continuing through to the cases of Syria and South Sudan in 2020. Based on a calculation of the number of individuals involved in any component of DDR, the dataset estimates more than 5 million individuals have been beneficiaries. The largest DDR program is that of China's military (the People's Liberation Army), while the smallest might be Fiji, where a group of 370 rebels demobilized in 2000. DDR programs are spread unequally across conflict-affected countries, as some countries have had repeated programs over time, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The data provide an estimate of over US$6 billion in spending across all programs and years, many times the previous estimates of DDR spending.[17] The intensity of DDR spending and resources also varies widely across

DDR Programs and Conflict Context

The context of DDR programs and processes varies, with 82 in post-conflict settings and 67 occurring during conflict (17 spanned conflict to post-conflict and 27 were in non-conflict settings). 68 were implemented as part of peace agreements, and 27 were implemented after cessation of hostilities. Source: DDRPD.

Many DDR Programs: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2002–2009)

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC of the Congo (DRC) has experienced long-running internal political strife and had a total of 13 DDR programs through 2009, more than any other country according to the data. As a result of the death of DRC's totalitarian leader Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 and other conflicts in the region, the Tutsi ethnic group invaded and captured parts of eastern DRC, sparking the First Congo War in 1996. In the resulting power vacuum, the rebel leader Laurent-Desire Kabila became president of the DRC. Under Kabila's new government, the DRC-Rwanda-Uganda alliance disintegrated, setting off the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, involving Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Angola, and Rwanda, as well as more than 25 armed rebel groups. The primary parties to the conflict signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, and negotiations with rebel groups officially ended the war in 2003. To aid several central African countries in the Great Lakes Region with demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement,

the World Bank and UNDP created the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), executed from 2002 to 2009. The World Bank was the primary source of funding, with total funding reaching more than US$220 million. The MDRP implemented several special projects in the DRC, including programs targeting child soldiers, such as the DRC Community Recovery, Ex-Combatants Reinsertion, and Small Arms Reduction-UNDP; the DRC Rapid Reaction Mechanism-UNDP; and the Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme. The demobilization program had a goal of demobilizing 150,000 soldiers, but only demobilized and reintegrated a total of 102,014 individuals, with 52,172 of the original target of 90,000 ex-combatants being reintegrated into DRC society. Given the scale of the conflict, the program achieved some degree of success, but remained incomplete, and armed conflicts persisted in the eastern part of the country.

programs. For example, Chad's National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration exhibits diverse program activities and high levels of expenditures per ex-combatant, while Guinea's security sector reform (2011–2015), involving the reintegration of military soldiers, was more meager in terms of resources.

While the focus of the DDRPD is on the nature of the implementation of DDR programming, the data can also be used for a global analysis and highlight some alarming trends in the management, assessment, and effectiveness of DDR programs. An initial global analysis shows a glaring gap in the implementation of programs, as only 49 (of 149) programs had formal evaluations conducted (though some evaluations may be unaccounted for). In 33 programs, DDR services were assessed as either being provided late or not delivered at all. Perhaps relatedly, in the context of 23 programs it was evident that there was significant re-recruitment into armed groups, a key outcome associated with conflict recurrence and a key criterion for DDR program success (although it is not yet clear how this pattern compares to non-DDR settings).

DDR Around the World

The data help to describe several key features and contextual conditions of DDR programs. Only 17 cases were assessed as "comprehensive DDR programs" in line with the definition of the DDRPD (including the four key components of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration activities). The data show that the context of DDR programs varies greatly in terms of conflict conditions. While 82 DDR cases occurred in post-conflict situations, 67 were implemented during ongoing armed conflict, 17 spanned from conflict to post-conflict, and 27 were found in neither conflict or post-conflict settings, such as in special security situations or as pre-emptive security sector reform. There are 68 DDR programs and processes in the context of peace agreements,[18] and 27 had declarations of cessation of hostilities.

The data also include information about the implementing organizations of DDR programs. Among international actors, the UN has participated in the greatest number of programs (78) followed by the World Bank (53). The data also show high rates of local ownership of DDR, though it could still be greater. There was at least some national government support in over two-thirds of cases (107 programs), and 65 cases had national DDR commissions to coordinate programming. However, in only 23 cases – such as some programs in the Philippines, Nigeria, and South Africa – were DDR programs solely or primarily implemented by national governments with little or no international support.

DDR Program and Process Implementers

There have been 17 comprehensive DDR programs and 65 national DDR commissions. The UN participated in 78 programs, while the World Bank has participated 53 programs. There was some national government support in 107 cases, and 23 cases were only or primarily run by national governments. Source: DDRPD.

Armed Actor Beneficiaries in DDR Programs and Processes

The armed actor beneficiaries vary, with most DDR efforts focused on opposition groups such as insurgents, followed by state armed forces and then militias and paramilitaries. Source: DDRPD.

Which types of armed actors are the main participants in DDR programs? According to the data, non-state opposition groups (insurgents) were the main participants in 38 percent of all DDR programs, followed by 28 percent for state armed forces, 13 percent for (unaligned) militias, and 7 percent for paramilitaries.[19] Nearly one-third of the DDR programs (44) in the dataset involved some form of security sector reform, or DDR programs that had components that focused on the exit, special retirement, or re-entry of members of state armed forces.

The data also identify the demographic breakdowns for key participants in DDR programs. Figure 5 displays the percentage of DDR programs that specify women as key beneficiaries over time (based on proportions of programs with focuses on women by decade). Women are participants in just over one-third of DDR programs, with almost half of programs in the 2000s including a gender focus. The rise of these program features is consistent with the UN's IDDRS emphasis on gender equality and gender-sensitive assessments and services.[20]

South Africa Demobilization and Reintegration, 1995–1998: A Limited Reintegration Process

AS PART OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID struggle in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) formed a military wing known as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in December 1961. A radical youth faction of the ANC also branched off in 1959 to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and its own military wing. These groups faced the counterinsurgency and counter-in-filtration efforts of the apartheid regime's South African Defence Force (SADF). Following the 1994 elections, in which Nelson Mandela was elected president, a new military structure was established known as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), linking demobilization to military integration. To shield the military integration process from potential one-party control, the Joint Military Coordinating Committee was formed, which granted authority to both the ANC's MK and the NP-apartheid government's SADF. Each army submitted lists of personnel to the Certified Personnel Register, and the SANDF subsequently conscripted combatants from the register, implying formal or legal demobilization. Despite these power-sharing efforts, the SADF dominated the military integration process, and some ANC and PAC former combatants were omitted from the process. There were claims of both racial and gender-based discrimination against MK combatants, as well as concerns that the SANDF was simply a new version of the SADF. Demobilization and reintegration began with the passage of the Demobilization Act of 1996 but only lasted until 1998. The legislation included a three-pronged strategy that provided ex-combatants with (1) one-off financial gratuity payments; (2) voluntary personal, social, and economic counseling services; and (3) Service Corps vocational training for up to 18 months. While many ex-combatants received gratuity payments, no financial counseling, skills development, or entrepreneur-friendly programs were provided to make the payments more effective. Out of an estimated total of 42,466 MK and Azanian People's Liberation Army fighters, approximately 25,000 went to demobilization assembly points, but only 19,000 had been integrated into SANDF by July 1998. Overall, South Africa's DDR process had some success integrating its military forces, though this was limited in scope, differentiating it from other DDR programs in the region.

The dataset also describes the content of DDR programs by their key program elements. The most frequent type of activity is vocational training to help former combatants prepare to get jobs, which features in 47 percent of the programs. In addition, psychosocial counseling and employment assistance were provided in 30 percent of programs, and 28 percent of programs contained community reintegration initiatives (however, data on these activities is missing for some programs).

Exploring Unconventional DDR Cases

The DDRPD describes and draws attention to unconventional DDR programs that are difficult to characterize. These programs may have DDR-like components and engage with armed combatants, but they do not neatly fit with traditional definitions of DDR programs, such as that used by the UN in the IDDRS. These cases are retained in the dataset (designated as different from traditional DDR), as they merit special attention and hold lessons for evolving trends in DDR. First, several cases that are coded as DDR programs are not as comprehensive in their offerings as conventional definitions of DDR might require. These include programs that were either short term or mainly provided limited services, such as special pension support to former fighters of non-state groups (e.g., Fiji in 2000, Lesotho in 2001; and pensions and services provided by southern U.S. states to Confederate soldiers after the American Civil War in 1865).

In other instances, certain DDR programs feature actors or contextual conditions different from those traditionally encountered. Some cases are unique because they feature state militaries rather than or in addition to non-state armed actors (reflecting an overlap of DDR and security sector reform). The downsizing of the Chinese military in the 1950s (the former People's Liberation Army insurgent group) after the Chinese Revolution is unique both as the largest known experience in terms of individual combatants (2.5 million) and as a non-state insurgent group during wartime that quickly morphed into a state military during peacetime.

Some cases are unique because they arose during ongoing conflicts or after conflicts without formal peace agreements, such as assistance provided in Burundi, Cambodia, Namibia, Iraq, and Uganda. Other cases of DDR-related processes are found in contexts that do not rise to conventional definitions of civil war but instead presented other situations of political insecurity, violence, and non-state violent actors. This was true in

DDR Program and Process Implementers Proportion of DDR Programs and Processes with Women Populations (by decade)

The number of DDR programs with a gender focus and emphasis on women as beneficiaries increased beginning in the 1980s. Source: DDRPD

DDR Programming Services

In terms of services, vocational training is most frequently found across DDR programs and processes, followed by counseling, employment assistance, and community reintegration. Source: DDRPD

Haiti in 1994 and 2004. In Syria, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces is a non-state military that has played a central role since 2018 in demobilizing and reintegrating ISIS fighters from the wars in Iraq and Syria. The dataset will include several announced but not-yet-implemented DDR programs in countries including Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan.

Conclusions and Implications

DDR PROGRAMS ARE AN INDISPENSABLE tool in the global peacebuilding toolkit. The DDRPD provides a wider and deeper view of the variety of DDR programs that have been implemented than previous assessments. The number of new and active DDR programs spiked around the year 2000 – many emerging in Africa and Asia – and has gradually been decreasing since. The data show there are many more DDR programs across a greater variety of cases and representing far more resources expended than previously understood. This is likely because the dataset has a wider review of documentation and broader inclusion criteria for DDR activities than previous assessments, and more precisely identifies distinct programs within countries that are focused on specific armed actors or security issues.

The DDRPD provides novel opportunities for scholars and practitioners to examine trends and patterns of DDR programming across time and space. The source document library also describes each DDR program in detail, allowing for more indepth studies. The DDRPD therefore promises to open new terrain for analyses of policy-relevant research questions about the reintegration of individuals associated with armed groups and armed forces, including through linking to existing datasets on the nature of different armed conflicts and their various modes of termination, peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities, and various societal indicators. Analysts can use the data to broaden their analyses to the more historically neglected non-mission settings and cases of DDR during ongoing armed conflict. Additional comparisons can be made to assess how DDR programs contribute to sustainable peace compared to other interventions, such as the deployment of peacekeeping troops, economic development, and political reforms such as power sharing.

For practitioners, the data can be used to track DDR program implementation progress over time and across contexts. Practitioners can use the data to learn more about particular DDR programs and their specific components. The data can also aid in DDR program planning purposes and can help identify the contextual conditions where and when DDR programming may be especially useful, as well as the resources and program features that may be required.

At present, conflict drivers such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, global economic crises, and surging food prices are creating worrying conditions that can spark new armed conflicts around the world.[21] DDR programs hold promise for bringing such emerging conflicts to an end by incentivizing and facilitating disarmament and preventing conflict recurrence. The DDRPD promises to help scholars and practitioners build upon past experiences to make new reintegration efforts even more effective.

Notes

[1]Barbara F. Walter, "Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2004), pp. 371–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043775

[2]Paul Bonard and Yvan Conoir, "Evaluation of UNDP reintegration programs: volume 1 final evaluation report" (UNDP, February 2013), available at erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=6983; Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and demobilization", in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens, eds. (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2002); UNDP, DDR and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review of DDR Contributions to Peacebuilding and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund (New York, New York, United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, November 2011), available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ ddr_pbf_thematic_review.pdf; Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, "Community counts: the social reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia", Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 35, No. 2 (March 2018), pp. 132–153 https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215614506; Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, "Explaining recidivism of ex-combatants in Colombia", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 62, No. 1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716644326 (January 2018), pp. 64–93 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0011-5029(18)30028-2; Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt, "Child soldiers as time bombs? Adolescents' participation in rebel groups and the recurrence of armed conflict", European Journal of International Relations, vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2016), pp. 408–436 https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115581910.

[3]The dataset is accompanied by a source document library.

[4]Robert Muggah, ed., Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (London, Routledge, 2009); Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment, Research Report (Stockholm, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010) https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203886915.ch1

[5]The author gratefully acknowledges funding from and collaboration with the Folke Bernadotte Academy in the construction of the dataset.

[6]See, for example, Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "Reintegrating and employing high risk youth in Liberia: lessons from a randomized evaluation of a landmine action agricultural training program for ex-combatants", Policy Report (New Haven, Connecticut, Innovations for Poverty Action and Yale University, 2011); Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Demobilization and reintegration", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, No. 4 (August 2007), pp. 531–567 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707302790; Theresa S. Betancourt and others, "High hopes, grim reality: reintegration and the education of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone", Comparative Education Review, vol. 52, No. 4 (November 2008), pp. 565–587 https://doi.org/10.1086/591298.

[7]Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2008).

[8]Humphreys and Weinstein, "Demobilization and reintegration".

[9]Stina Torjesen and S. Neil Macfarlane, "Reintegration before disarmament: the case of post-conflict reintegration in Tajikistan", in Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition, Mats Berdal and David Ucko, eds., Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding (New York, New York, Routledge, 2009).

[10]Steven A. Zyck, "Former combatant reintegration and fragmentation in contemporary Afghanistan: analysis", Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 9, No. 1 (2009), pp. 111–131 https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800802704945

[11]For many cases, the data are based on implementers' program documents, however, where such documentation is not available, coding was conducted for some programs based on secondhand academic or historical analyses (often based on source documents or accounts). UN program information was accessed via available published reports.

[12]The UN IDDRS (Senior managers' briefing note) defines DDR as "a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. DDR processes can also contribute to stabilization efforts, and to creating an environment in which a peace process, political and social reconciliation, access to livelihoods and decent work, and sustainable development can take root." IDDRS 2.10 on The UN Approach to DDR additionally states that integrated DDR processes are made up of various combinations of (1) DDR programs; (2) DDR-related tools; and (3) reintegration support, including when complementing DDR-related tools. DDR-related tools include (1) pre-DDR, (2) transitional weapons and ammunition management, (3) community violence reduction, (4) initiatives to prevent individuals from joining armed groups designated as terrorist organizations, (5) DDR support to mediation, and (6) DDR support to transitional security arrangements.

[13]See, for example, Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, "Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs"; and Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn and Patrick M. Regan, "Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989–2012", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2015), pp. 551–562 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314567486. The latter's Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Database, which includes observations for all DDR programs associated with a comprehensive peace agreement from 1989–2012, is useful but also provides grounds for caution. Their findings demonstrate that DDR programs that might appear comparable on paper can differ from one another in their implementation.

[14]DDR Section, UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, "DDR Section Support to Non-Mission Settings", September 2021. Available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr_section_support_to_non-mission_settings.pdf

[15]The data on comprehensive peace agreements is, however, limited to only 33 cases, representing approximately half of the cases identified by Muggah (Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction) and excluding cases without an agreement or conflict termination. Similarly, Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Termination data for 1989–2009 indicate that only 34 of 194 conflicts (18 per cent) were terminated via peace agreement (Joakim Kreutz, "How and when armed conflicts end: introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset", Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, No. 2 [March 2010], pp. 243–250). There is thus a need to understand whether DDR programs are effective in the vast majority of post-conflict cases in which no comprehensive peace agreement has been reached.

[16]Gordon White, "The politics of demobilized soldiers from liberation to Cultural Revolution", The China Quarterly, No. 82 (June 1980), pp. 187–213 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000012340

[17]An estimated US$630 million was spent on DDR programs worldwide for around 1 million ex-combatants in 2007 (Muggah, citing analysis of the Escola de Cultura de Pau). Per another estimate, the international community now invests over US$1.5 billion into these programs each year (Lilli Banholzer, "When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed?" Discussion Paper No. 8/2014, Bonn, German Development Institute, 2014. Available at https://www.idos-research.de/uploads/media/DP_8.2014.pdf
Albert Carames Boada and Eneko Sanz Pascual, DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in 2008 (Bellaterra, Escola de Cultura de Pau, July 2009). Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/ddr-2009-analysis-worlds-disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration-ddr-programmes

[18]Kreutz, "How and when armed conflicts end".

[19]For 14 percent of programs, the primary type of armed actor participants remained "unidentified"/"unclear".

[20]"Like men and boys, women and girls are likely to have played many different roles in armed forces and groups, as fighters, supporters, wives or sex slaves, messengers and cooks. The design and implementation of integrated DDR processes should aim to address the specific needs of women and girls, as well as men and boys, taking into account these different experiences, roles, capacities and responsibilities acquired during and after conflicts." UN IDDRS 2.10, The UN Approach to DDR, 2019.

[21]Jonathan D. Moyer and Oliver Kaplan, "Will the coronavirus fuel conflict?" Foreign Policy, 6 July 2020.

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