

# *Beyond the Frontline:* **Public perceptions of security in Ukraine**

Analytical report

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centre**



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This analytical report was prepared by the Folke Bernadotte Academy based on the results of a nationwide population survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre. It is intended for representatives of state authorities, local self-government bodies, law enforcement agencies, other actors in Ukraine's security and defense sector, as well as civil society organizations involved in building security, strengthening the rule of law, and advancing democratic governance.

**Design:** Dmytro Mokryy-Voronovskyy

**Cover photo:** "Bomb shelter – Pointer in Ukrainian language in Dnipro", © rospoint.ukr.net

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# *1. List of acronyms and abbreviations*

AFU – Armed Forces of Ukraine

CMA – Civil-military administration

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (before 2018 – Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces)

DFTG – Volunteer territorial defence unit

EU – European Union

FBA – Folke Bernadotte Academy

FGD – Focus group discussion

GCA – Government-controlled areas

GDP – Gross domestic product

GBV – Gender-based violence

IDP – Internally displaced person

MHPSS – Mental health and psychosocial support

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSDC – National Security and Defence Council

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SALW – Small arms and light weapons

SBU – Security Service of Ukraine

SES – State Emergency Service

UN – United Nations

## 2. Introduction

Sweden is committed to supporting Ukraine as it faces the consequences of Russia's aggression, which began in 2014 and escalated with the fullscale invasion in 2022. The violations of international law and the UN Charter have caused immense suffering for the Ukrainian people and continue to pose significant threats to European and global security. In response, Sweden's 2023–2027 strategy for reconstruction and reform cooperation with Ukraine became its largest foreign aid initiative to a single country. It focuses on advancing Ukraine's freedom, resilience, and economic prosperity, with EU integration as an overarching goal.

**Folke Bernadotte Academy** is a government agency for peace, security and development, and one of three Swedish institutions tasked with implementing the strategy, supporting security sector reform, veterans' reintegration, and inclusive dialogue to enhance resilience and recovery in war-affected communities.

**The Razumkov Centre** is a Ukrainian non-governmental think tank, that conducts research of public policy in the fields of economy, energy, law, political sciences, international relations, military security, land relations, sociology, history and philosophy.

This report is part of FBA's work on supporting both short- and long-term initiatives under the "Community Security in Wartime" program, providing capacity-building and expertise to enhance resilience and security at the local level.

It presents the findings from a nationwide survey and qualitative interviews conducted by the Razumkov Centre to assess public perceptions of security, related threats and priorities in Ukraine. The study explores security concerns at national, community, and individual levels, with a particular focus on the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion and measures needed to enhance resilience and stability.

The survey included 3,096 respondents aged 18 and older, complemented by the findings from the five online focus group discussions with 43 participants from different regions.

The analysis compares security perceptions among the general population and specific groups, including residents of different macro-regions, individuals living near the contact line or in missile-affected areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, military staff and veterans. A gender perspective is applied throughout the report to highlight security-related disparities and challenges faced by men and women (See [Annex 1 Methodology](#)).

Findings from the survey will inform discussions with policymakers and stakeholders, serving as one of the foundations for evidence-based security policies and targeted interventions.

# 3. *Executive summary and key findings*

## **General perception of security**

- Since 2014, Ukrainians' perceptions have been profoundly influenced by direct existential threats coming from Russia, making national security a dominant lens through which personal safety is viewed.
- Security is generally viewed as both military strength and socio-economic stability. A strong army, protected airspace, and absence of hostilities are vital for national and local security. At the same time, stable infrastructure, economic well-being, and international guarantees shape a broader, long-term view of security.
- There are confirmed links between lasting security and democratic governance, with NATO and EU membership widely recognized as key prerequisites for the country's future stability.

## **Local and national security perceptions and threats**

- War has reshaped security perceptions, making national stability a prerequisite for local safety.
- Security perceptions vary by proximity to the contact line—residents in regions less affected by direct hostilities feel more secure, while those near the frontline report the lowest sense of safety.
- In spite of the pressing external threats, the strong sense of national unity prevails.
- Public demand for accountability is high, with corruption being recognized as a major internal security threat.
- There is a strong support for targeted assistance to war-affected groups, expanded psychological services, and structured security measures such as survival training and stricter firearm control.
- The proliferation of small arms and growing firearm-related violence present new risks, while inadequate shelters, especially in the south, expose infrastructure gaps.

## **Role of security structures and efficiency assessment**

- Public trust in security efforts remains moderate, with neither local nor central authorities receiving strong approval.
- Perceptions of effectiveness of security providers vary based on regional disparities and proximity to the frontline, with higher approval in areas where state presence and targeted security measures are more pronounced.
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to be the most trusted security provider.
- Civilian, volunteer, and international contributions are gaining recognition, with NATO and the EU increasingly seen as essential external partners .
- Trust in law enforcement has improved since early 2022, yet dissatisfaction remains most pronounced in de-occupied areas.

## **Assessment of the effectiveness of the security-related measures**

- The effectiveness of security measures depends on individual experiences, personal situations, as well as proximity to threats, and perceived risks.
- Public perception of government-imposed security measures reflects a balance between trust in protective actions and considerable concerns about restrictions on movement, media, and personal freedoms.
- Women tend to evaluate the imposed measures like martial law and identity checks higher, while men are more critical of travel restrictions.
- Preparedness is shaped by risk exposure, as those in high-risk areas, as well as displaced persons and returnees, are more proactive in evacuation readiness, while people in less affected regions focus on preparedness for power outage.
- Attitudes toward firearms are divided, with men more likely to see them as protective and women as risky. Low trust in law enforcement correlates with a higher belief in firearms as a necessary security measure.

## **Gender dimensions of security**

- Gender shapes security perceptions and trust in law enforcement, emphasizing the need for gender-sensitive policies, particularly in post-war recovery.
- Despite broad recognition of gender-based violence as a crime, low confidence in law enforcement's response highlights institutional gaps. Addressing these requires societal norm shifts, improved law enforcement capacity, and stronger protective mechanisms.
- Women's contributions to security decision-making remain under-recognized, with many perceiving their role as limited or unclear. Enhancing women's visibility and participation in security leadership positions is essential for a more inclusive and effective security strategy.

## **Citizens' post-war vision**

- Ukrainians view self-reliance, military strength, and a robust domestic defense industry as the foundation of post-war security, prioritizing these over external alliances like NATO.
- The main post-war fears are focused around war resumption, territorial integrity, and economic instability, with heightened concerns in war-affected regions and among displaced populations.
- Rehabilitation and support for war-affected communities, investments in preparedness and emergency services, as well as economic recovery are seen as essential for strengthening community resilience and ensuring long-term security.

## 4. Respondents profile

The survey sample consists of a slightly higher proportion of women (54.9%) than men (45.1%) and reflects the gender distribution in the general population.

### Gender, %

Male	45.1
Female	54.9

The largest age group surveyed is those aged 60 and older (28.8%), while the youngest age group (18-29) represents 15.8% of respondents.

### Age, %

18-29	15.8
30-39	20.8
40-49	18.2
50-59	16.4
60+	28.8

The majority of respondents have either secondary special education (45.0%) or higher education (37.0%), with only 1.0% having incomplete secondary education.

### Education, %

Incomplete secondary	1.0
Complete secondary	16.6
Secondary special	45.0
Incomplete or complete higher	37.0
NA	0.4

The most common social groups among respondents are workers (24.1%) and pensioners (24.7%), while business owners and military personnel each constitute a small fraction.

### Social status, %

Head of an enterprise or institution / branch	0.9
Businessman, farmer	1.9
Self-employed, individual entrepreneur	5.0
Specialist in humanitarian, technical, natural sciences and other fields	9.7
Military serviceman, SBU or police officer	2.3
War veteran	0.6
Civil servant	2.9
Employee in another field	9.3
Worker	24.1
Student	4.8
Pensioner	24.7



Non-working individual (including a person with disability)	3.2
Non-working individual (not registered as unemployed)	6.3
Officially registered as unemployed	0.6
Other	2.2
NA	1.6

The vast majority (95.5%) of respondents have remained in the same settlement, with only 3.3% displaced due to the war.

### **Place of residence before 24 February 2022?, %**

I lived here, in this settlement	95.5
I moved here after 24 February 2022 due to the outbreak of hostilities and I am an IDP / a displaced person	3.3
I moved here after 24 February 2022, but for another reason and I am not an IDP / a displaced person	0.9
NA	0.3

Nearly half of respondents (50.0%) report financial hardship, with 10.7% struggling to afford even basic necessities and 39.3% able to cover essentials but not much more.

### **How can you best describe your family's financial situation?, %**

We barely make both ends meet and lack money even to buy necessary products	10.7
We can afford only food and essential inexpensive goods	39.3
In general, we have enough to live on, but it is quite difficult to buy durables, such as furniture, refrigerator, TV	39.1
We live a comfortable life but still unable to make major purchases, such as an apartment or car	7.8
We can afford virtually everything we want	0.2
Hard to say	2.8

## 5. General perception of security

The concept of security for Ukrainians has drastically evolved since 2014, shifting from a personal safety focus to a national perspective, reflecting a deepened sense of unity and collective threat but also resilience. While personal security and safety has obvious links with national stability, the respondents feel safest in familiar surroundings where they have a certain degree of control. Gender and age influence perceived safety: men generally feel safer than women, young adults tend to feel safer than seniors.

Key security factors encompass both military strength and socio-economic stability. The absence of hostilities, a protected airspace, and a strong army are seen as essential conditions for national and local security, highlighting the population's reliance on military resilience. At the same time, the significance of stable infrastructure, economic security, and international guarantees underscore the broader understanding of security, extending beyond immediate threats to long-term stability. The respondents associate lasting security with adherence to democratic principles, governance and human rights, and institutional strength. Notably, NATO and EU membership are widely viewed as crucial security guarantees, reinforcing the perception that further “western” integration is a key to the country's safety and future stability.

### 5.1 National stability and personal safety aspects

According to the respondents of the focus group discussions (FGD), security is often perceived as a psycho-emotional state of “calmness”, “comfort” or “sense of safety.” The notion of security includes financial, social, legal and environmental safety in addition to the crucial physical and psychological elements.


Generally, when talking about security, most survey respondents (51%) link the concept of security primarily with the security of the entire country; 25% connect the notion with their own physical safety and their immediate environment; for 13% security means safety of the settlement where they live; and for 8% it is the security of their own home.

***«We live not far from the kindergarten. And whenever there is alarm, I see teachers leading their groups to the shelter. I guess I associate such a walk with safety, with the fact that we care about our lives and the lives of our children»***

*Female, 46, Chernivtsi*

These results highlight the fact that Ukrainians perceive security in a broad, national context rather than at a personal or local level, showing considerable cohesion and unity where national security is seen as integral to individual safety. The relatively lower percentage of respondents who associate security with their settlement (13%) or home (8%) suggests that personal and community-level security considerations, while present, are overshadowed by the overarching focus on national stability.

**Figure 1. Security for you is above all..., %**



Residents of high-risk areas, including the east and settlements near the contact line, prioritize personal, local, and home security more than national security, likely due to their direct exposure to immediate threats and instability. In contrast, those in de-occupied and relatively safe regions focus more on the country's security (57%), possibly because the restoration of control in their area and relevantly safe conditions strengthen residents' identification with the state and its protection.

Similarly, communities with a high proportion of IDPs are less likely to prioritize national security (43%) and more inclined to focus on settlement and personal safety (47.5%), which may stem from their displacement experiences and the pressing need for security in their immediate surroundings.

Men and women share similar perceptions of security, with the majority prioritizing the security of the entire country (52.4% of men and 49.6% of women). However, women are slightly more likely than men to associate security with their own physical safety (26.1% vs. 24.1%) and the safety of their home (8.2% vs. 7.5%).


The respondents were asked how safe they felt in different locations (at home, in the neighbourhood, in public transport, at work, in other places or settlements, in a car, etc.). The survey showed that Ukrainians feel the safest (totally or rather safe) in their own apartment (77%) and in their own entrance hall (yard) (73%).

The perceived safety varies significantly across different regions, with the de-occupied territories showing a relatively higher feeling of security compared to areas near the contact line, as a majority of respondents feel "Totally safe" or "Rather safe" in their homes (85.4%) there while in areas near the contact line, 59% of respondents feel "Rather unsafe" or "Totally unsafe" in their homes.

Across all regions, safety perception is highest in personal environments (homes) and decreases in public spaces such as stores, public transport, and workplaces. In regions near the contact line, public spaces are particularly unsafe, with 81.5% of respondents feeling "Rather unsafe" or "Totally unsafe" in shopping centres and cultural institutions. Even in relatively safe regions, concerns remain high in public spaces—only 69.7% feel safe in public transport, compared to 90.7% in their homes.

These findings reveal a certain contrast in security perceptions, as while most respondents conceptually associate security with the safety of their entire country, emphasizing national stability as a key condition of their well-being, in their day-to-day experiences, they feel the safest in their own surroundings, where they have a certain degree of control.

**Figure 2. How safe do you feel...,%**



Internally displaced persons (IDPs) feel less safe than the general population, people returning from abroad also report lower safety levels. Rural residents feel safer than urban dwellers.

Men generally feel safer than women: at home (78% vs. 75%), in entrance halls or yards (76% vs. 71%), in their neighborhood (70% vs. 66%), in other visited areas (57% vs. 51%), and in public transport (57% vs. 52%).

Age differences are also evident, as young people feel safer than seniors in their neighborhood (73% vs. 66%), in other visited areas (57% vs. 50%), and in public transport (60% vs. 51%) (See [Annex 2](#) for detailed tables).

## 5.2 Key factors shaping security

A secure living environment is shaped by multiple factors, ranging from military defense capabilities to social and economic stability. Thus, when assessing the necessary prerequisites or factors to consider the country or the settlement safe, respondents mostly name the absence of hostilities (86%), a sky “closed” from missiles, drones, and shells (84%), and a powerful army (81%). Other necessary conditions include stable electricity, water, and gas supply (65%), modern shelters/bomb shelters (64%), having parts of the country not under occupation (60%), stable national currency and controlled inflation (58%), security guarantees from major countries (51%), and adherence to democratic norms – elections, human rights, and free media (51%).

When assessing NATO membership, 78% of respondents consider it either a necessary or a desirable condition; 75% state EU membership as an important prerequisite to making the country safer.


The high social standards (43%) and the absence of ethnic or religious conflicts (32%) are also listed among the priority conditions for security. The stipulated factors are almost equally important for both men and women.

**«Security for me is Europe and NATO»**

*Male, 37, Irpin, Kyiv oblast*



**Figure 3. For each of the factors, please tell how important it is for you to consider your country or your settlement safe to live in?, %**



Support for NATO and EU membership as security prerequisites also varies significantly by region. While the west and centre show the highest support for NATO (52% and 53% considering it necessary), the east is the most sceptical, with only 29% seeing NATO membership as essential and 24% believing it does not affect safety. A similar pattern is observed regarding EU membership (See [Annex 2](#) for detailed tables).

## *6. Local and national security perceptions and threats*

War reshapes security perceptions, making national stability a prerequisite for local safety. National security is perceived as consistently low across all regions, with the most pessimistic views in de-occupied and missile-affected areas, reflecting fears of renewed threats and ongoing attacks. Security perceptions vary significantly based on proximity to contact line, with residents in relatively safe regions feeling the most secure locally, while those near the contact line report the lowest sense of safety due to direct exposure to hostilities. In the de-occupied territories, moderate assessments of local security indicate a partial restoration of stability, although concerns about potential re-occupation, unexploded ordnance, and limited access to basic services remain relevant. The external threats, particularly stemming from Russia's full-scale invasion, are viewed as the most serious at both the local and national levels.

The relatively low concern for internal divisions, political conflicts, and socio-economic protests suggests that, apart from prioritizing external threats over internal, the findings prove a strong sense of societal resilience and unity, which has shifted general focus away from internal discord toward collective national defense.

Security requires accountability: public awareness of corruption as a critical threat reflects a unified demand for a systemic change. Corruption is viewed as a critical security threat, reflecting its deep impact on governance, law enforcement, and resource distribution.

The increased circulation of firearms and rising firearm-related encounters reflect growing public exposure to violence, while the lack of adequate shelters, particularly in the south, underscores critical gaps in protective infrastructure. These factors highlight the complex security landscape, where both immediate threats and long-term stability concerns must be addressed.

### **6.1 Assessment of the security situation at the local and national level**

The survey results show that the residents in relatively safe regions feel the most secure locally (3.5), while those near the contact line rate their security lowest (1.9), reflecting direct exposure to hostilities. De-occupied territories show moderate local security (3.3), suggesting regained stability and control over the local environments.

National security is perceived as significantly worse across all regions, with ratings between 1.6 and 2.2. The lowest national security rating comes from de-occupied territories (1.6), likely due to ongoing concerns about renewed threats. Missile-affected regions also rate national security poorly (1.9), highlighting the impact of continued attacks.

Generally, local security is rated higher than national security, suggesting people feel relatively safer in their immediate surroundings but remain concerned about Ukraine's overall stability. Across various demographic groups, perceptions remain largely consistent, with the sharpest contrast observed in de-occupied areas (3.3 local vs. 1.6 national), where residents recognize local improvements but fear broader insecurity. There is no statistically significant difference between genders in relation to perception of security ([See Annex 3 for detailed tables](#)).

**How would you rate the overall security situation in the locality where you live and in Ukraine as a whole?** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means that the security situation is “very bad” and “5” means that it is “very good”), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
Settlement where I live	3.1	3.5	3.3	2.9	2.4
Ukraine as a whole	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.1

**How would you rate the overall security situation in the locality where you live and in Ukraine as a whole?** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means that the security situation is “very bad” and “5” means that it is “very good”), average scores

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
Settlement where I live	1.9	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.5
Ukraine as a whole	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.0

## 6.2 External and internal threats in Ukraine’s security landscape

The survey results indicate that external threats, particularly those stemming from Russia’s full-scale invasion, are viewed as the most serious at both the local and national levels by all respondents, with minor statistical variations. When evaluating local security, the external threats were perceived as high (3.9), while internal threats were seen as less severe (3.1).

When evaluating the overall security situation in Ukraine, respondents rate the severity of external threats at an average of 3.8, while internal threats are perceived as significantly lower, at 3.2.

**Assessing the security situation in the settlement where you live, how serious do you consider the following threats?** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “no threat” and “5” means “the highest threat”), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
External (coming from outside Ukraine)	3.9	3.6	3.9	4.0	4.0
Internal	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.3

**Assessing the security situation in Ukraine, how serious do you consider the following threats?** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “no threat” and “5” means “the highest threat”), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
External	3.8	3.9	3.6	4.1	3.8
Internal	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.4

When asked to assess the seriousness of external threats to Ukraine’s national security, respondents identified armed aggression by a foreign state as the most critical threat (4.6). This was followed by concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (4.2), financial instability due to debt dependence (4.2), hostile information propaganda (4.2), and cyberattacks on state institutions (4.1).

**Please rate how serious the following EXTERNAL threats to Ukraine’s national security are now** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “no threat” and “5” means “the highest threat”), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
Armed aggression of a foreign state	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.6
Hostile information propaganda	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.0
Cyberattacks and unauthorised access to computer networks of Ukrainian state institutions and infrastructure facilities	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.9
International terrorism	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.6
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical)	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.0	4.0
Cyberattacks (hacker attacks) against individuals and businesses	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.7
The threat of epidemics	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.7
Financial problems caused by Ukraine’s debt dependence on foreign creditors and international financial institutions	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3
Trade wars and restrictions against Ukrainian goods	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.9	3.9

When assessing internal threats to Ukraine’s national security, respondents identified corruption (4.4) and violence by Russian occupiers against civilians (4.4) as the most serious concerns, with the latter being a direct consequence of the Russian aggression.

*«The primary risk is corruption, its rise after the war. Corruption eats up a large chunk of the funds provided by our partners and from our taxes. If corruption is eliminated and all funds are directed to where they need to be, there will be no problems with the military, or with rehabilitation, or with the payment of pensions and minimum wages»*

*Female, 57, Lviv*

The prolonged economic crisis (4.1) is a nationwide concern, but areas near the contact line rate it slightly higher (4.2). Compared to others, residents of the de-occupied territories see a particular threat in the increasing number of the veterans (3.9) and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance (4.3).



The relatively low scores for threats related to a divided society (3.0), violent political struggles (3.0), and mass protests over socio-economic policies (2.8) suggest that Ukrainians currently see internal political and social instability as less pressing concerns compared to external threats. This once again highlights that there is a certain level of societal resilience and unity, influenced by the ongoing aggression. There is no statistically significant difference between genders (See [Annex 3](#) for detailed tables).

**Please rate how serious the following INTERNAL threats to Ukraine’s national security are now** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “no threat” and “5” means “the highest threat”), average scores

	Total respondents
Violence by the Russian occupiers against civilians	4.4
Corruption, including theft and illegal resale of property, nepotism, tender fraud, etc.	4.4
Prolonged economic crisis, unemployment, falling incomes	4.1
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance	4.0
Proliferation of firearms	3.9
Oligarchic groups, including lobbying interests at the state level	3.8
Terrorist and sabotage activities	3.7
Increasing number of veterans of the Russian war	3.7
Increasing number of internally displaced persons	3.6
Increasing crime	3.6
Subversive anti-Ukrainian activities, including inciting ethnic and religious hatred, separatist movements, spreading panic, disrupting mobilisation, etc.	3.4
Activities of illegal armed groups, including thugs, private security companies, volunteer units not controlled by the government	3.4
Man-made disasters	3.4
Divided society (language, religious affiliation, national heroes, history, foreign policy orientation, etc.)	3.0
Aggravation of internal political struggle to violent forms	3.0
Mass protests against the government’s socio-economic policy	2.8

Rising prices and cost of living (4.2), economic crisis (3.6), and deterioration of living conditions (3.6) are among the top concerns together with missile and drone strikes (4.4). Corruption (4.1), abuse of power by law enforcement (3.7), and inefficiency of central (3.5) and local authorities (3.4) once again confirm the widespread frustration over transparency, accountability, and the effectiveness of institutions in addressing both wartime and domestic challenges.

While external and economic threats dominate, social issues such as street crime (2.7), domestic violence (1.8), and ethnic or religious conflicts (2.2) are rated much lower. This suggests that, despite wartime hardships, the primary dangers are seen as stemming from external aggression and economic instability rather than domestic social unrest or crime.

**Please rate the level of danger you feel from each of the threats below**, (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “I do not feel the danger at all” and “5” means “I feel the highest danger”), average scores

	Total respondents
Missile and drone strikes	4.4
Rising prices, rising cost of living	4.2
Hostilities	4.1
Corruption	4.1
Destruction of critical infrastructure (energy facilities, hospitals, schools, etc.)	4.0

Possible nuclear attack by Russia	3.9
Lasting power outages	3.9
Loss of home and accommodation	3.7
Abuse of power by representatives of controlling and law enforcement agencies	3.7
Lack of rule of law, violation of human rights and freedoms	3.6
Loss of access to telephone (mobile) communications	3.6
Economic crisis	3.6
Deterioration of living conditions and quality of life	3.6
Threats to the health and life of loved ones and friends	3.5
Inefficiency of central authorities	3.5
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance	3.5
Arbitrariness, abuse of power by public officials	3.5
Explosions at military depots	3.4
Loss of access to sources of information (e.g. television, Internet)	3.4
Possibility of capture / occupation of my town or village by the enemy	3.4
Inefficiency of local authorities	3.4
Destabilisation of the political situation in the country	3.2
Epidemics, pandemics	3.2
Inability to receive quality and timely medical care	3.2
Reduced access to education (for me, children, grandchildren)	3.1
Non-epidemic diseases	3.1
Terrorism	3.1
Man-made disasters, soil, water and air pollution	3.1
Road traffic accidents	2.9
Deterioration of psycho-emotional state, mental health issues	2.9
Fires	2.9
Natural disasters, catastrophes	2.8
Job loss, unemployment	2.7
Street crime	2.7
Lack of food	2.6
Domestic injuries	2.6
Loss of support from people around, loneliness	2.5
Conflicts on political grounds	2.5
Mass protests	2.5
Attacks on property, crimes against property	2.4
Ethnic conflicts	2.3
Accidents at work	2.2
Religious conflicts	2.2
Psychological violence (abuse, bullying)	2.0
Discrimination at work	1.8
Domestic violence	1.8
Sexual violence and sex crimes	1.8

The obtained results highlight subtle gender-based differences in perceived threats, though overall concern levels remain similar between men and women. Men are more likely than women to perceive workplace accidents as a threat (2.3 and 2.1), which may reflect their higher representation in physically demanding or hazardous occupations. Conversely, women report marginally higher concerns about psychological violence (2.1 and 2.0), loss of support and loneliness (2.6 and 2.5), and mental health deterioration (3.0 and 2.8), possibly reflecting gendered social pressures and caregiving roles.


Women also feel slightly more threatened by crimes against property (2.5 and 2.4), sexual violence (1.8 vs. 1.7), and domestic violence (1.8 vs. 1.7), aligning with broader trends of gender-based vulnerability. In contrast, men and women rate external threats, such as missile strikes (4.4), hostilities (4.1), and economic challenges (4.2 for rising prices), almost identically, suggesting a shared sense of insecurity regarding the ongoing war and economic instability.

The ongoing Russian aggression has led to an increase in the availability and circulation of SALW in Ukraine. This proliferation poses long-term risks to public security, including the potential for crime, violence, and unauthorized firearm use in civilian settings.

There is a small but notable rise in firearm-related encounters between early 2022 and December 2024. The percentage of respondents who had a firearm pointed at them increased from 2.8% to 3.3%, while those who used a firearm against others rose from 1.7% to 2.6%.

More respondents report witnessing the use or pointing of firearms against others (6.2% in 2024 vs. 4.7% in 2022) and the general use of firearms not directed at individuals (7.1% vs. 6.3%). This suggests growing public exposure to firearm incidents, potentially due to ongoing security challenges.

**Figure 4. Have you ever encountered or had any experience with the use (or threat of use) of firearms other than hunting and sport shooting? (Respondents could select all applicable options), %**



The data also reveals a notable shift in gender disparities, with women reporting increased exposure to firearm-related incidents between 2022 and 2024—particularly in experiencing a firearm being pointed at them (from 1.0% to 1.6%) and using a firearm against others (from 0.4% to 1.5%)—while the overall share of those unaffected by such incidents has declined more sharply among women (from 91.1% to 85.9%) than among men (from 72.5% to 70.4%).

<sup>1</sup> The survey was conducted from 21 January to 2 February 2022 by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service at the request of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator's Office in Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ukraine. The survey used a sample representing the adult population (18+) of all regions of Ukraine excluding non-government-controlled areas of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, according to the main socio-demographic indicators (region, type of settlement, gender, age). A total of 7,010 respondents were interviewed.

## 6.3 Access to protection infrastructure – covers and shelters

When assessing the current local security situation through access to the quality covers and shelters, a significant portion of respondents (44.4%) stated that their area is insufficiently provided with shelters, while another 24.8% say there are no shelters at all. This highlights a major gap in protective infrastructure, with the problem being most acute in the South, where 63.5% report insufficient shelter availability—the highest among all regions.


Despite being heavily affected by the war, the East has the highest share of respondents (22.1%) who say they are sufficiently provided with shelters.

In addition, a peculiar observation found among the West and East, with 13% of respondents believing that shelters are not needed in their area, compared to just close to 4% in the South.

*«Most shelters are flooded and locked, and the key is kept in the housing office, and there is no one waiting for us. So basically, there is nowhere to hide»*


*Female, 34, Dnipro, IDP from Kramatorsk, Donetsk oblast*

**Figure 5. How well is the area where you live provided with quality covers and shelters in case of missile attack or shelling?, %**



Men and women have similar perceptions of shelter availability, with no significant gender differences. Around 45% of men and 43% of women feel their area is insufficiently provided with shelters, while about 24% of men and 26% of women report having no shelters at all. Slightly more women (8.7%) than men (8.0%) are uncertain about shelter coverage, which may indicate differences in the awareness level. Overall, the data suggests that concerns about shelter availability are widespread and not strongly influenced by gender.

**Figure 6. How well is the area where you live provided with quality covers and shelters in case of missile attack or shelling?, %**





## 7. Role of security structures and efficiency assessment

Public confidence in security efforts remains cautious, reflecting unmet expectations and regional disparities. The general assessment of both local and central authorities' efforts to ensure security seems moderate, with no region expressing strong approval. Overall, the survey findings indicate that despite the continuous efforts, many citizens believe that more can be done to enhance security, both nationally and locally.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) continue to play the most crucial role as the primary guarantor of security, with highest level of trust among Ukrainians. There is also a growing recognition of civilian, volunteer, and international contributions. The increasing importance of international actors, including NATO and EU, reflects a broader acknowledgment of external support to Ukraine and its vitality.

Public perception of law enforcement's role has improved since early 2022, but regional differences remain, with de-occupied territories expressing the highest dissatisfaction.

### 7.1 Central and local authorities

When answering the question on the activities of local (including the CMAs) and central authorities in ensuring citizens' safety, respondents are not overly appreciative. Local authorities receive an average score of 3.0, while central authorities are rated somewhat lower at 2.9. Ukrainians living in the South and the East rate activities of both local and central authorities somewhat higher than their respondents in the West and the Centre.

**Please rate the local and central authorities' activities to ensure safety of citizens** (*on a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "do nothing at all" and "5" means "do everything possible"*), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
Local authorities	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.1	3.2
Central authorities	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.1

Generally, the local authorities' efforts are rated relatively similarly, however the lowest rating is observed in de-occupied territories (2.7), possibly reflecting lingering local governance challenges and limited resources. The highest rating is observed in regions hosting IDPs (3.1), which may indicate effective local responses to displacement-related security concerns.

Unlike local authorities, central authorities receive a higher rating in de-occupied territories (3.2). It is important to note that no region rates either local or central authorities above 3.2, indicating a lack of strong public confidence in security efforts.

*«In winter, the city authorities installed petrol generators in all our yards, we all had them. That is, if we had a power cut, we would always have heating»*

*Male, 33, Odesa*

**Please rate the local and central authorities' activities to ensure safety of citizens** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "do nothing at all" and "5" means "do everything possible"), average scores

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
Local authorities	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.9
Central authorities	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.2	2.9

## 7.2. Key security structures and international institutions

The AFU (96.5%) are seen as the most crucial actor in strengthening security, followed by the Ministry of Defence, the National Guard, and other defence institutions. Law enforcement agencies, the National Security and Defence Council, and central authorities also hold significant roles, while citizens, volunteer organisations, and international partners contribute notably. Compared to 2016, the perceived importance of most actors has risen, with the biggest increases for the State Emergency Service (+36.5%), citizens (+31%), and the Ombudsperson (+25%). However, trust in the Verkhovna Rada (-3.5%) and the Cabinet of Ministers (-4%) has declined compared to 2016. These findings highlight a strong reliance on defence institutions and growing recognition of civilian and international involvement in security.

The perceived importance of international entities in strengthening Ukraine's security has grown notably since 2016<sup>2</sup>, particularly for NATO (from 44.4% to 60.3%) and the EU (from 45.3% to 57.6%). Support for international humanitarian organizations (from 41.1% to 57.5%) and UN agencies (from 38.1% to 49.7%) has also increased, reflecting a greater recognition of their role in providing aid and support. In addition, there are no significant gender differences in the perception of security actors' roles, as men and women rate most entities similarly.

The perceived effectiveness of key security structures in countering national threats has significantly increased since 2016, with the Armed Forces showing the most substantial rise (from 3.4 to 4.6). Other notable improvements include the State Emergency Service (2.9 to 4.3), National Guard (3.2 to 4.1), and State Border Guard Service (3.0 to 4.0).

However, trust in political institutions remains low, with only slight increases for the President (+2.5 to 3.3) and the Cabinet of Ministers (+2.2 to 2.4), while the Verkhovna Rada's rating remains unchanged at 2.2. This emphasizes growing public confidence in defence and emergency response institutions, alongside relatively lower confidence in political leadership.

The effectiveness ratings of security structures show minimal gender differences, with men and women largely aligning in their assessments (See [Annex 4](#) for detailed tables).

<sup>2</sup> Results of a nationwide sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service as part of the project "Monitoring Ukraine's Security Governance Challenges" implemented by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), in cooperation with the Razumkov Centre, with the financial support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The study, sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, was carried out on 27-31 May 2016 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 2019 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

**Please rate the effectiveness of the following structures in countering threats to national security** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “not effective at all” and “10” means “very effective”), *average scores*


	May 2016	December 2024
Armed Forces	3.4	4.6
State Emergency Service (SES)	2.9	4.3
National Guard	3.2	4.1
State Border Guard Service	3.0	4.0
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)	2.7	3.9
Territorial Defence Forces	3.0	3.8
Volunteer organisations	3.6	3.8
Ministry of Defence	–	3.5
Ministry of Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces	2.7	–
President	2.5	3.3
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC)	2.7	3.1
Ministry of Internal Affairs (police)	2.7	3.1
Cabinet of Ministers	2.2	2.4
Verkhovna Rada	2.2	2.2

## 7.3. Law enforcement agencies

Law enforcement agencies in Ukraine play a crucial role in maintaining stability and security, especially during wartime and in an increasingly complex security environment. Their effectiveness in responding to threats, ensuring public order, and upholding the rule of law is vital for national resilience and public trust.


Despite the ongoing challenges, public perception of law enforcement's ability to protect citizens from illegal attacks remains divided. While 45.5% of Ukrainians believe that law enforcement agencies cannot adequately protect them, 40.5% express confidence in their capabilities. Notably, these figures show a slight improvement compared to early 2022, when 50% lacked trust, and only 38% believed in their effectiveness. This shift suggests gradual progress in law enforcement efforts, likely influenced by wartime adaptation, strengthened security measures, and increased public engagement with law enforcement institutions.

**Figure 7. Do you think the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine can protect you from illegal attacks?, %**




Women are somewhat more likely than men to believe that law enforcement agencies can protect them from illegal attacks (43% and 38% respectively).

**Figure 8. Do you think the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine can protect you from illegal attacks?, %**



Public perception of law enforcement’s role in maintaining public order has improved since early 2022, with the share of those rating it as “rather good” increasing from 37% to 45.3%, while negative assessments have slightly declined. However, regional differences persist—residents of de-occupied territories express the most dissatisfaction, with over 40% rating law enforcement performance as “rather bad” or “very bad.”

**Figure 9. How do you think public order is protected by law enforcement in the city, (town, village) where you live?, %**



Gender differences are minimal, though women tend to view law enforcement more positively than men, with 47.7% rating its performance as “rather good” compared to 42.5% of men.

The highest approval is observed in relatively safe regions, while areas near the contact line and under missile attacks report mixed perceptions, influenced by ongoing security challenges.

A peculiar trace observed with regards to the linkage between the level of respondents’ well-being and effectiveness assessment, where the higher the level of respondents’ well-being is - the better they assess the work of law enforcement agencies: the share of those with positive assessments increases from 44% among those who do not have enough money even to buy food to 59.5% among those who report higher well-being.

Despite overall improvement, a significant share of respondents remains uncertain about the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. High levels of uncertainty may contribute to distrust and signal the need for more visible and effective policing, as well as intensified efforts to build trust in those regions where law enforcement performance was rated low (See [Annex 4](#) for detailed tables).



## 8. Assessment of the effectiveness of the security-related measures

The effectiveness of security measures is shaped by personal experiences and circumstances, even within a shared national defense vision. The insights emphasize that they are solely perceived through deeply personal and situational lenses, influencing how different groups evaluate the effectiveness of such measures, e.g. while air raid alerts, curfews, and martial law are widely recognized as necessary responses, yet restrictions on movement and media control generate more divided opinions. Gender and regional differences also shape attitudes toward security enforcement.

Personal security is built on preparedness, shaped by experience—those who face the highest risks take the most proactive measures. The findings show a strong reliance on information as the primary personal security measure, with regional differences reflecting varying levels of threat exposure. Despite widespread adoption of defensive measures like the "two-wall rule" and document-carrying, first-aid preparedness remains a critical gap, with most respondents lacking life-saving skills.

As already noted earlier in this report, corruption is identified as the greatest internal threat to security. Notably, among all proposed measures, respondents consider strengthening anti-corruption efforts (8.3) to be the most effective way to ensure personal and family safety. Looking ahead, it is worth noting that this issue remains highly relevant in the context of post-war reconstruction.

Measures focused on supporting vulnerable groups and war-affected citizens (8.1) and developing psychological support services, particularly for veterans (7.8) are also rated highly. This indicates widespread recognition of the social and mental health challenges caused by the war and the need for systemic support.

*«I think that people who had to face death [who will return from the war] will find it very difficult to adjust to civilian life, where they need to survive in a different way. And society is sometimes not ready to meet them, as they say, face to face»*

*Female, 45, Kyiv, IDP from Kramatorsk, Donetsk oblast*

Tactical medicine and survival skills (7.7), stricter firearms control (7.6), and public education on firearms risks (7.4) are rated as relatively effective measures. In contrast, increasing civilian ownership of the firearms scores much lower (4.3), and the idea of personally owning a registered firearm is rated only slightly higher (4.8). This suggests that respondents prefer organized security initiatives and activities rather than widespread civilian armament.

Another interesting finding confirms the perceptions that having more law enforcement officers does not seem as highly effective security measure. While stricter firearm control is rated relatively high (7.6), the idea of fewer people owning firearms (5.2) does not have strong support. This suggests a nuanced perspective—people want stronger regulations but may not fully support broad disarmament.

**Please rate how effective each of the following measures would be in ensuring the safety of you and your loved ones (on a scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means “not effective at all” and “10” means “very effective”), average scores**


	Total respondents
Strengthening measures to combat corruption	8.3
Effective policy to support vulnerable groups and citizens affected by the war	8.1
Development of psychological support and mental health services, in particular, for veterans	7.8
Knowledge and skills in tactical medicine (first aid) or how to behave in extreme war conditions	7.7
Stricter rules for controlling firearms	7.6
More information and public education campaigns to raise awareness of the responsibilities and risks of owning, using and handling firearms, ammunition and explosives	7.4
More people who refuse to own and use firearms	5.2
More law enforcement officers in the city (town, village) where I live	5.1
Me having an officially registered firearm	4.8
More people who own firearms so that they can defend themselves	4.3

Firearm-related measures are somewhat divisive – while public education on firearm risks (7.4) and stricter gun control (7.7 women and 7.5 men) are widely supported, owning a registered firearm is rated significantly higher by men (5.5) than women (4.3), and increasing firearm ownership scores the lowest among all proposed measures (4.7 for men, 4.1 for women).

In addition, women show slightly higher support for policies on war-affected citizens (8.2 women and 8.0 men) and expanding mental health (7.9 women and 7.6 men) services.

Overall, the majority of government-imposed security measures are perceived as effective, with air raid alerts (63.6%), curfews (55.8%), and martial law (51.2%) receiving the highest rate. However, responses indicate that not all measures are universally accepted, with restrictions on movement and media control generating more mixed reactions. While most respondents acknowledge the relevance of these measures in response to Russian aggression, the varying levels of perceived effectiveness suggest that public confidence in their impact depends on individual circumstances and experiences. The ban on men aged 18-60 traveling abroad (25.8%) and the United News telethon (20.2%) have the lowest perceived security benefits, with many respondents either seeing no impact or expressing uncertainty about their effectiveness.

**Figure 10. How have the following measures introduced by the government due to Russian aggression affected your level of security?, %**



The effectiveness of martial law and curfews is perceived differently depending on proximity to the contact line. De-occupied territories report the highest sense of security increase (63.9% for martial law in general, 64.2% for curfew in particular), while relatively safe regions show lower approval (47.3% and 51.6%, respectively), pointing out that possibly strict security measures are more appreciated in high-risk areas. Security measures such as martial law, curfews, and ID checks are slightly more favorably viewed by women than men, as women report slightly higher levels of perceived security increase across these measures.

Economic and mobility-related restrictions are more divisive, with noticeable gender disparities. Women are slightly more likely than men to view the war tax as increasing security (27.7% vs. 24.9%), but they also report higher uncertainty about its impact (23.3% vs. 21.2%). Regarding the ban on men traveling abroad, men are more likely to view it negatively, with 18.9% saying it has decreased security compared to 14.9% of women. This suggests that while both groups have mixed opinions, men perceive the travel restrictions as more detrimental to security than women do (See [Annex 5](#) for detailed tables).

The most widely practiced safety measure across all regions is staying informed about potential threats. This is particularly high in missile-affected regions (68.1%), de-occupied territories (68.4%), and relatively safe regions (65.4%). Similarly, when looking at regional breakdowns, residents in the South (69.5%) report the highest levels of threat monitoring, while those in the East (60.1%) are slightly less engaged, potentially due to the "habituation" of constant threats in frontline areas.

Taking physical cover varies significantly. The "two-wall rule" (staying in interior rooms during shelling) is most common in high-risk areas near the contact line (60%) and missile-affected regions (56.5%). Regional differences highlight that this approach is most prevalent in the South (59.7%) and the East (50.2%), while it is significantly lower in the West (30.5%), where the perceived threat of direct strikes is lower.

Personal protective equipment (e.g., first-aid kits, tourniquets) is more commonly used in contact line areas (18.3%), reflecting a greater awareness of immediate medical risks.


The presence of grab-and-go bags for emergency evacuation is highest in missile-affected regions (44.1%) and de-occupied areas (41.4%), while significantly lower in relatively safe regions (29.4%). Regionally, the South (54.5%) stands out as the most prepared in terms of evacuation readiness, while the West (24.7%) shows the lowest level of grab-and-go bag preparedness.

Having generators or backup power sources is relatively consistent across regions (ranging from 23% to 28.3%), with slightly higher numbers in relatively safe regions (28.3%), where prolonged outages may be a greater concern (See [Annex 5](#) for detailed tables).

***«All the documents, some money – everything is in a suitcase, because there is no other way. Because if there is no time, you will have to run with what you have»***

*Male, 57, Irpin, Kyiv oblast*

**Figure 11. What personal safety measures do you take under martial law? Please choose all relevant answers, %**




With regards to the gender disparities, the survey results suggest that women prioritize evacuation preparedness, while men focus more on preparedness for power outage, as women are more likely than men to have an “emergency” grab-and-go bag with all necessary documents and things for evacuation (40% and 31% respectively), while men are more likely to stock up on generators or additional batteries (29% and 24% respectively).

Despite these efforts, first-aid readiness remains low—only 25% feel adequately trained, while nearly 70% report insufficient or no knowledge, highlighting a critical gap in life-saving skills. Military personnel and veterans are the only groups of respondents, the majority of whom have sufficient skills and knowledge (57%).

Gender differences in first-aid preparedness are minimal, with men and women reporting similar levels of low or no first-aid skills (68.6% and 70%, respectively).


Some of the respondents of FGD noted that the number of tactical medicine training offers has decreased, with most remaining courses being paid sessions.

**Figure 12. During the war, the ability to provide first aid is vital. Please rate your skills and knowledge in providing first aid to those injured, %**



Men are nearly twice as likely as women to believe that owning a firearm enhances safety, while women are more inclined to see it as a potential risk. Ukrainians’ perceptions of whether or not they should have firearms to ensure their own safety partially depend on their assessment of whether Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies can protect them from illegal attacks. Thus, the idea that having a firearm would help them feel safer is shared by 31% of respondents who think that law enforcement agencies cannot protect them, and only by 23% of those who believe that law enforcement agencies can protect them.

**Figure 13. Do you think that having a firearm will help you feel safe and prevent illegal attacks on you and your loved ones?, %**



# 9. Gender dimensions of security


Gender-sensitive security policies is a key to strengthening trust in law enforcement and ensuring an inclusive recovery that addresses diverse security needs. The survey results suggest that gender shapes security perceptions, preparedness, and trust in law enforcement, highlighting the need for gender mainstreaming in security policies, especially in post-war recovery. The gender-based violence, and specifically domestic violence, is viewed as a crime that should be reported. At the same time, limited confidence in law enforcement’s response suggests gaps in institutional capacity. Addressing these challenges may require shifting societal norms, strengthening law enforcement response, and ensuring inclusive security frameworks that prioritize protection for all. While women do contribute to security-related decision-making at both local and national level, their role is perceived as moderate at best and often under recognized. Gender plays a significant role in shaping security perceptions, preparedness, and concerns in Ukraine. The gender disparities are reflected in many ways, underscoring the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective in security policies, particularly in post-war recovery and law enforcement efforts. Additionally, ensuring gender-sensitive security policies is essential for addressing gender-based violence (GBV), increasing women’s representation in decision-making, and fostering inclusive security frameworks.

While many survey respondents recognize gender-based and domestic violence as serious issues, public confidence in law enforcement’s response remains uncertain, as only 18.5% believe these crimes are taken seriously, while the most common response (38%) is “it depends”, and 25% do not think that the gender-based and domestic violence are taken seriously by the law enforcement.

However, a strong majority (65%) view GBV as a crime that should be reported to the police, with women (69%) and those with higher education (69%) more likely to hold this view than men (61%). The finding that 14.5% of respondents still perceive GBV and domestic violence as a private family matter rather than a crime indicates the persistence of traditional and patriarchal attitudes that can hinder both prevention and response efforts.


This perception can contribute to underreporting of GBV cases, as victims may feel discouraged from seeking help due to fear of stigma, social pressure, or lack of trust in law enforcement. Additionally, men (16.7%) are more likely than women (12.7%) to see GBV as a private matter, suggesting that gender norms may influence how violence within families is understood and addressed.

**Figure 14. Do you think the law enforcement agencies in your community take gender-based violence/domestic violence seriously?, %**






**Figure 15. Do you think gender-based violence/domestic violence is a private conflict between family members or a crime that should be reported to the police?, %**




Regarding women's role and impact in security-related decision-making, respondents generally see such role as moderate but limited. At the national level, 34% consider women's participation in security decision-making as medium, 30% as low, and only 12% as high. Similar assessments are seen at the community level.

The high percentage of respondents who chose "hard to say" when assessing women's participation in security decision-making - ranging from 20.5% to 29% - may indicate that women's contributions to security remain under-recognized or poorly communicated, leading to low public awareness of their involvement in decision-making. The fact that more men than women struggle to answer this question (29% vs. 22.3% at the community level and 26.8% vs. 20.5% at the national level) could also reflect differences in exposure to women's leadership roles, with women perhaps being more aware of female figures in security-related positions.

**Figure 16. How would you rate the overall level of women's participation in decision-making and influence on the security situation at the national level?, %**



**Figure 17. How would you rate women's involvement in security-related decision-making in your community?, %**



## 10. Citizens' post-war vision


The post-war vision is focused around self-reliance, defense capacity, and resilience against future threats. Ukrainians see both internal and external threats as equally critical to post-war security, with concerns centered on war resumption, territorial integrity, and economic instability. The post-war security is reliant on military strength, economic stability, and social resilience. A modern, well-equipped army and a domestic defense industry are seen as the most effective measures, emphasizing the priority placed on military strength and national defense capabilities. While NATO membership is also considered important, it ranks considerably lower than self-reliant measures.

The essential local security measures include rehabilitation and support for war-affected populations, alongside investments in shelters, emergency services, and economic opportunities. These priorities align with broader national security strategies, as local preparedness, economic recovery, and social cohesion serve as fundamental pillars of long-term security.

Public opinion is divided on the nature of security threats after the war. Most respondents (53%) expect internal and external problems to be equally serious, while 22% anticipate greater internal challenges and 16% see external threats as more pressing.

Both men and women overwhelmingly view internal and external security threats in the post-war period as equally serious (52–54%).

**Figure 18. After the war is over, which security problems will be more serious for Ukraine – internal or external?, %**




The top post-war concerns for Ukrainians include the resumption of war (78%), loss of territory (75%), population decline (74%), corruption (71%), decline in living standards (69%), and labor shortages (68%). Economic instability, government inefficiency, and security risks are also widely cited. While most threats are seen as serious, intergroup conflicts are the least concerning, with only 39% viewing them as a major issue.

Regional differences are notable, as respondents from the East are the most alarmed, ranking nearly all threats higher than the national average, particularly war resumption (83%), decline in living standards (80%), and corruption (76%). Southern residents generally perceive threats as less severe, except for unemployment (72%), their top concern. IDPs are especially worried about living standards (83.5%) and hyperinflation (65%). Rural residents are slightly more concerned about unemployment (58%) than urban dwellers (52%).

Most Ukrainians believe self-reliance is key to post-war security, with 73% supporting a modern, well-armed army and 59% advocating for domestic defense production. Other measures receive less support, with NATO membership (40%) being the most popular external security option.

Internal stability is also a priority, with 35.5% favoring anti-corruption reforms and 33% supporting stronger borders. Economic recovery and restoring Ukraine's nuclear status (22% each) are also seen as important. EU membership (20%), demining (19%), veteran rehabilitation (17.5%), and Russian reparations (16%) round out key measures (See [Annex 6](#) for detailed tables).

**Figure 19. In your opinion, which of the following measures at the national level can best ensure the security of Ukraine and its citizens in the post-war period? (Respondents could choose up to 5 answers), %**



A modern, well-armed army and domestic defense industry development are top security priorities across all groups (50%+ support in each). However, different regions have own specifics in assessing various measures to ensure Ukraine's post-war security.

Near the contact line, NATO membership is less favored (25%), while economic recovery (37%), demining (29%), and veteran rehabilitation (23%) are more prioritized.

Relatively safe regions place greater emphasis on EU membership (25%) as a key security measure.

At the community level, rehabilitation and assistance for war-affected populations (52%) is seen as the most critical security measure. Other key priorities include building shelters (46%), establishing local defense and emergency services (43%), and boosting business and employment opportunities (42%). Training in public and personal security (42%) is also widely supported. Additionally, one-third (34%) emphasize the need for reliable alert systems, while 23% highlight community engagement in security efforts. The focus on rehabilitation and local security structures underscores a strong public demand for social resilience, preparedness, and economic stability as key elements of Ukraine's post-war recovery (**See [Annex 6](#) for detailed tables**).

# 11. Annexes

## Annex 1. Methodology

Between December 6 and 16, 2024, the Razumkov Centre conducted a nationwide survey involving **3,096** respondents aged 18 and older. Before conducting the survey, five online focus group discussions were held to gather qualitative insights and validate the data collection tool. A total of 43 participants, both men and women aged 21 to 60, from the surveyed regions took part in the discussions.

The field stage involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts was only carried out in government-controlled areas (GCA) not subject to hostilities).

The survey was based on a stratified multi-stage sampling with random selection at the initial sampling stages and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected based on gender and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the effects of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced displacement of millions of citizens.

The report analyzes security perceptions at national, community, and individual levels, covering both the general population and specific groups, including:

### Residents of macro-regions:

- West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions
- Centre: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, and Kyiv city
- South: Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson regions
- East: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk regions

### Residents of specific areas:

- Near the contact line
- Regions affected by missile attacks
- Regions with high shares of IDPs
- De-occupied territories
- Relatively safe regions

The survey examines the security perceptions of various social groups, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and combatants. A gender perspective is integrated throughout the survey to assess gender disparities and examine how security challenges impact different genders, providing insights for long-term policy responses.

Findings are presented in comparison across these groups whenever their security perceptions and assessments stand out or differ from the general population. Additionally, selected indicators are compared with previous Razumkov Centre surveys to identify trends over time.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Comparisons are made with the results of surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service in May 2016, April 2017, and January-February 2022. The latter was commissioned by the Office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.



## Annex 2. General perceptions of security

### Security for you is above all..., %

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
My own physical safety, including my immediate environment	36.3	26.2	27.9	26.7	20.7
Safety and security of my home	13.2	7.1	9.4	5.0	7.7
Safety of the settlement where I live permanently	18.0	14.2	16.5	9.0	12.0
Security of the entire country	29.0	49.3	42.8	57.0	57.2
Hard to say	3.4	3.2	3.3	2.4	2.5

### Security for you is above all..., %

	Men	Women
My own physical safety, including my immediate environment	24.1	26.1
Safety and security of my home	7.5	8.2
Safety of the settlement where I live permanently	13.1	13.4
Security of the entire country	52.4	49.6
Hard to say	2.8	2.8

### How safe do you feel..., %

	Totally safe	Rather safe	Rather unsafe	Totally unsafe	Hard to say
In your apartment (house)?					
Areas near the contact line	7.5	30.7	36.4	22.6	2.9
Regions affected by missile attacks	23.4	43.8	22.9	6.1	3.7
Regions hosting IDPs	29.3	41.0	19.5	7.6	2.6
De-occupied territories	33.1	52.3	13.0	1.1	0.5
Relatively safe regions	45	45.7	6.8	1.4	1.1
In your entrance hall (yard)?					
Areas near the contact line	4.0	27.8	40.4	22.6	5.2
Regions affected by missile attacks	17.4	46.8	24.6	6.8	4.4
Regions hosting IDPs	21.9	44.0	22.7	7.8	3.6
De-occupied territories	26.8	56.7	13.4	1.9	1.1
Relatively safe regions	38.4	49.2	8.5	1.7	2.2
In your neighbourhood?					
Areas near the contact line	2.5	18.4	52.2	24.7	2.2
Regions affected by missile attacks	13.1	46.4	28.2	6.1	6.2
Regions hosting IDPs	15.9	44.3	27.2	8.7	3.9
De-occupied territories	13.0	64.9	19.4	1.4	1.2
Relatively safe regions	30.4	52.5	12.4	2.1	2.6

In other areas or settlements where you often visit?					
Areas near the contact line	1.3	14.8	53.8	26.9	3.2
Regions affected by missile attacks	7.9	36.0	36.7	8.9	10.5
Regions hosting IDPs	9.5	37.2	33.4	11.3	8.6
De-occupied territories	5.5	54.3	30.5	3.2	6.6
Relatively safe regions	20.5	48.4	21.1	3.7	6.3
In stores, shopping and entertainment centres, cultural institutions and other public places?					
Areas near the contact line	0.7	15.6	50.4	31.1	2.2
Regions affected by missile attacks	10.8	41.3	34.5	7.9	5.5
Regions hosting IDPs	12.2	40.8	31.2	11.1	4.6
De-occupied territories	8.9	58	27.4	1.9	3.8
Relatively safe regions	21.9	47.8	20.7	4.3	5.3
In public transport?					
Areas near the contact line	1.7	12.0	46.4	31.1	8.8
Regions affected by missile attacks	9.6	40.4	33.3	9.9	6.8
Regions hosting IDPs	10.5	39.6	30.5	11.5	7.9
De-occupied territories	6.5	57.3	25.0	2.9	8.3
Relatively safe regions	17.9	47.6	23.5	4.0	7.0
At your workplace or place of study? (among those who work or study)					
Areas near the contact line	4.7	17.1	46.8	26.9	4.5
Regions affected by missile attacks	14.5	42.2	25.5	7.9	10.0
Regions hosting IDPs	15.4	43.3	24.2	8.4	8.8
De-occupied territories	12.5	61.4	20.5	1.2	4.4
Relatively safe regions	24.3	49.0	14.6	3.9	8.2
In your own car? (among those who have a car)					
Areas near the contact line	4.0	14.9	37.5	26.0	17.6
Regions affected by missile attacks	12.9	38.5	20.7	5.5	22.5
Regions hosting IDPs	14.4	37.3	19.0	7.4	21.9
De-occupied territories	10.8	64.1	17.4	0.5	7.2
Relatively safe regions	22.1	41.2	18.2	3.7	14.7

## How safe do you feel..., %

	Totally safe	Rather safe	Rather unsafe	Totally unsafe	Hard to say
In your apartment (house)?					
Men	34.9	43.5	14.7	4.8	2.1
Women	31.2	44.0	16.8	5.9	2.1
In your entrance hall (yard)?					
Men	29.5	46.6	15.8	5.3	2.7
Women	24.3	46.5	19.3	6.3	3.6
In your neighbourhood?					
Men	22.9	47.5	20.2	5.8	3.6
Women	18.1	47.8	24.2	6.2	3.7
In other areas or settlements where you often visit?					
Men	15.6	41.7	28.1	8.1	6.5
Women	10.7	40.2	32.6	7.9	8.6
In stores, shopping and entertainment centres, cultural institutions and other public places?					
Men	17.5	42.6	26.9	8.8	4.3
Women	12.2	42.8	31.3	8.0	5.7
In public transport?					
Men	15.2	41.6	27.3	8.8	7.0
Women	10.0	41.9	31.2	9.1	7.9

At your workplace or place of study?					
Men	15.2	35.3	17.0	6.1	26.4
Women	11.9	32.2	16.3	5.6	34.1
In your own car?					
Men	13.1	28.4	13.4	3.6	41.5
Women	6.4	17.3	10.4	3.6	62.3

**For each of the factors, please tell how important it is for you to consider your country or your settlement safe to live in?, %**

	Necessary condition	Desirable condition	Does not affect the safety	Hard to say
Sky "closed" from missiles, drones, shells				
Total respondents	83.8	14.1	1.0	1.1
West	81.0	16.7	1.0	1.3
Centre	86.6	13.0	0.0	0.4
South	78.7	13.4	5.2	2.7
East	84.7	13.3	0.5	1.5
Absence of hostilities				
Total respondents	86.3	12.2	0.8	0.7
West	77.9	19.9	1.3	0.9
Centre	92.9	6.9	0.0	0.2
South	80.9	15.3	2.7	1.1
East	86.5	11.4	0.8	1.3
Modern shelters / bomb shelters				
Total respondents	63.6	29.4	5.9	1.1
West	57.2	35.7	6.2	0.9
Centre	69.9	25.3	4.2	0.6
South	57.1	38.5	2.7	1.6
East	62.4	24.1	11.4	2.1
Stable electricity, water and gas supply				
Total respondents	64.9	31.7	2.6	0.8
West	51.6	43.8	3.8	0.7
Centre	75.3	22.6	1.4	0.6
South	57.7	39.6	1.6	1.1
East	64.9	30.0	4.0	1.2
Parts of the country are not under occupation				
Total respondents	60.4	29.4	5.3	5.0
West	56.8	31.6	6.2	5.4
Centre	70.0	24.1	2.0	3.9
South	47.0	42.9	4.9	5.2
East	52.5	29.6	11.2	6.7
Adherence to democratic norms: elections, human rights, free media, etc.				
Total respondents	50.7	33.3	11.9	4.1
West	48.7	38.5	8.8	4.0
Centre	55.0	31.7	10.3	3.0
South	39.5	36.8	21.0	2.7
East	50.6	28.0	14.2	7.2
A powerful army				
Total respondents	81.4	14.8	2.3	1.6
West	78.1	17.5	2.3	2.1
Centre	89.0	9.0	1.0	1.0
South	67.3	23.4	6.0	3.3
East	77.4	18.6	2.8	1.2

Stable national currency and controlled inflation				
Total respondents	58.1	29.8	8.4	3.7
West	50.7	37.2	8.2	3.9
Centre	67.5	25.9	3.6	3.0
South	39.5	33.8	22.6	4.1
East	59.0	25.9	10.5	4.6
Security guarantees from major countries				
Total respondents	50.9	35.8	8.9	4.4
West	46.7	36.8	11.1	5.4
Centre	59.3	34.6	3.7	2.4
South	45.1	38.0	12.0	4.9
East	42.1	35.5	15.5	6.9
NATO membership				
Total respondents	45.6	32.0	11.7	10.8
West	51.6	36.8	5.5	6.1
Centre	52.5	28.9	9.5	9.1
South	34.6	41.7	13.6	10.1
East	29.2	26.4	23.6	20.9
EU membership				
Total respondents	37.4	37.9	13.8	10.9
West	41.3	42.1	9.6	7.0
Centre	42.0	36.7	11.0	10.2
South	28.6	44.4	15.8	11.2
East	27.1	31.0	24.4	17.5
Absence of ethnic or religious conflicts				
Total respondents	32.4	39.8	21.5	6.4
West	30.6	41.3	21.4	6.7
Centre	34.5	41.1	18.3	6.1
South	24.5	37.3	34.3	3.8
East	35.0	36.1	20.6	8.3
High social standards				
Total respondents	43.3	38.8	11.8	6.1
West	34.1	43.8	13.9	8.2
Centre	50.4	36.2	8.3	5.2
South	32.2	44.7	19.1	4.1
East	46.8	34.1	12.2	6.9

## Annex 3. Local and national security perceptions and threats

Please rate how serious the following INTERNAL threats to Ukraine's national security are now (on a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "no threat" and "5" means "the highest threat"), average scores

	Total respondents	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
Prolonged economic crisis, unemployment, falling incomes	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1
Corruption, including theft and illegal resale of property, nepotism, tender fraud, etc.	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.3
Mass protests against the government's socio-economic policy	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9
Aggravation of internal political struggle to violent forms	3.0	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.7	3.1
Violence by the Russian occupiers against civilians	4.4	4.2	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.4
Increasing number of internally displaced persons	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.5
Increasing number of veterans of the Russian war	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.5
Subversive anti-Ukrainian activities, including inciting ethnic and religious hatred, separatist movements, spreading panic, disrupting mobilisation, etc.	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.5
Man-made disasters	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4
Oligarchic groups, including lobbying interests at the state level	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
Terrorist and sabotage activities	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.6
Increasing crime	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.6
Proliferation of firearms	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.9
Activities of illegal armed groups, including thugs, private security companies, volunteer units not controlled by the government	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.6
Divided society (language, religious affiliation, national heroes, history, foreign policy orientation, etc.)	3.0	3.3	2.9	2.9	2.7	3.2
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance	4.0	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.3	3.9

Please rate the level of danger you feel from each of the threats below (on a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "I do not feel the danger at all" and "5" means "I feel the highest danger"), average scores

	Total respondents	West	Centre	South	East
Missile and drone strikes	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.6
Rising prices, rising cost of living	4.2	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3
Hostilities	4.1	4.0	4.1	3.7	4.5
Corruption	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.2
Destruction of critical infrastructure (energy facilities, hospitals, schools, etc.)	4.0	3.9	4.1	3.9	4.2
Possible nuclear attack by Russia	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.8

Lasting power outages	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8
Loss of home and accommodation	3.7	3.3	3.7	3.6	4.1
Abuse of power by representatives of controlling and law enforcement agencies	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.9
Lack of rule of law, violation of human rights and freedoms	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.9
Loss of access to telephone (mobile) communications	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5
Economic crisis	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8
Deterioration of living conditions and quality of life	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.7
Threats to the health and life of loved ones and friends	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.7
Inefficiency of central authorities	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.7
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7
Arbitrariness, abuse of power by public officials	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.7
Explosions at military depots	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.5
Loss of access to sources of information (e.g. television, Internet)	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4
Possibility of capture / occupation of my town or village by the enemy	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.8
Inefficiency of local authorities	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.6
Destabilisation of the political situation in the country	3.2	3.4	3.0	3.0	3.4
Epidemics, pandemics	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.3
Inability to receive quality and timely medical care	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.5
Reduced access to education (for me, children, grandchildren)	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.3
Non-epidemic diseases	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.3
Terrorism	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.1
Man-made disasters, soil, water and air pollution	3.1	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.1
Road traffic accidents	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.0
Deterioration of psycho-emotional state, mental health issues	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.7	3.2
Fires	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.9
Natural disasters, catastrophes	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.6
Job loss, unemployment	2.7	2.7	2.5	3.2	3.0
Street crime	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8
Lack of food	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7
Domestic injuries	2.6	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.6
Loss of support from people around, loneliness	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.8
Conflicts on political grounds	2.5	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.7
Mass protests	2.5	2.8	2.3	2.5	2.7
Attacks on property, crimes against property	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.7
Ethnic conflicts	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.2	2.5
Accidents at work	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.2
Religious conflicts	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.0	2.4
Psychological violence (abuse, bullying)	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.8	2.3
Discrimination at work	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.8	2.0
Domestic violence	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.0
Sexual violence and sex crimes	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.0



**Please rate the level of danger you feel from each of the threats below** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “I do not feel the danger at all” and “5” means “I feel the highest danger”), average scores

	Men	Women
Accidents at work	2.3	2.1
Road traffic accidents	2.9	2.9
Domestic injuries	2.6	2.6
Natural disasters, catastrophes	2.8	2.8
Fires	2.9	2.9
Street crime	2.7	2.8
Domestic violence	1.7	1.8
Sexual violence and sex crimes	1.7	1.8
Psychological violence (abuse, bullying)	2.0	2.1
Attacks on property, crimes against property	2.4	2.5
Lack of food	2.5	2.6
Loss of support from people around, loneliness	2.5	2.6
Deterioration of psycho-emotional state, mental health issues	2.8	3.0
Threats to the health and life of loved ones and friends	3.5	3.6
Inability to receive quality and timely medical care	3.2	3.2
Man-made disasters, soil, water and air pollution	3.0	3.1
Terrorism	3.0	3.1
Possible nuclear attack by Russia	3.8	3.9
Ethnic conflicts	2.3	2.3
Religious conflicts	2.2	2.3
Conflicts on political grounds	2.5	2.5
Hostilities	4.1	4.1
Missile and drone strikes	4.4	4.4
Loss of home and accommodation	3.6	3.7
Destruction of critical infrastructure (energy facilities, hospitals, schools, etc.)	4.0	4.1
Lasting power outages	3.8	3.9
Loss of access to telephone (mobile) communications	3.6	3.6
Possibility of capture / occupation of my town or village by the enemy	3.3	3.4
Loss of access to sources of information (e.g. television, Internet)	3.3	3.4
Deterioration of living conditions and quality of life	3.5	3.6
Reduced access to education (for me, children, grandchildren)	3.0	3.1
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordnance	3.5	3.5
Explosions at military depots	3.5	3.4
Inefficiency of central authorities	3.5	3.5
Inefficiency of local authorities	3.4	3.4
Destabilisation of the political situation in the country	3.2	3.2
Mass protests	2.5	2.5
Discrimination at work	1.8	1.8
Job loss, unemployment	2.8	2.7
Economic crisis	3.6	3.6
Rising prices, rising cost of living	4.2	4.2
Epidemics, pandemics	3.2	3.3
Non-epidemic diseases	3.0	3.2
Arbitrariness, abuse of power by public officials	3.5	3.5
Corruption	4.1	4.0
Abuse of power by representatives of controlling and law enforcement agencies	3.7	3.6
Lack of rule of law, violation of human rights and freedoms	3.6	3.6

**Have you ever encountered or had any experience with the use (or threat of use) of firearms other than hunting and sport shooting?** *(Respondents could select all applicable options), %*

	Men		Women	
	January-February 2022	December 2024	January-February 2022	December 2024
I had an experience when a firearm was pointed at me	5.0	5.3	1.0	1.6
I had an experience of using a firearm against other people	3.3	3.8	0.4	1.5
I was involved in a conflict in which both sides used firearms	5.2	5.5	0.8	1.2
I have witnessed the use or pointing of firearms at (against) other people	7.7	9.3	2.2	3.6
I have witnessed the use of firearms, but not against specific people	9.9	10.5	3.4	4.3
No, none of the above has ever happened to me	72.5	70.4	91.1	85.9
Refused to answer	3.5	6.6	1.7	4.1

## Annex 4. Role of security structures and efficiency assessment

In your opinion, how important is the role of the following entities in strengthening security in Ukraine?, %

	Very important	Rather important	Limited	Absent	Hard to say
President					
May 2016	49.8	31.0	9.0	4.2	5.9
December 2024	62.1	25.4	6.8	2.6	3.1
Verkhovna Rada					
May 2016	39.7	36.4	12.1	4.9	7.0
December 2024	38.5	34.1	15.5	7.2	4.9
Cabinet of Ministers					
May 2016	39.0	36.7	11.6	5.1	7.6
December 2024	35.3	36.6	16.3	5.8	6.0
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC)					
May 2016	38.7	35.1	11.3	4.1	10.9
December 2024	48.1	33.3	10.2	3.1	5.4
Armed Forces					
May 2016	49.1	30.4	10.6	2.4	7.6
December 2024	84.9	11.6	1.4	0.5	1.5
Ministry of Defence					
December 2024	66.9	25.5	4.2	0.9	2.5
National Guard					
December 2024	65.0	26.7	4.6	1.0	2.7
State Border Guard Service					
December 2024	63.9	26.5	6.2	1.0	2.4
Police and other law enforcement agencies					
May 2016	28.3	39.8	17.9	5.2	8.8
December 2024	45.5	36.0	11.7	3.4	3.4
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)					
May 2016	41.1	34.0	11.0	4.4	9.6
December 2024	57.9	29.1	7.7	2.0	3.3
Courts					
May 2016	19.3	32.6	21.5	12.1	14.5
December 2024	24.5	34.2	22.4	11.1	7.8
Prosecutor's Office					
May 2016	19.3	32.3	22.5	11.3	14.5
December 2024	24.3	35.8	21.7	10.6	7.6
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson)					
May 2016	12.1	27.5	22.0	12.3	26.1
December 2024	28.8	35.9	21.2	5.5	8.6
State Emergency Service (SES)					
May 2016	18.1	34.5	21.3	8.1	18.0
December 2024	62.2	26.9	6.9	1.4	2.7
Citizen's associations					
May 2016	14.2	31.3	30.3	13.9	10.3
Volunteer organisations					
December 2024	33.1	38.1	21.6	3.2	4.0
Citizens themselves					
May 2016	14.2	26.9	30.4	17.5	11.0
December 2024	39.9	32.0	19.6	3.5	4.9

International humanitarian organisations (International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, etc.)					
May 2016	12.1	29.0	23.0	9.7	26.3
December 2024	21.2	36.3	23.9	9.9	8.7
UN agencies in Ukraine					
May 2016	11.7	26.4	20.4	9.7	31.8
December 2024	18.3	31.4	23.1	14.3	12.9
EU Delegation to Ukraine					
May 2016	12.9	32.4	20.2	7.7	26.8
December 2024	24.0	33.6	21.6	8.8	12.0
NATO Representation to Ukraine					
May 2016	14.2	30.2	19.2	7.8	28.7
December 2024	28.7	31.6	18.5	9.4	11.8

**In your opinion, how important is the role of the following entities in strengthening security in Ukraine?, %**

	Very important	Rather important	Limited	Absent	Hard to say
President					
Men	61.4	26.3	6.8	2.5	3.1
Women	62.6	24.7	6.8	2.7	3.2
Verkhovna Rada					
Men	39.0	32.9	15.6	7.5	5.0
Women	38.0	35.0	15.3	6.9	4.7
Cabinet of Ministers					
Men	35.0	36.6	17.1	5.8	5.6
Women	35.5	36.6	15.7	5.8	6.4
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC)					
Men	48.6	32.6	10.6	3.3	4.8
Women	47.7	33.8	9.8	2.9	5.8
Armed Forces					
Men	84.7	11.7	1.6	0.4	1.6
Women	85.1	11.6	1.3	0.6	1.3
Ministry of Defence					
Men	67.3	25.5	3.8	1.0	2.4
Women	66.7	25.4	4.5	0.8	2.6
National Guard					
Men	65.1	25.9	5.1	1.2	2.7
Women	64.9	27.4	4.1	0.8	2.8
State Border Guard Service					
Men	64.6	24.8	6.8	1.2	2.6
Women	63.2	28.0	5.6	0.8	2.3
Police and other law enforcement agencies					
Men	46.3	35.5	11.5	3.8	3.0
Women	44.9	36.4	12.0	3.0	3.7
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)					
Men	58.8	27.9	8.0	2.2	3.1
Women	57.3	30.1	7.3	1.8	3.5
Courts					
Men	24.6	33.1	22.8	12.5	7.0
Women	24.5	35.1	22.0	9.9	8.4

Prosecutor's Office					
Men	24.4	35.8	21.0	12.0	6.8
Women	24.3	35.9	22.2	9.4	8.3
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson)					
Men	28.0	35.6	21.0	6.5	8.9
Women	29.5	36.2	21.3	4.6	8.3
State Emergency Service (SES)					
Men	62.0	27.2	6.3	1.6	2.9
Women	62.3	26.7	7.4	1.2	2.5
Volunteer organisations					
Men	31.6	39.3	21.1	3.6	4.4
Women	34.3	37.1	22.1	2.9	3.6
Citizens themselves					
Men	39.3	32.1	19.5	3.6	5.5
Women	40.3	31.9	19.8	3.6	4.5
International humanitarian organisations (International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, etc.)					
Men	20.4	36.8	24.3	9.7	8.8
Women	21.9	35.8	23.6	10.1	8.6
UN agencies in Ukraine					
Men	18.5	30.2	23.6	15.6	12.0
Women	18.1	32.4	22.7	13.3	13.5
EU Delegation to Ukraine					
Men	24.5	33.3	22.3	9.0	10.9
Women	23.6	33.8	21.0	8.7	12.8
NATO Representation to Ukraine					
Men	28.7	32.4	18.7	9.4	10.8
Women	28.7	30.9	18.3	9.4	12.7

**Please rate the effectiveness of the following structures in countering threats to national security** (on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means “not effective at all” and “10” means “very effective”), average scores

	Men	Women
Armed Forces	4.6	4.6
State Emergency Service (SES)	4.3	4.3
National Guard	4.1	4.1
State Border Guard Service	3.9	4.0
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)	3.9	3.9
Territorial Defence Forces	3.8	3.9
Volunteer organisations	3.8	3.9
Ministry of Defence	3.4	3.5
President	3.3	3.3
Ministry of Internal Affairs (police)	3.1	3.2
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC)	3.0	3.1
Cabinet of Ministers	2.4	2.4
Verkhovna Rada	2.2	2.3

**How do you think public order is protected by law enforcement in the city, (town, village) where you live?, %**

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
Very bad	5.3	6.5	4.5	10.2	5.8
Rather bad	23.3	28.8	28.3	32.4	28.1
Rather good	38.1	44.6	44.2	40.8	47.5
Very good	6.5	4.1	4.5	2.4	5.0
Hard to say	26.9	16.0	18.5	14.1	13.6

**How do you think public order is protected by law enforcement in the city, (town, village) where you live?, %**

	Men	Women
Very bad	5.8	6.2
Rather bad	29.9	26.2
Rather good	42.5	47.7
Very good	5.3	4.2
Hard to say	16.5	15.7

## Annex 5. Assessment of the effectiveness of the security-related measures

Please rate how effective each of the following measures would be in ensuring the safety of you and your loved ones (on a scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means “not effective at all” and “10” means “very effective”), average scores

	Men	Women
Strengthening measures to combat corruption	8.3	8.3
Effective policy to support vulnerable groups and citizens affected by the war	8.0	8.2
Development of psychological support and mental health services, in particular, for veterans	7.6	7.9
Stricter rules for controlling firearms	7.5	7.7
Knowledge and skills in tactical medicine (first aid) or how to behave in extreme war conditions	7.7	7.7
More information and public education campaigns to raise awareness of the responsibilities and risks of owning, using and handling firearms, ammunition and explosives	7.4	7.4
More people who refuse to own and use firearms	5.0	5.4
More law enforcement officers in the city (town, village) where I live	4.9	5.3
Me having an officially registered firearm	5.5	4.3
More people who own firearms so that they can defend themselves	4.7	4.1

How have the following measures introduced by the government due to Russian aggression affected your level of security?, %

	Security has increased	Security has decreased	Security has not changed	Hard to say
Introduction of martial law				
Men	50.2	14.5	26.6	8.6
Women	52.1	15.0	24.0	8.9
Introduction of a curfew				
Men	54.9	11.9	26.3	6.9
Women	56.6	12.8	23.1	7.5
Requirement for citizens to carry their ID documents at all times for possible inspections				
Men	49.6	12.4	30.0	8.0
Women	51.8	9.8	29.1	9.4
Operation of the Air Raid Alert warning system				
Men	61.5	12.7	20.2	5.6
Women	65.4	12.4	17.2	5.0
Organisation of the United News telethon				
Men	18.7	12.2	52.4	16.7
Women	21.4	12.1	48.9	17.6
Establishment of volunteer territorial defence units (DFTG)				
Men	45.0	11.2	26.7	17.1
Women	46.7	10.7	24.3	18.3
Introduction of war tax				
Men	24.9	13.3	40.5	21.2
Women	27.7	13.3	35.7	23.3
Ban on travelling abroad for men aged 18 to 60				
Men	23.4	18.9	35.1	22.6
Women	27.7	14.9	34.9	22.5



**What personal safety measures do you take under martial law? Please choose all relevant answers, %**

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions
I regularly monitor information about the threat of shelling in the media and messengers	48.1	68.1	63.7	68.4	65.4
I have generators or batteries as additional power sources	24.9	24.0	23.0	25.7	28.3
I regularly go down to bomb shelters / take covers during alerts	14.3	15.7	14.8	5.9	9.6
I stay at home and use the 2-wall rule during shelling	60.0	56.5	54.2	51.9	34.5
I have a grab-and-go bag ready with all necessary documents and things for evacuation	37.8	44.1	37.4	41.4	29.4
I use the means / have personal protective equipment and/or bleeding control devices	18.3	13.2	13.0	12.7	9.9
Other	1.6	0.3	1.1	0.6	2.3
Hard to say	5.5	2.9	4.4	2.3	8.8

**What personal safety measures do you take under martial law? Please choose all relevant answers, %**

	Men	Women
I regularly monitor information about the threat of shelling in the media and messengers	64.0	64.7
I have generators or batteries as additional power sources	29.1	23.7
I regularly go down to bomb shelters / take covers during alerts	11.0	12.7
I stay at home and use the 2-wall rule during shelling	42.9	43.9
I have a grab-and-go bag ready with all necessary documents and things for evacuation	30.6	39.7
I use the means / have personal protective equipment and/or bleeding control devices	12.5	11.8
Other	1.6	1.2
Hard to say	6.9	5.2

## Annex 6. Citizens' post-war vision

**After the war is over, which security problems will be more serious for Ukraine – internal or external?, %**

	Men	Women
Internal	23.3	21.7
External	16.5	16.3
Equally serious	52.0	53.6
Hard to say	8.3	8.4

**How serious do you think the following threats will be for Ukraine after the war is over?, %**

	Very serious threat	Not very serious threat	No such threat	Hard to say
<b>Resumption of the war</b>				
Total respondents	78.4	8.7	3.1	9.8
West	77.3	11.1	2.1	9.5
Centre	79.0	7.2	4.9	9.0
South	71.2	9.2	2.2	17.4
East	83.0	8.6	1.2	7.2
<b>Loss of part of the territory</b>				
Total respondents	75.0	12.5	3.4	9.2
West	74.5	14.3	3.3	7.9
Centre	79.4	9.0	4.0	7.5
South	58.4	15.8	3.8	22.0
East	75.8	15.5	1.8	6.9
<b>Loss of sovereignty, country's non-existence</b>				
Total respondents	61.4	15.5	12.2	10.9
West	60.5	19.1	10.2	10.1
Centre	61.6	13.8	15.5	9.1
South	56.3	13.3	10.3	20.1
East	64.9	15.7	8.9	10.5
<b>Political crisis</b>				
Total respondents	52.8	26.7	7.7	12.8
West	50.8	28.8	7.1	13.3
Centre	52.8	26.8	7.9	12.5
South	41.8	26.5	12.6	19.1
East	62.1	23.7	5.3	8.9
<b>Critical population decline due to military losses, emigration and falling birth rates</b>				
Total respondents	74.8	16.8	2.8	5.6
West	66.5	20.9	4.4	8.3
Centre	79.7	14.9	2.1	3.3
South	73.0	15.0	2.7	9.3
East	76.3	16.5	2.5	4.8
<b>Lack of labour resources for post-war recovery</b>				
Total respondents	67.7	20.7	5.3	6.2
West	59.6	25.4	6.7	8.3
Centre	70.9	20.6	3.9	4.7
South	68.9	16.1	5.7	9.3
East	71.1	17.7	6.3	5.0

Conflicts between different groups or segments of the population				
Total respondents	36.9	36.1	16.2	10.9
West	33.3	38.2	15.5	12.9
Centre	35.6	38.0	17.1	9.3
South	32.2	35.4	19.3	13.1
East	47.3	29.3	13.0	10.4
Deterioration of the crime situation				
Total respondents	51.2	30.8	7.1	10.9
West	44.9	33.0	9.3	12.8
Centre	51.3	32.8	6.1	9.8
South	47.6	28.8	10.9	12.8
East	61.6	25.0	3.8	9.6
Decline in living standards				
Total respondents	69.3	20.9	3.7	6.1
West	62.8	25.4	4.4	7.4
Centre	72.7	19.5	3.1	4.7
South	54.2	28.3	6.5	10.9
East	79.9	13.5	2.1	4.4
Unemployment				
Total respondents	54.6	26.2	12.7	6.6
West	53.5	28.6	10.7	7.2
Centre	47.2	30.5	14.9	7.4
South	71.7	10.6	9.5	8.2
East	61.7	22.9	12.2	3.1
Default, hyperinflation				
Total respondents	55.4	19.8	6.8	18.0
West	52.4	22.4	6.7	18.4
Centre	56.1	19.3	6.4	18.3
South	43.1	17.4	14.2	25.3
East	65.3	18.8	3.5	12.4
Failure of the government to support vulnerable and war-affected populations, including IDPs, persons disabled by the war				
Total respondents	61.6	20.2	6.1	12.1
West	58.2	22.8	6.0	13.0
Centre	64.2	18.8	6.2	10.9
South	50.0	20.5	8.7	20.8
East	67.5	19.9	4.6	7.9
Failure to build a modern army and establish military production				
Total respondents	54.1	20.8	13.1	12.0
West	54.1	24.7	9.5	11.7
Centre	53.5	19.4	16.5	10.6
South	40.3	24.0	15.0	20.7
East	64.1	16.8	9.2	9.9
Failure to restore the country's economy				
Total respondents	60.5	20.6	8.1	10.8
West	56.4	24.3	6.8	12.5
Centre	60.4	20.2	9.3	10.2
South	53.1	18.3	12.3	16.3
East	70.5	18.1	4.6	6.8
Corruption, which will make it impossible to reform and revive the country				
Total respondents	70.8	14.9	4.0	10.4
West	66.3	17.2	4.5	12.0
Centre	74.0	12.3	2.7	11.0
South	59.8	18.3	7.9	13.9
East	76.3	15.3	3.5	4.9

**In your opinion, which of the following measures at the national level can best ensure the security of Ukraine and its citizens in the post-war period? (Respondents could choose up to 5 answers), %**

	Areas near the contact line	Regions affected by missile attacks	Regions hosting IDPs	De-occupied territories	Relatively safe regions	ALL
Creating a modern, well-armed army	64.9	69.9	72.9	83.5	75.6	73.0
Developing our own defence industry and making new modern weapons	51.2	61.3	59.7	64.0	59.6	59.4
Becoming the NATO member	24.9	39.4	40.6	43.7	42.7	39.7
Fighting corruption and implementing reforms	36.7	38.4	34.1	25.1	34.8	35.5
Strengthening the border areas, building a modern border	27.8	31.3	34.7	25.5	37.0	33.3
Ensuring economic recovery, supporting small and medium-sized businesses	36.7	21.3	21.2	21.1	21.0	22.4
Restoring nuclear status (obtaining nuclear weapons from partners or creating own)	28.1	26.1	23.7	21.2	18.5	22.1
Becoming the EU member	14.8	15.2	17.9	18.8	24.7	19.9
De-mining of territories	28.9	22.2	18.6	18.1	15.2	19.2
Ensuring physical and psychological rehabilitation of war veterans and victims of war	23.1	19.9	16.6	12.4	15.6	17.5
Receiving reparations from Russia	19.4	19.6	17.4	18.4	12.5	15.7
Obtaining security guarantees from major countries	17.1	15.7	12.4	16.1	12.6	14.5
Having NATO and partner countries' military bases on our territory	13.6	15.5	17.5	13.8	14.1	14.3
Creating conditions for foreign investment in Ukraine	19.6	13.5	13.9	11.2	9.7	12.3
Supporting active reconstruction of infrastructure	22.7	12.2	13.2	10.9	9.1	11.6
Conducting de-oligarchisation of the economy and politics	8.5	11.5	9.2	8.9	8.7	9.6
Introducing basic military training as part of the school curriculum	4.5	4.9	5.2	3.5	6.2	5.4
Maintaining defence and security spending at a level of at least 5% of GDP	4.6	3.4	4.4	2.3	5.5	4.5
Introducing compulsory basic military training for Ukrainian citizens aged 18 to 60, regardless of gender	1.4	4.0	4.6	7.5	3.9	4.0
Implementing state policy to encourage forced migrants to return to Ukraine	3.3	4.3	3.8	5.9	3.4	3.5
Strengthening anti-Russian censorship in the media	3.0	2.3	2.9	0.9	4.0	3.1
Introducing universal military service for all Ukrainian citizens aged 18 to 60, regardless of gender	1.7	2.7	2.2	3.7	2.7	2.6
Simplifying procedures for citizens to exercise their right to own firearms	1.6	2.5	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.8
Other	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1
Hard to say	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.0	1.9	1.2

**In your opinion, which of the following measures at the local level can best ensure the security of Ukraine and its citizens in the post-war period?** *(Respondents could choose up to 5 answers), %*

Providing rehabilitation and assistance to the war-affected population	52.4
Building and maintaining shelters and protective structures	45.9
Establishing voluntary defence units, emergency rescue services, medical aid groups, and law enforcement in communities	43.1
Creating conditions for business development and employment	42.2
Introducing training courses on public and personal safety for the population	41.8
Setting up reliable alert systems in communities	34.1
Increasing the activity of community members, including on security issues	22.8
Other	2.1
Hard to say	6.1



