The SSR Adviser’s Handbook

By: Emma Skeppström with contributions from Frida Gabrielsson Kjäll
FBA is a Swedish government agency with the overall objective to contribute to lasting peace and development. The agency functions as a platform for cooperation between Swedish agencies and organizations and their international partners. Its main areas of responsibility are:

- Recruitment of Swedish civilian personnel to international peace operations
- Multifunctional education, training and exercises
- Policy, research and development
- Bilateral development cooperation in the field of peace and security
- Funding of civil society peace projects.

FBA has a preparedness to offer good offices for conflict management initiatives, such as talks between parties to a conflict. Within its mandate, it serves as a national point of contact with international organisations, including the UN, EU, AU, OSCE and NATO. The Academy aims for broad international participation in its activities, and cooperates closely with partner institutions throughout the world. The Folke Bernadotte Academy is named after Count Folke Bernadotte, the first official UN mediator and its mission reflects Sweden’s commitment to international peace and security.
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Foreword

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is fundamental for building sustainable peace and has become a priority on the global agenda. It is the process of creating a secure environment for citizens, where prosperity and democracy can grow and the rule of law is respected. It is to see the security needs of men, women, boys and girls and enable security institutions to take on effective, legitimate and democratically accountable roles in providing security for the societies they serve.

The SSR adviser has an instrumental role to play with regard to the sustainability of SSR. Security problems often reflect the wider structural problems of a society, such as poverty, governance difficulties and violent conflict. Consequently, security cannot be seen in isolation from its political, economic and social contexts. One of the main tasks of an SSR adviser is therefore to link the reform process to this wider context and, when giving advice, to always keep the political and holistic dimension in mind.

The SSR programme at the Folke Bernadotte Academy was established in 2007. Through training, the deployment of personnel, research, and policy and methodology development, FBA has contributed to the work evolving around SSR. This handbook is the latest contribution in this regard. It is hoped that it can serve SSR advisers within the European Union, the United Nations and other international organizations or those who are bilaterally deployed.

Sven-Eric Söder, Director General
Many people have contributed to the realization of this book. I would like to express my appreciation to those who have taken the time to answer my questions and provide me with their experience of working as or with an adviser. I am forever in their debt.

I also received a lot of input and inspiration from my participation in the course on Effective Advising in Peacebuilding Contexts developed by the International Peacebuilding Advisory Team. Special thanks go to the core team: Koenraad Van Brabant, Nora Refaeil and Jan Ubels.

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Emma Skeppström, Project Manager for Security Sector Reform at the FBA
Introduction

Although credit for the concept of security sector reform (SSR) is normally attributed to the then Secretary of State at the British Department for International Development (DFID), Clare Short, in a speech in 1998, the ideas behind SSR had been evolving since the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War allowed the political space to conceive of security beyond geopolitics, and to move towards a people-centred rather than state-centred approach to security within the human security paradigm. As a consequence, the role of the security sector had to be re-evaluated to enable it to meet the security needs of the population. SSR has since developed into a concept that frames technical reforms in a political process with the aim of making the security sector effective, affordable, transparent and accountable.

The number of international missions and programmes with an SSR mandate has increased in the past ten years, as SSR has emerged at the heart of the development and security nexus. SSR is undertaken in conflict and post-conflict settings but also in developing countries, post-authoritarian states and stable democracies. It is as an integral part of the statebuilding agenda, however, that SSR has gained most attention in recent years. This has led to a dramatic increase in the number of people working on SSR.

Expertise in assisting with SSR is a much sought-after quality and is of great importance to SSR interventions. Most advisers are recruited due to their command of a subject area or particular technical expertise but while technical knowledge is necessary, it is far from sufficient. An understanding of the reform process is required that goes far beyond technical expertise—to include the political and cultural dimensions and how SSR can contribute to shifting power balances and renegotiating the social contract between state and society. This means that
advisers will have to be prepared to participate in areas of work that were previously unknown to them.

Despite the rich panoply of policy frameworks, handbooks and guidance notes, there is still a lack of guidance specifically focused on the role of the SSR adviser or the specifics of an SSR portfolio that often has political dimensions. This handbook is an attempt to provide such guidance. This would enhance the effectiveness and impact of the SSR adviser, and probably make the reform process more sustainable in the long run.

The handbook provides insights into the role of an SSR adviser—the challenges connected to the role, and the tools, methodologies and best practice that can be applied when advising in complex political environments and reform contexts. It does not, however, dig deep into the more technical aspects of SSR, as these are areas which most advisers have already mastered.

Some of the suggestions in the handbook might at first sight appear to be far removed from the reality on the ground. The handbook should be seen not as providing ready-made or tailored solutions, but outlining points of departure from which an adviser can develop their own appropriate and unique actions and approaches.

The primary target audience is those appointed to SSR advisory positions in government departments or crisis management missions who will have vast technical experience but may lack capacity with regard to the political dimensions of SSR or the role of being an adviser.

The handbook is based on interviews with former and current SSR advisers with the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), or those bilaterally deployed. Represen-
tatives from advice recipient partner countries were consulted. FBA’s experiences in the area of SSR have also been taken into account. The relevant literature on advising in peacebuilding and statebuilding settings proved useful as background material.

Scope of the Handbook

Chapter 1 sets the stage for the SSR adviser by explaining the political dimensions of SSR and the importance of understanding politics in order to do the job properly. Chapter 2 describes the role of an SSR adviser. Chapter 3 looks at the preparatory phase of being an adviser. Chapter 4 focuses on the practicalities of working as an SSR adviser, focusing on issues such as building trust, developing and delivering advice, local ownership, gender, corruption and change processes. The annex to the handbook provides some useful tools that may facilitate the work of an SSR adviser.
As noted above, SSR is a concept that frames technical reforms within a political process with the aim of making the security sector more effective, affordable, transparent and accountable. What is meant by this?

The SSR agenda addresses a central building block of the modern state—the monopoly on the legitimate use of force—with the overall objective of achieving a balance between the security sector’s effectiveness and its legitimacy by responding to the security needs of the population. Within the security sector there will be a multitude of security actors that may require technical reforms, such as the police, defence forces or customs, to meet the security needs of the people. These reform processes are more often than not limited to the operational effectiveness and the mandate of a certain security sector.

At the same time, however, SSR is striving for democratic control and oversight, and the accountability of the security sector. Furthermore, the starting point for any SSR reform process is the people, which includes all members of society—men, women, boys and girls—and their security needs. This means that SSR should take a people-centric,
rather than the traditional state-centric, approach to security, based on
the notion of human security. In SSR, the relationship between the
state and members of society is therefore crucial. Hence, SSR is one of
the mechanisms for renegotiating the social contract between
individuals and groups in society, and the state. This makes SSR an
essentially political activity.

SSR touches on many of the fundamental elements of state sovereignty.
In many contexts, control over the security sector has meant the control
of power and control over the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
As in any other public administration reform, a common end goal for
SSR is to make security a ‘public good’. This will inevitably lead to
power balances being shifted. SSR is often a far more sensitive issue
than reforms to other sectors of public administration. Changing these
power balances can ultimately become an issue of life and death,
especially in post-conflict settings. This helps to make SSR both
political and highly challenging.

SSR is also about bringing the different technical reform processes
together and aligning the different parts of the sector. This requires
engagement at the highest political level, which further underlines the
political nature of SSR.
When I started working for the UN, a wise and experienced colleague told me that ‘political problems cannot be solved with technical solutions’. Applying this to my work with SSR processes, I could not agree more. As different as my experiences have been, they have one thing in common: that reform of the security sector is highly political but often met with technical solutions.

As an SSR adviser I have seen repeatedly during hostilities that the security sector has been used as an instrument, in many cases in an undemocratic, unaccountable, non-transparent way, to serve the interests of the ruling elite. After conflict, there has been a great void between political leaders, security officials and the people in the articulation of what security means and how it should be provided in a post-conflict setting. Only a political process can address this.

Instead, I experienced during my time as an SSR adviser that SSR is systematically viewed as, and translated into, a technical and logistical challenge rather than a social and political one. As a manifestation of that, the international community has been quick to provide technical assistance, in terms of equipment and capacity development, while ignoring the political nature of the problems related to the security sector.

Inefficient, corrupt and criminal aspects of a security structure are symptoms of the wider environment. It is therefore not difficult to draw the conclusion that the problems of a dysfunctional security sector cannot be resolved by mere technical support. Central to the problems of the security sector, but often ignored, is the will and readiness of the political leadership to undergo genuine reform and change. I have sat in countless meetings with national leaders who have been frustrated by the lack of political will to reform the security sector.
counterparts who have wanted to discuss equipment, helicopters and uniforms. As SSR advisers, often working for international donors, the objective is to widen the perspective and clarify the links to broader security issues and how these are related to governance, transparency and accountability. Unfortunately, there is no universal recipe for how to achieve this, but I have found that building trust and partnerships is a useful way to start the process.

In many countries where we engage in SSR it is tempting to spend endless resources and capacity to train specific actors in the security sector. One actor that tends to be the focus for international SSR support is the national police service, as it is the closest security authority to the people on the ground. And yes, although the national police might turn out to be well trained and competent to do their job, they will probably not be able to be part of the solution of a reformed security sector, unless the political leadership genuinely directs its security forces to respond to the security needs of the population and ensure a democratic, accountable and transparent delivery of security to its citizens as a public good.

After years of advising on SSR it has become clear to me that in order to succeed, a politically agreed SSR strategy must lead all technical SSR interventions and serve as a platform for SSR negotiations with partner countries and as a roadmap for the reform. That is not to say that supporting the technical aspects of SSR, linked to equipment and capacity, is not important. All of us who have been involved in SSR processes know that it is significant and remains a priority for any country undertaking SSR. The point is that technical commitments must be connected to strategic political frameworks and a clear vision of what the international community is trying to achieve with its support to the security sector and the country as a whole—and to clarity on what the political impetus for SSR is.
Chapter 1 sets out the foundations of the political dimensions of SSR. An SSR adviser is not first and foremost a technical adviser but an adviser who understands and is able to give advice on the political aspects of SSR. The SSR adviser needs to be able to link the technical reform process to the wider political picture, and this requires another set of competences in addition to, for example, purely police-, military- or correction service-related skills. An adviser also has to understand that he or she will to some extent be playing a political role. This is also true for advisers working at the tactical and operational levels, as such reforms need to be linked to the wider reform agenda. Hence, even the most technically focused adviser within the security sector needs to be able to incorporate an SSR dimension into their work.

SSR is more sensitive than other public administration reforms because the security sector is central to the issue of state sovereignty and the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Reform almost always leads to shifts in power balances. In the case of SSR, however, a loss of power or control might be dangerous for the people involved. Hence, an SSR adviser must be mindful of the consequences of the advice given and aware of the wider impacts of the reform process.

The complexity of reform processes and often the resistance to reform mean that SSR is not a quick fix but a rather lengthy process. The World Bank has indicated that reform processes this complicated can take up to a generation to conclude. An SSR adviser must therefore adopt a time perspective that goes far beyond the length of deployment of SSR.
an individual adviser. This long-term perspective, however, might run contrary to the wishes of donor governments and international organizations. Part of the role of an SSR adviser is therefore about the management of different expectations.

Key Skills and Qualities of an SSR Adviser
One of the main preconditions for being a successful SSR adviser is gaining the trust of the principal, who may be your local counterpart, the Head of Mission or another member of the leadership team. Without trust the adviser will almost certainly not be able to gain access to the principal, other relevant actors or information. Nor will the adviser be listened to. The issue of trust is more thoroughly explored in chapter 3. It is sufficient here to say that gaining trust is to a large extent about how the adviser interacts with the principal and how the adviser is perceived. Of course experience as a practitioner and technical expertise matter, but these will only get the adviser so far. Being a good adviser ultimately boils down to a certain set of personal skills and qualities.

An adviser for example needs to be:

• **A good listener:** Attention must be paid to the needs of the principal.
• **A communicator** with the ability to transmit advice in an easily understandable way.
• **Cooperative:** There will be many people seeking to give advice and this needs to be coordinated.
• **Culturally aware** with an awareness of the cultural differences between the adviser and others and that culture affects the way advice is given and received.
• **Empathetic:** The ability to comprehend the needs, feelings and views of others. This is not the same as being sympathetic, or feeling sorry for someone.
• **Flexible:** An ability to adjust to new circumstances.
• **Gender-responsive:** The security needs and rights of the whole population must be accounted for and taken into consideration when giving advice.3

3. The meaning of gender-responsive SSR is further elaborated in chapter 4.
• **Honest** about personal strengths and weaknesses, and only give advice that one truly believes in.

• **Humble**: A realization that external actors, including the adviser, are probably the people who know the least about the specific context.

• **Independent**: Not aligned to a specific individual or party. At times, advice that is uncomfortable or challenging might be required.

• **Observant**: Striving to understand relevant structures, institutions and individuals.

• **Open-minded**: The complex environment that advisers work in will constantly demand new solutions.

• **Patient**: SSR is not a quick fix and the reform process will probably not be finalized during an adviser’s deployment.

• **Politically aware**: SSR is a political process and other ongoing processes are linked to and will have an effect on SSR.

• **Respectful**: Treat the principal as an equal, or as a superior if they are more senior.

• **Transparent**: An openness about the areas of expertise the adviser possesses and the experience or information on which their advice is based.

This list is not exhaustive. Several more skills and qualities could be added to it. There might, for example, be occasions when advisers need to be blunt, or very clear about their opinion or the lines that they are not willing to cross, or resilient, by staying true to and not compromising on their norms and values. The list only serves to demonstrate the complexity that lies at the heart of the role of an adviser.

The Different Roles of an SSR Adviser

An adviser will not necessarily have only one interlocutor: the principal. There may be an entire institution. The work will include different contact areas and the role of an adviser will change over time. In his *Political Adviser’s Handbook*, Fredrik Wesslau (2013) describes the different core functions of a political adviser, which could easily be transferred to an in-mission SSR adviser. The functions described are upwards, downwards, inwards and outwards.
For an in-mission SSR adviser the principal will probably be the senior mission leadership, and the *upward function* therefore entails advising her or him on all matters related to SSR. Getting the mission leadership on board will be crucial to moving an SSR process forward, since these individuals might be more suitable to discuss the political dimension of SSR with. The SSR adviser is also the mission’s expert on SSR and is therefore supposed to be able to advise the rest of the mission on both planning and operational engagement. This is the *downward function*. The *outward function* consists of engaging with external interlocutors, such as the partner country and the actors in the international community involved in SSR. The *inward function* represents the interaction with headquarters and its SSR experts, for example the SSR unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations or staff at the European External Action Service.

Many SSR advisers, however, will not be in-mission advisers but instead co-located with the partner country. Here the main role will be to interact with the national principal in the partner country’s structure, for example in a ministry or government department—the *upward function*. Even though the adviser might have been assigned a principal, the task will also include interacting with other actors within the host structure—the *downward function*. The *inward function* would be interaction with the employer. Within the mission or as part of a team, this would include coordination and cooperation with other representatives of the mission. If deployed alone, for example bilaterally, there would be a role to play in connection with the donor. This would include information sharing and advising on SSR-related activities. The *outward function* would be the same as for the in-mission adviser.

These different roles pose a challenge to anyone providing advice. When working as a co-located adviser: is the adviser working for the headquarters or the principal? This is a difficult balancing act. There is no blueprint for this dilemma but if the principal feels that the adviser is listening more to headquarters than to her or him, it might be difficult to gain trust—and this would ultimately hamper the work of the adviser.
The different roles of being an adviser require different ways in which advice is delivered. Depending on whether the main focus is capacity growth or results, the adviser will play different roles. Figure 2.1 gives examples of the different roles an adviser might play. Although originally developed for consultants, these roles are a good fit for advisers too.

Figure 2.1 The different roles an adviser might play

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNSELLOR</th>
<th>COACH</th>
<th>PARTNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You do it. I will be your sounding board.</td>
<td>You did well; you can add this next time.</td>
<td>We will do it together and learn from each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACILITATOR</td>
<td>TEACHER</td>
<td>MODELLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You do it; I will attend to the process.</td>
<td>Here are some principles you can see to solve problems of this type.</td>
<td>I will do it; you watch so you can learn from me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFLECTIVE OBSERVER</td>
<td>TECHNICAL ADVISOR</td>
<td>HANDS-ON EXPERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You do it; I will watch and tell you what I see and hear.</td>
<td>I will answer your questions as you go along.</td>
<td>I will do it for you; I will tell you what to do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Champion, Kiel and McLendon (2010)

In Figure 2.1, the grid can be read in the following way: the further to the right, the more interventionist the role, focused on results; the higher up, the greater the focus on the capacity growth of the principal. Which role the adviser plays will depend on the capacity of the partner, their own capacity and skills, the mandate and the timeframe in which the adviser must work. An SSR adviser will have to take on different roles depending on the situation. The role of a reflective observer will almost certainly be the starting point, as an adviser will have to learn to understand both the context and the principal. The hands-on expert, on the other hand, is a role an adviser should try to avoid as this means leaving the role as an adviser and going back to being an implementer. There might also be other roles, not covered by the grid, which might have to be played. One example would be that of a broker, connecting people with one another.
Different Operational Environments

SSR can take place in many different contexts: in a conflict setting, such as in Somalia; in a post-conflict environment, such as Sierra Leone; in post-authoritarian countries, such as the Baltic states after the break-up of the Soviet Union, or in stable democracies, such as the reorganization of the police and military in Sweden. Usually, the political or operational environment will influence what can be achieved. An SSR adviser will probably be working in a conflict or post-conflict setting and might therefore deploy to a situation in which there are no or very few institutions to work with. Such a situation might be more about security sector creation than reform. In a more stable situation the adviser will work with established institutions. In other circumstances the adviser will be deployed at a time when the international community sees SSR as an exit strategy for its own engagement.

SSR will vary significantly depending on the context in which it is to take place. Different settings and countries will have their own history and dynamics that affect how the reform process will need to be carried out. All these aspects will affect the work of the SSR adviser and what the adviser will be able to contribute. It is thus important to understand what is feasible in the specific environment one is operating in. A common mistake for many advisers is trying to apply past experience in a new situation without analysing what is different. Even though past experiences are important, such as the way the police force is organized in one’s country of origin or the way that customs reform was carried out in a previous mission, the adviser needs to see beyond this and base the advice on the specific needs of the country at hand. Relying too much on experience from the home country might also result in overlooking informal systems for security provision. In a conflict or post-conflict setting these might be the most trusted providers of security. When looking at past reform processes to try to identify best practices and lessons learned, it might be more useful to look at neighbouring countries or to draw parallels from countries in the same region or with the same cultural context, as it is more likely that similarities will be found there.
In September 2011, the EU decided to deploy me to Bengasi in Libya, to assess the feasibility of the EU establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission on border control in the country. At that time most Libyan cities were still under the control of Qaddafi’s army. An attempt was made to put in motion a reform process of the defence, intelligence and internal security forces, including the revolutionary forces, as well as the justice sector in a country with an ongoing conflict and without an elected government in place.

Working as a Security Policy and Security Governance Adviser was very challenging for several reasons. First and foremost I was an outsider, and did not belong to the same culture and religion. On top of that I was a woman dealing with security issues. Nonetheless, my presence in Bengasi almost from the beginning of the revolution gained me huge credibility and opened doors to security actors and their beneficiaries until the day the EU Delegation was evacuated from Libya. I was no longer an outsider, a Westerner or a ‘she’.

Another challenge was that the international community tended to see Libya as another Afghanistan or Iraq, and therefore tried to model the reform process on those two examples. The conflict was very often simply dismissed as a ‘tribal issue’. In a highly chaotic situation I remained determined not to see the Libyan conflict and the transformation of the security sector as equivalent to other scenarios I had previously experienced. Instead I focused on an analysis of the surrounding political dynamic and the ongoing conflict between the armed groups on the ground.

I was also asked to give advice on SSR in a situation where the state...
security actors were not legitimate in the eyes of the revolutionaries. In Libya, the monopoly on the use of force is shared between actors that are not necessarily representatives of the state. This element is often challenging for an SSR adviser educated in and tasked with supporting an SSR process within a governmental framework.

In an ongoing and unresolved conflict the conditions for undertaking SSR are far from ideal due to the lack of political unity and absence of a social contract between the state and society. I had to focus on steps that you normally would not think of including in an SSR process, such as how to move from conflict to a more stable situation by managing the security context and its numerous actors. Due to the security situation in Libya, the crucial initial step of an SSR process—analysing and mapping the situation and relevant actors such as the various groups of freedom fighters—was either impossible or only partially possible. In addition, local ownership was missing as there was no constitution or other formal document to stipulate what security sector governance might look like.

I often wondered what my contribution could be in such chaos and what could be feasible in a situation where my Libyan counterparts were overwhelmed by a revolution that of course was affecting not only the security and justice sectors, but the entire state apparatus and the whole of civil society. What could I recommend that could make a difference?

A conflict context such as Libya is a fairly new one for SSR. Stabilization and the management of a fragmented security sector and the myriad security actors need to be linked to the political process, which entails the agreement of a new social contract. In Libya there was no political unity and a social contract was completely lacking. This meant that feasible conditions for undergoing SSR were absent. My experience has left me convinced that without a peace agreement and an agreed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process it is not feasible to proceed with SSR in a situation such as the Libyan one.
3. Preparing for the Advisory Role

Preparing for the advisory role starts at home, but continues once deployed in the field. Preparations will include analysing what can be done within the framework of the given mandate, the terms of reference, mission structure and timeline, and so on. These factors will establish the framework and room for manoeuvre. They may for example dictate which specific areas the advice should focus on and who one can or cannot interact with.

More importantly, preparing for the advisory role includes understanding the culture, religion, history, and so on, of the partner country and how this can affect the reform process. Hence, SSR expertise alone—even with the political dimension included—is insufficient when working as an SSR adviser.

Understanding the Context

For advice to be sound and relevant, context must be taken into account. An SSR adviser should be familiar with: (a) the political, cultural, religious and historical context of the country; (b) the socio-economic status of the country, including the social relations between men, women, boys and girls and how these influence their respective access to participation and influence, resources and protection; (d) the host nation’s strategic and geopolitical situation globally and regionally; (e) the international SSR agendas, and actors’ and the adviser’s relationships to these; (f) the national security framework and architecture; and (g) the fine detail of institutional and office politics and personal relations. The first step would of course be to use existing analyses to understand the situation, as long as a validation of their quality has been undertaken.
There might however be instances where this type of analysis has not been made, especially at the level of detail on the security sector that would be necessary. An adviser might therefore have to start by doing her or his own analysis.

Conducting a political economy analysis is a way to connect political and economic processes by looking at the distribution of power and resource within a society and how it is created, sustained and transformed over time.4 As SSR is a political process this type of analysis is necessary. It might however not be realistic for an individual adviser to undertake such a complex analysis. Here, the adviser would many times rely on the analysis of others.

For an adviser working in a conflict setting, a conflict analysis might be useful. A conflict analysis looks at the causes of, and actors and dynamics in, a conflict in order to gain a better understanding of the relationships and issues that contribute to the situation. Knowledge of the different aspects of a conflict situation can make actions and strategies more constructive. Apart from gaining a broad understanding of the context in which the reform is to take place, such an analysis can contribute to understanding the security actors’ role(s) in the conflict as well as the security deficit that might be the result of the conflict and that the reform process aims to address. Furthermore, the reform in itself might affect the conflict dynamics, especially if it is taking place during conflict. The conflict analysis is a way to understand how different steps of the reform will affect the dynamics between different groups.

It is important to include in the conflict analysis a gender dimension that encompasses not only men and women, but also age, ethnicity, socio-economic class, and so on, as different individuals will have different perspectives on and experiences of the conflict. Without this, the analysis will fail to accurately reflect the conflict dynamics. Again, a conflict analysis may be too complex for an individual adviser to carry out. Gen-

4. OECD (2012). For political economy analysis and security programmes see also Denney (2016).
erally, ‘good enough’ thinking is required, which means accepting that the analysis can never be exhaustive or provide absolute clarity.

Sometimes an SSR adviser is assigned to a certain person or position. In other instances the adviser will be providing advice to an institution. No matter which, it is important to identify all the actors it might be important to influence, especially if assigned to a principal who is reluctant to reform. Actor mapping is used to identify the relevant actors, their relationships and their mandates.

Stakeholder analysis, on the other hand, can be of assistance in identifying the relevant stakeholders and the interests they represent. It reveals who has the real influence, the agents for change, the key actors who have to be won over, who to focus on and who to ignore. These types of analysis are important tools for gaining a better understanding of who to engage with.

These preparatory tasks are dynamic and will require regular revisiting. They are not something to be done only at the beginning of the work, but constantly throughout the deployment. It is worth noting, however, that once deployed the adviser might have little time to conduct these types of analyses. Nonetheless, it is worth dedicating some time to this process as it will mean that the advice given will remain much more relevant and be more sustainable in the long run.

Some tools for facilitating analysis and mapping can be found in annex 1.

The National Security Architecture
Regardless of the context in which an SSR adviser is working, the adviser never arrives with a clean sheet of paper. The starting point will almost always be the national security architecture, including the decision-making and oversight structures and institutions, management frameworks, and national visions, strategies, policies and plans5;

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5. For more detailed information on policies and strategies see United Nations (2012).
or, in other words, the structures within parliament, the government, ministries, and so on, that work on security and oversight of the security sector, as well as the documents setting out a country’s security priorities and how these should be addressed. These structures vary between countries. An adviser at the strategic level will probably work with, and be co-located within, the national security architecture.

Understanding the national security architecture will help the SSR adviser to identify the key actors and important documents that are already in place, such as national security strategies and policies or agency-specific strategies. Documents that tend to be overlooked are the national budget, where one will find the economic framework in which the reform process must take place—a reformed security sector cannot cost more than the funds allocated—and national commitments to and strategies on gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the prevention of gender-based violence. Since 2012 the UN and the World Bank have joined forces to conduct so-called security sector public expenditure reviews (SSPERs), which look more closely at the affordability of the security sector. Such reviews will also play a valuable role.

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When I first arrived in Monrovia, where I was to work as an SSR co-ordinator at the Swedish Embassy, I thought I was fairly well prepared, having read relevant guidance documents, action plans and process papers. I had also been working with the Liberian security sector from Stockholm and had visited Monrovia on a couple of occasions. I soon realized that my preparations were far from enough. The first weeks were filled with confusion. I realized that nothing was what it seemed and that I had to dig deeper into the Liberian context.

The first thing I did was to map out the security and justice sector on the wall by my desk. I read and re-read documents and I interviewed everyone I could get hold of. I used a lot of post-its and I drew lines between the actors. I rearranged them all one week and then again after another week. I started to use thicker lines for relationships of power and thinner lines for relationships of influence. I used different colours for internal, external and intraparty actors. It was quite a complex map in the end, but in retrospect it was the best way to use those first weeks in Monrovia. This is how I came to understand the National Security Architecture of Liberia.

To be able to give context-specific advice based on relevant and accurate information takes time and effort. It means being ready to digest enormous amounts of text as well as spending time talking to people. I pretty soon learned that a successful approach was two-fold. I first tried to do my homework to figure out where the decisions were being made. That way I knew when to be prepared for ‘crunch time’. The second, equally important, part was to be kept in the loop in the preparations for the decision-making, which meant being constantly in contact with people.

One important lesson was to always keep an eye on the national budget.
I soon discovered that it seemed as if the budget was in a silo, and that not much interaction was taking place. Regarding the Ministry of Finance as an integral part of the security sector is often overlooked, but it makes all the difference. Expenditure reviews and national budget plans might appear a little frightening, but taking time to ‘follow the money’ made the fog lift a little bit.

The National Security Architecture says a lot about the dynamics of, as well as the relationships, gaps and overlaps within, the sector. Bringing actors together can sometimes help increase understanding of the respective standpoints, but it can also help to take technical discussions to the strategic level and jointly discuss the long-term vision. Together with national and international partners, we did an overall mapping of roles and responsibilities, and oversight and accountability within the security sector. Responsible budget planning and resource mobilization as well as effective coordination came out as strong contenders as upcoming challenges.

These different measures were the approach I took as an adviser to become aware of the new context that I was to work in. It was time-consuming and complicated but in the end gave me a fairly good understanding of the Liberian context, and became the foundation on which my continuing work could rest.
4. Working as an SSR Adviser

Having understood the political underpinnings of SSR and the importance of understanding the specific context, there are certain additional elements without which the provision of advice becomes futile: building functioning relationships based on rapport and trust; assessing how advice is developed and delivered; ensuring local ownership and gender-responsiveness; reacting to corruption; handling resistance; and developing strategies to consolidate change.

Getting Access: Building Trust

An SSR adviser is highly dependent on their relationship with the principal. This relationship has to be built on trust and rapport if the principal is to accept the advice offered. There is no single way to gain the trust of the principal (or other relevant actors). This has to be adjusted to each individual. It is therefore important to get to know the principal. Furthermore, building trust takes time and cannot be rushed. The initial phase of the work as an SSR adviser is therefore complicated but nonetheless extremely important.

Becoming a trusted adviser is a two-fold process. It has a technical dimension—the ability to provide the right information. This is based on previous knowledge of the subject matter but also on the ability to ask the right questions and to gain an accurate picture of the current situation. It also has an emotional dimension—giving the right information in the right way. This includes gaining an understanding of the needs, drivers and beliefs of the counterpart and adjusting the way in which advice is delivered accordingly. It also entails being aware of and
learning how to read subconscious ways of communicating, such as body language, tone and voice.

Some tips that will assist the adviser in gaining trust and building rapport are set out below:

Get to know the principal, both professionally and personally. This will tell you what type of adviser and style of advice he or she is interested in.

Establish a peer-to-peer relationship. This could be done by acknowledging the principal’s skills and competences and viewing the principal as an equal, or when applicable as a superior. The principal will certainly know the system to a much greater extent than the adviser.

Building trust is a long-term process. It is therefore difficult to have an impact as an adviser if not deployed long term. Be aware of the limitations that the deployment time might cause. Seasoned advisers estimate that it takes at least three months to gain initial trust, and this assumes that the main principal remains in post.

Do not start planning for SSR without the principal. The process should be locally driven and the adviser is only there to assist the principal.

Self-awareness and self-management are important tools for an adviser. What are the adviser’s strengths and weaknesses? What would be the usual reaction in a specific situation? What signals are sent out by body language and the tone of the voice? It is important to remember that these types of signals are not universal but vary between different countries and cultures. By analysing this it will become easier to respond to the principal in an appropriate way.

It is important that the adviser and the principal have the same view on the role the adviser is to play. There should be a mutual understanding
of the adviser’s terms of reference so as not to create unnecessary misunderstandings. Given the sensitive and often political nature of SSR, terms of reference not only provide transparency and clarity between the SSR adviser and the principal, but can also be useful for the rest of the team, department or organization. It may also be a good idea to be open about strengths and weaknesses.

Be consistent and show integrity. In this way the adviser will show that he or she is a person to be trusted. It is also important to show loyalty to the principal.

Start small. It will probably be difficult to assess the really complicated and sensitive issues at first. Any issue, no matter how trivial, is a good starting point if an opportunity arises and the adviser is asked to contribute.

Develop and Deliver SSR Advice

An SSR adviser must always acknowledge the political dimension of SSR and their SSR advice. Hence the advice should be based on an understanding of the links between different parts of the security sector, and between the work of the principal and other ongoing processes within the security sector.

This can be exemplified using reform of a certain actor, in this case police reform. Police reform would include several different actors and institutions, such as the ministry of the interior, the police service, the ministry of finance and parliament. An adviser might be assigned to work with the police service. The advice given to the principal has to be based not on what would work for the police service in isolation, but on what would work for the police service in tandem with all the other actors and institutions. Furthermore, for their advice to be sound and relevant, an adviser needs to be aware of and understand what is going on in the other parts of the security sector and at the highest level of the national security architecture.
Developing and delivering advice is also about managing expectations. An adviser might be working for two different entities, a formal employer—a mission or donor—and the principal, including the host nation. The expectations of these different actors are not likely to be identical and there will be a tendency to adjust the work in accordance with the employer’s priorities. It is therefore important to analyse what type of advice is feasible and, to the furthest extent possible, to meet these different expectations, but also to discuss what is realistic to achieve.

**Good SSR advice can be defined by the following principles:**

**Evidence-based.** Advice should be founded on proven results and lessons learned. There may have been earlier attempts to reform and previously deployed advisers. What can be learned from these processes?

**Forward-looking.** An adviser needs to think ahead and identify future needs. For example, since SSR is a long-term process the adviser needs to bear in mind what security needs might exist in the years to come and how the security sector should be adjusted accordingly.

**Gender-responsive.** How the advice will affect different parts of the population should be taken into consideration. For example, does the advice address the different security needs of the population? Will it contribute to equal access to the security institutions? Will it enhance the participation of previously excluded or underrepresented groups in the reform process?

**Inclusive.** An adviser has to remember that he or she does not have an executive role to play. The problems and solutions are not the adviser’s, but he or she can assist in identifying them. Advice should therefore be developed in close dialogue with the principal. What does the principal envisage with regard to the security sector? In what way can the advice given contribute to fulfilling this vision? National security plans and strategies can play an important role here.
SSR Advice in the Field: Building Trust with Counterparts
by Andreas Berg

For almost two years I served as a Senior SSR Adviser to the Kosovo Security Council (KSC) Secretariat. This institution supports the work of the KSC to coordinate security policy between ministries, agencies and other government actors. Among its more relevant tasks are the coordination of major security strategies, such as the Strategic Security Sector Review carried out in 2012–2014 and the National Security Strategy. This institution has not been in an easy position, often ignored and bypassed by its own government, marginalized in favour of stronger voices and ministries seeking to impose their views, and poorly supported by political leaders. I have nonetheless worked to promote and strengthen the position and capacity of the secretariat and its staff, while advocating its role as part of a properly functioning SSR process in Kosovo. My relationship with colleagues in the secretariat was excellent and the level of trust was very high. This took time to develop. The saying that ‘trust is earned’ is no cliché, and it took me around six months of simply being and working in the office to feel that I had been accepted as an integral part of the team by those I worked closely with. In this regard, the first step to reaching a place of trust is to be patient, take the time to listen to the concerns and priorities of your colleagues, and use what you learn to investigate the local context further.

Taking the time to listen to the concerns of my institution and investigating them further made it clear to me that the support I could provide would be split into two parts—basic capacity building and higher strategic support, both of which are as critical as the other to achieving sustainable reform of
institutions and processes. Basic capacity building could be defined as identifying grass-roots needs, providing educational courses and study visits, facilitating communication between the institution and international partners, and promoting the role of especially talented or competent staff. Higher strategic support would constitute an understanding that your role as SSR adviser can only be carried out if changes take place outside the institution where you are based. Why is the institution you are advising in need of help? What is the wider government context of this problem? How can it be fixed? Which partners can be worked with to encourage such steps? In this sense, a broad strategic view is critical to providing good advice and, more importantly, ensuring that such advice makes an impact.

Finally, I would note the importance of sincerity in approaching the institutions and tasks with which the SSR adviser engages. This may also sound like a cliché, but in international post-conflict situations and contexts where multiple international advisers have sought to leave their mark—perhaps repeatedly on the same institutions—it is easy for an international adviser to be seen as yet another voice dictating policies and lessons to local staff without showing real engagement and understanding for the needs and struggles of a particular institution or process.

An adviser who knows her or his role clearly, can connect the daily support to the wider context of SSR in the national or regional context—and feels supported in this work by their home government or institution—can be sincere and supportive in a manner that makes trust truly possible. There is no shortcut to trust, and it cannot be achieved without a genuine and clear goal on the part of the SSR adviser. With this you will be able to approach the challenging role of the adviser from a position of strength.
**Innovative and creative.** An adviser should be able to see a situation from a new perspective and find solutions that have not been thought of before. For an SSR adviser it is important not to focus too much on experiences from previous missions or her or his country of origin. Those reform processes and structures might not fit the current situation. Do not be afraid of unique solutions and building on existing, non-traditional security structures if that will move the process forward.

**Joined up.** There will be several actors working on the same issues. Make sure to coordinate with other actors before giving advice. There might for example be different views among the international partners on what the security sector should look like and be used for. SSR advice should be based on counterparts’ views of the future security sector, and these need to be conveyed and discussed among the different advisers.

**Outward looking.** What else is out there that can affect the reform process? How can the advice contribute to other ongoing processes? As SSR is a political process, there will be other ongoing initiatives that must be taken into account. In addition, because SSR is part of a larger statebuilding agenda, it is important to reflect on how the advice given could affect the statebuilding process at large.

**Sustainable.** When giving advice, keep in mind how suggestions could affect the security sector in the long run. Furthermore, will the advice contribute to a situation in which the results of the reform can be sustained after the international support has been withdrawn? For example, will the security sector be affordable for the state?

**Local Ownership**

Local ownership is one of the main principles of SSR. There is no single definition of local ownership, but a useful description by Laurie Nathan is that ‘local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, man-
aged and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors’.⁷ This means that the adviser must not be the driver of the process, but instead be there to support and help. An adviser should not try to impose ideas or solutions on their principal but rather present creative ideas or argue for a certain point of view.

Why Local Ownership is a Prerequisite for Sustainable SSR
To be sustainable, SSR must be based on the needs and priorities of the host country. Those needs and priorities can only be identified by the country itself. If the local counterpart has not been included from the very beginning, there might be no individuals or institutions that are willing or able to carry on a reform process initiated by an external actor once the international community leaves. Thus, international engagement has the capacity to catalyse and support reform but can never carry out the reform. The question is consequently not how the international community can do SSR in partner countries but rather how the international community can support local actors in the best way possible to undertake SSR in their countries.

How to Ensure Local Ownership
Local ownership is complicated for a variety of reasons. First and foremost: who represents the local ownership? Local ownership is often defined as the state, but the state structure, which is what an adviser is most likely to be supporting, may not be representative of the population. Because SSR must be based on the needs of men, women, boys and girls, public participation in the reform process is crucial. If advisers are unaware of the security needs of the population, they will not understand the core problems and the response will be neither relevant nor sustainable.

Second, if working in a conflict or post-conflict setting, there might be no, or very few formal institutions established to work with. Part of the work might therefore include advising on what structures and institu-

tions need to be in place and supporting capacity building to that end. Third, there might be no interest in the reform process or resistance to change by the local counterpart, or the state as a whole. In many instances the initiative for reform might not have come from within, but from the international community as part of a peacebuilding and statebuilding process. An adviser might therefore have to start by creating an interest in the reform process that would eventually lead to goodwill, commitment and, in the end, ownership. Even in this case, however, such a process must be grounded, to the greatest extent possible, in local ownership of the process and its goals.

Local ownership is a complex matter and it can sometimes be difficult to determine the extent to which it really exists. Interpeace has developed a set of indicators where the key point is to determine who takes the key decisions:

- Who defines the problem?
- Who sets the agenda and the priorities?
- Who convenes?
- Who manages the trajectory, rhythm and length of the intervention?
- Who owns the results of a process?
- How do people, particularly those close to a process, talk about it—especially in informal and unofficial settings? Do they refer to it as ‘our process’, ‘our programme’, ‘our institution’ or ‘our results’?
- Do people continue a process even if an external supporting agent is not present? (short of, for example, financial means making it impossible to continue)
- Do people support the implementation of decisions taken?
- What other indicators might there be?
- Are there context-specific indicators?8

When using these types of questions, it is important to remember to use disaggregated information in order to understand how men and women are representing the local ownership.

8. Adapted from Interpeace (2010).
How to Ensure Local Ownership as an SSR Adviser

What can an adviser do to ensure local ownership? First, the adviser needs to be aware of her or his role and how it affects local ownership. Is the adviser doing things on her/his own or allowing the principal to be in the driving seat? Is advice based on assumptions or the genuine needs of the country? Ensuring local ownership as an adviser also means being aware that your counterparts might not be representative of the population and its views on the security sector. A co-located adviser might want to try to encourage the principal to engage with non-state actors. If working as an in-mission adviser, the advice to the principal would be to raise these issues in the dialogue with the partner country. It is important to remember, however, that there is no consensus on what constitutes local ownership, and both the principal and the mission might take a much narrower view. Hence, there may be a need to demonstrate how public participation would enhance the sustainability of the reform process.

Gender-responsive SSR

In order to support an SSR process that is people-centred and driven by local ownership an SSR adviser needs to deliver advice in a gender-responsive manner. This section provides some basic suggestions on how such advice can be delivered and outlines some of the challenges related to the delivery of gender-responsive advice to SSR.

Early and systematic integration of gender perspectives into SSR is necessary in order to achieve a democratic, representative and sustainable security sector. A gender-responsive security sector is also a prerequisite for the security sector’s ability to provide security according to the needs of all individuals in society.

Gender refers to the identity of being a man or a woman in a given context. It informs the social norms in a society and consequently the society’s expectations on how to behave as a man or woman, boy or girl. These social expectations, sometimes referred to as femininity and masculinity, influence the limitations and opportunities that men, women, boys and girls experience in a particular context.
Local ownership is often considered to be the foundation for successful SSR but political incoherence and divided communities exist in most theatres of operation, which makes identifying the ‘local’ a subjective task. There is no single, clear definition of ‘local ownership’ but in my opinion the best guidance was offered by Laurie Nathan (see above).

Local ownership supposes a two-way relationship and commitment. In the context of police reform I tend to think that local ownership means that those with a vested interest in the outcome and who will ultimately be responsible for the leadership and implementation should identify the policing model, structures and services. This also includes civil society. My experience of policing in the United Kingdom and internationally has taught me that bespoke solutions, which take cognizance of specific local needs, are more likely to receive buy-in and support than an imported model, which few local actors are educated or trained to deliver. When working with Somalia to develop a more community-based policing model we were very aware that in some areas the challenging security situation demanded the establishment of not only community liaison officers, but also an armed unit capable of repelling the threat of attack by militants. Not the standard approach to ‘community policing’, but one we found necessary in order to respond to meet local needs.

Too often projects are established and led, with good intentions, by international donors/NGOs, but fail as soon as the funding ends or the international programme lead moves on. Some such programmes, as I witnessed in Somalia, can do more harm than good. There I learned of a police unit, established with short-term international funding to deal with women...
victims of sexual crime, conducting intrusive medical examinations using untrained staff. When questioned they explained that they had learned from their ‘Western advisers’ that this was a prerequisite for criminal investigations but after the international project closed, they were left without sufficient trained staff. They were working with ‘who they had’.

Ensuring local ownership is challenging in practice. Establishing buy-in and ownership of local solutions is often fraught with internal rivalries, politics and conflicting demands. In Libya I found resolving local divisions required careful and sustained negotiations with local leaders from all parties to the conflict and/or political intervention and influence. This can stall or slow the pace of implementation—and works against international mandates where timescales, particularly for reform, are frequently unrealistic. Failure to commit this time and effort will inevitably reduce the chances of success.

Local ownership is also often about engaging women, since they tend to be excluded from the security sector. Supporting women as leaders—particularly in historically male-dominated uniformed services—can be controversial. Persuading senior male leaders to optimize the number of women officers can mean a significant change in cultural norms and needs to be approached in a sensitive and time appropriate manner. I have found that supporting a respected senior male officer who recognizes the value of bringing women into his team to act as ‘gender champions’ can be more persuasive than some gender-specific actions. It is also imperative to ensure sustainability and to provide long-term support to women who may feel challenged and isolated when entering a workplace with a lack of inclusive and gender equal norms and practices.
Gender informs for example the division of labour between men and women and their respective opportunities to access and control resources and political power.

Gender-responsive SSR implies awareness of the social roles applied to men, women, boys and girls in the relevant context and an assurance that the different needs, experiences and perspectives that arise from these roles are taken into account when SSR is being planned and implemented.

Social expectations of how women and men should behave and interact vary between and within contexts and are in turn influenced by other aspects of identity, such as age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability and social class. The role of an SSR adviser is to understand how these aspects interact and produce different forms of inequality in relation to for example accessing security services, interacting with security sector actors and influencing the national security agenda.

Social norms linked to being male or female continue to pose problems in relation to SSR. In many contexts existing norms lead to fewer women being accepted into, or wanting to be a part of, the security sector, for example as police officers. However, if the police service is to have credibility, it is crucial that it is representative of the whole population. For men, existing social norms can make them more susceptible to recruitment into armed groups or prone to use violence to resolve disputes. SSR needs to address these core problems.

Why Gender-responsive SSR is a Prerequisite for Sustainable SSR
Advice on gender-responsive SSR is more likely to be sustainable and responded to if it is context specific and based on national and international commitments and strategies to promote gender equality. To mention a few: United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 and United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 of 2000 (together with the following seven supporting resolutions) on
Women, Peace and Security. CEDAW has been confirmed and agreed on by 187 countries and therefore constitutes a legally binding document for these states.\(^9\) It is recommended that advice, to the extent possible, is based on the existing legal frameworks in the relevant context.

There are also operational arguments for why SSR needs to be gender-responsive. These relate to ownership, effectiveness and strengthened oversight and accountability.\(^10\)

*Local Ownership*

A security sector that reflects society as a whole when it comes to the above-mentioned identity factors, such as sex, age, ethnicity and social class, is more representative of the population and therefore more likely to promote a wider interest and public trust in security sector institutions. Broader representation in SSR can consequently be expected to strengthen local ownership of the reform and the reformed security sector.

*Effective Provision of Security*

In the same way that the social roles of men and women differ, the security needs of men and women can differ too. Men in some contexts might be more vulnerable to political violence and direct violence than women, as they may be perceived as more political or as fighters for the opposing side. Women might be more subject to indirect violence, harassment or domestic violence as a result of their gender role. How the security needs and experiences of men and women differ must however never be assumed but should be assessed in the relevant context.

Because gender is central to an individual’s experience of security, a gender-responsive security sector will deliver more effective security services as they will be more knowledgeable of and responsive to the different security needs in society. A gender-responsive security sector can be particularly important in post-conflict settings; for example,

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\(^9\) Reservations are sometimes applied to ratified legal frameworks. For more information see Grina (2011).

\(^{10}\) Kristin Valsek (2008).
in how it addresses post-traumatic stress and domestic violence which may have increased as a consequence of the conflict.

**Democratic Oversight and Accountability**
Increasing the participation in oversight bodies responsible for SSR, such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, by groups that were previously excluded or discriminated against helps to make these institutions more representative. This in turn is likely to increase the public’s interest and confidence in the security sector and therefore contribute to strengthening the democratic oversight and accountability of the sector. Broadened participation in oversight functions is also likely to strengthen the capacity of these institutions, as they will become more informed of the different security needs and experiences of different groups in society.

**How to Ensure Gender-responsive SSR**
Advice on gender-responsive SSR has to be based on the security needs and capacities of men, women, boys and girls in the relevant context. In practice this means that the collection of information needs to take into account the perspectives of various groups in society, not least those groups which may have been excluded from influence over the formal security agenda.

For example, women’s organizations and other civil society organizations are often already engaged in the informal provision of security services to marginalized groups in society. This means that such organizations could have first-hand, context-relevant expertise regarding the insecurities faced by certain groups in that specific society. It also means that they have access to and knowledge of the key actors involved and affected. A gender-responsive SSR will recognize and include this expertise.

Gender-responsive advice on SSR can entail the promotion of a more gender-balanced security sector workforce or support aimed at making security institutions more responsive to the different needs and experi-
ences of all groups in society. \(^{11}\) Two key and complementary approaches can be applied to promoting a gender equal security sector: gender mainstreaming and gender-specific activities. \(^{12}\)

*Gender mainstreaming* in relation to SSR is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of men and women, boys and girls an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR. It is a strategy for promoting gender equality and ensuring that inequality is not perpetuated by SSR-related initiatives. \(^{15}\)

The basis for gender mainstreaming in SSR is an initial analysis that identifies the social relations between men, women, boys and girls and how these influence their respective security needs and capacities in relation to SSR. In many of the contexts currently undergoing SSR there have been only limited specific analyses conducted of the different needs, experiences and perspectives of men, women, boys and girls in relation to the security sector. It will therefore be likely that the adviser will have to obtain this information from broader, but nonetheless context-specific, gender analyses and analyses of the security sector. As noted above, it is important to look at *all* the relevant social variables that influence gender in order to successfully gender mainstream envisaged reforms. Analyses should therefore always aim to include disaggregated data. A tool for gender analysis is included in annex 1 to this handbook.

Examples of gender mainstreamed activities are: the development of legislation that promotes the equal rights of men and women; strategies and action plans that promote equal access to justice and security services for men, women, boys and girls; the development of codes of conduct to prevent and address gender-based violence and gender discrimination; and gender-responsive budgeting in the security sector.

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11. Gender-balance is about the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work and at all levels, including in senior positions.
13. Gender equality refers to equal opportunities and outcomes for women and men. This involves ending discrimination and structural inequalities in access to resources, opportunities and services.
As highlighted above, information on the budget allocated to the security sector can provide important information about national security priorities. Similarly, the aim of conducting gender-responsive budgeting in the security sector is to understand and analyse the distribution of resources according to security needs and opportunities for participation in the security sector. The aim of SSR-related gender budgeting is to ensure that the distribution of resources promotes equal rights and access for all groups in society.

*Gender-specific activities* are targeted support that addresses particular problems that contribute to sustaining inequality. In relation to SSR this can relate to particular security needs or to equal opportunities for participation.\(^{15}\) Gender-specific activities must also be based on an initial analysis, without which it is difficult to identify the different needs and opportunities of specific groups. The analysis will also inform how to prioritize the implementation of the SSR process going forward. Examples of gender-specific activities related to SSR include promoting the participation, retention and advancement of women in the police service by establishing targets for women’s recruitment or a specific initiative to prevent and respond to violence among male youth.

**How to Influence Gender Integration as an SSR Adviser**

Advising on gender in relation to SSR does not require substantially different skill-sets from those highlighted above. However, as ideas of femininity and masculinity, and consequently the division of labour, are so prevalent in the discourse of the security sector, comprehensive gender awareness is a prerequisite for advising on this issue in a professional and strategic manner. In addition, it may be the case that certain skills and attributes, such as cultural and political awareness, become even more relevant as gender is often closely linked to cultural identity and power structures in the contexts where SSR is most commonly supported.
As noted above, ensuring the provision of context-specific and locally relevant advice requires a thorough understanding of the different needs, priorities and experiences of different groups in society. The advisory role therefore includes a responsibility to properly account for the experiences and needs of underrepresented groups in the formal security sector setting.

In order to be sensitive to possible controversies, any advice on gender must be based on an understanding of how such initiatives can and will be perceived in the relevant context. Before making recommendations on how to increase women’s participation in the armed forces, for example, it is important to be aware of how such an initiative will be received by local counterparts and what protective and preventive measures are in place to promote and sustain such an initiative. The same approach applies when advising on a gender perspective in the face of resistance. Advice should always be based on an understanding of how it might be perceived and on information received from a broad representation of stakeholders in the relevant context.

Gender-responsive SSR is a prerequisite for a democratic, representative and sustainable security sector. It is never an option to omit or dismiss this part of the process. Prioritizing and planning the advice, however, needs to be built on the local context and local ownership.

Corruption

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Two objectives of SSR are to make the security sector more accountable and more transparent. The use and control of government funds, investments and contracts must be as transparent as possible, and civil servants must be held accountable for how resources are allocated and spending is prioritized.
I served as a gender expert for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). I worked for two EU-led SSR missions: EUSEC (defence reform) and EUPOL (police reform). Working as a member of the civilian staff on gender issues in a military- and police-dominated environment requires some steps to be carefully followed. The first is to really understand the mission’s mandate and my specific terms of reference as a gender expert. One of the pitfalls for experts working on gender issues, whether related to SSR or not, is to assume that our terms of reference make us women’s experts or experts supporting women’s empowerment in the host country.

The mandate of EUSEC RD CONGO included technical support to modernize the financial systems in the army and fight against impunity. The integration of a gender component meant supporting the army to identify and work on the obstacles, such as social perception, low pay, the allocation of resources, career paths and poor working and living conditions, that were preventing men and women from specific categories from joining the army. Working to fight impunity meant supporting the establishment of structures and procedures, such as vetting during recruitment and promotion, and internal oversight structures, to prevent and punish bullying, sexism, harassment, tribalism, and other forms of misconduct.

It is important to see our position as a support function, which means I had to provide practical guidance to my colleagues and the senior staff on gender issues in full compliance with the mission’s mandate. Once I had understood my terms of reference, I also had to be aware of the resources each mission would provide for my work. They were limited in my case but I managed to fill the gap by slowly and steadily building alliances.
with external organizations, which agreed to fund common projects that aimed to strengthen the capacities of the local security forces (army and police) to better investigate sexual and gender-based violent crimes and disseminate core values related to discipline (code of conduct) and respect of human rights.

I also realized that to do my job better, I had to regularly explain my position to my colleagues in a very simple and practical way in order to keep them on my side. I was quite often perceived as a social worker who could support any woman who was suffering in my area of responsibility. For instance, I explained to my colleagues that a gender component in an SSR process means supporting the local police force to be better equipped, in terms of training, equipment, specialized units and legal procedures, to investigate crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence.

The first change I observed was within the mission: my colleagues interacted more often with me by seeking my advice, and the leadership always backed my position, despite having had legitimate reservations at the beginning. It took me at least six months to complete my first stakeholders' analysis with local actors. This time was needed to avoid rushing in and raising false expectations about the EU's mission and the resources available for SSR and gender in the country.

I have learned from my field experience as a gender expert on SSR that the key requirements for me to be an effective expert were: (i) to understand the mandate, the internal structure and available resources of both missions; (ii) to approach my colleagues and understand their work in order to provide inputs into their work; (iii) to make constant efforts to build alliances within and outside the mission; and (iv) to have a deep knowledge of my local counterparts in order to be able to manage their expectations and frustrations.

I managed to achieve realistic results, given that my presence in the country was so short. It was a constant balance between achieving concrete results and emphasizing the lengthy process of building trust with my colleagues and local counterparts in order to do my job in a more effective manner.
Furthermore, the procedures by which the government manages security sector funds must be transparent and documented, just like any other sector of public administration. Transparency over the provision of incentives, privileges and promotions is another way to avoid corruption. A security sector that is controlled by a civilian political leadership that can exercise financial control would contribute to achieving this.

Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, has developed a framework for understanding corruption in the defence and security sectors. Even though it mostly has the defence sector in mind, it can shed some light on corruption in the broader security sector.

**According to the framework, corruption can be divided into five broad risk areas:**

- **Political**, when individuals or groups are able to influence defence and security policy for their personal gain.
- **Finance**, misusing budgets for personal gain.
- **Personnel**, where payroll, recruitment and appointment processes as well as rewards and disciplinary matters favour certain individuals.
- **Procurement**, when the procurement of equipment and material is used for personal gain.
- **Operations**, when peacekeeping and intervention forces become a source of corruption.

The first four areas at least can also be applied to the structures and institutions an adviser has to support. Keeping these risk areas in mind could help the adviser to identify ongoing corruption.

The most pertinent challenge when working as an adviser might not be a corrupt system but rather a corrupt counterpart—the individual or individuals one is working closest with. An adviser does not normally choose her or his principal; the principal is normally assigned to the

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adviser. The adviser will have no advance knowledge of the principal’s norms and values. Advisers might therefore find themselves in a situation where the principal takes an unacceptable stance on corruption—on any other principle that is important to the adviser. Where to draw the line? This is a very difficult judgment call because taking too hard a stance on sensitive issues might alienate the adviser from the principal, but at the same time corruption is totally unacceptable. Before starting an assignment, it is therefore a good idea to identify where to draw the line, and which lines the adviser is under no circumstances prepared to cross. Doing so will make it easier to argue a certain point of view.

Another important step would be to discuss the issue of corruption or a corrupted counterpart with the employer. What are their rules and regulations? Is there a code of conduct? What type of support can they provide? An adviser, even though deployed outside a mission, should always have the support of their employer when it comes to addressing such issues and making judgement calls.

Transparency International promotes three guiding principles when it comes to fighting corruption: build partnerships, proceed step-by-step and stay non-confrontational. One should never go it alone. Advisers should discuss with the mission, with their employer and with colleagues how best to address the corrupt counterpart. Find an entry-point for discussing the topic, possibly in conjunction with another less sensitive topic. As trust and rapport are built with the principal, it will become easier to discuss more sensitive issues.

Working with Resistance

Given the political dimension of SSR, an SSR adviser will almost certainly encounter some resistance, either from the principal or from the structures and institutions the adviser is working with. SSR is not always seen as something positive. By promoting democratization and the rule of law, SSR might be seen as making government institutions more like those in

15. Transparency International (n.d.).
liberal Western democracies, and might therefore be seen as culturally insensitive. One way to counter such a critique is to ensure local ownership to the greatest extent possible, for example by discussing with the local counterpart why SSR would be a good thing in this particular context, what is to be gained from SSR and the role SSR can play in statebuilding and peacebuilding. In this way, the reform process will answer questions relevant to the stakeholder and the reform is more likely to be tailored to the specific context.

Another critique is that SSR is state-centric, since it focuses on reforming government institutions. In reality, in the areas where SSR is most often undertaken, state institutions are likely to be weak and there might have been other actors providing security. One response would be to include non-state actors in the reform process. In such cases, public participation, including by representatives of all sections of society as well as other providers of security, becomes important. Topics to discuss with the principal might be why SSR is an issue that is relevant to all areas of society, who currently are providing or might previously have provided security and why the inclusion of civil society and public participation are important.

A third critique is that SSR works in theory but not in practice because it is too ambitious to be implementable. When encountering such a critique, it is important to remember that these processes are long-term and that it is usually too early to evaluate their results. It is also important to acknowledge small steps forward and, in this way, redefine what is meant by success. Issues to discuss might be what success would look like, whether there are any quick wins to focus on in the initial phase and over what timespan the reform process is envisaged to take place.

Resistance to SSR might also come from a fear of losing power as reform processes shift power balances and question who has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It is therefore important not to rush the reform process in order to have time to thoroughly explain why the majority would benefit from the reform. Furthermore, there might be a need to demonstrate quick wins that are also seen as positive for those who might be losing power and influence.
The resistance encountered might have nothing to do with SSR as such, but could instead be an expression of a lack of competencies, work overload or previous bad experiences of reform. Hence, one important thing when encountering resistance is to try to understand the drivers behind it. In this way, the adviser will probably find a suitable way to respond to the resistance. It is important not to just focus on the negative, but to try to identify positive attitudes and reform capacities in order to make progress.

Strategies to Consolidate Change

Reform is a change process and, as noted above, change might encounter resistance. There are however strategies for how to consolidate change. First, it is important to acknowledge that change is a process and not an event. Second, the forces working for and against the reform need to be identified and handled accordingly. Third, change is about not only structures and processes but also individuals. Hence, the human dimension must not be forgotten. This means that change only can take place by working with individuals rather than just looking at organizations. In the end an institution or a structure is made up of individuals. If they are unwilling to change, the structure will be unable to.

There are many different models for change processes and detailing them all is beyond the scope of this handbook. However, one popular strategy that could be used to exemplify the process of change is the ‘eight step process for leading change’ by John Kotter and Kotter International.16 Initially developed for the private sector, it can also serve as a tool in statebuilding and advisory contexts. An adapted version describing how it relates to the advisory role and SSR is set out below:

- **Create a sense of urgency.** Why are the reforms important? Try to find incentives, motivations and windows of opportunity.
- **Build a guiding coalition.** Try to work with a core group of people that is reform positive. Suitable individuals could be identified through a stakeholder analysis.

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16. For more information on the ‘eight steps of advising for change’ see Kotter International (n.d.).
• **Form a strategic vision and initiatives.** What would the end state of the reform process look like?

• **Enlist volunteers.** Go beyond the core group of people and try to get as many as possible on board the reform process.

• **Enable action by removing barriers.** What is preventing the reform process from taking place and what could be done to remove these obstacles? This is where actual reform would start to take place.

• **Generate short-term wins.** To win trust and get people interested in reforms, there is a need to be able to show some short-term results within the framework of a long-term plan.

• **Sustain reform processes.** Continue to build on the short-term wins and what has already been achieved as well as on what is already in place.

• **Institutionalize change.**

Change is not linear and might not happen in a predictable way, and thus the above steps might not necessarily follow in order. It is important to remember that the reforms planned for at the start might change as the process takes different routes along the way. It is therefore important to have the courage to go back and adjust the originally envisaged outcomes.

Another way to work on both change and resistance is to analyse the factors for and against the change process, in this case SSR. These factors can relate to a certain individual but also to institutions. Through such an analysis it will be possible to identify the factors that need to be strengthened and those that need to be weakened in order to support change. This could show the adviser how to move the reform process forward. Annex 1 provides a tool for this type of analysis.
This handbook is a contribution to the work of the growing number of SSR advisers based all over the world. By underlining the importance of the political dimension of SSR the hope is that SSR advisers will be better prepared for the important but challenging work that the advisory role entails.

As is highlighted above, the advisory role requires a certain set of skills and qualities. It is not sufficient, however, to have technical expertise, political awareness and a certain set of skills. An understanding of the context in which the adviser is to operate is of crucial importance. The key to success for any adviser lies in their interaction with the principal and other relevant actors. This interaction might at times be difficult due to a certain level of resistance to change, but must be viewed from a long-term perspective.

SSR is not an easy endeavour—far from it. It is to be hoped that by reading this handbook, the role of the SSR adviser has become a bit clearer and the impact that SSR advisers can have on reform processes has been enhanced.
Being an SSR adviser is a complicated business. There are however some useful tools that can make the work somewhat easier. As the tools can be viewed as a neutral topic, introducing a tool might be a good way to start a discussion with your local counterpart.

Conflict Analysis

There are various tools and methods for conducting a conflict analysis. It is not within the scope of this handbook to present a comprehensive conflict analysis tool. There are however some generic aspects to take into consideration when undertaking a conflict analysis. Conflicts are usually analysed on the basis of the following key components: actors (parties), conflict issues, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes. Some suggestions for questions that might be posed in relation to an analysis of each component in a given conflict are set out below.\(^{17}\) When answering these types of questions it is important to remember to take a gender-responsive approach, and hence to use disaggregated data, and so on.

**Actors**
- Who are the parties to the conflict? (primary, secondary and third parties)
- Have there been any significant changes over time? (new alliances, splits or the emergence of new actors)
- What are the parties’ primary power resources and what are their power relations? (symmetrical versus asymmetrical conflicts)

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\(^{17}\) Based on a lecture given by Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, Head of Research at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, at an internal FBA seminar in Sandö on 20 October 2015.
• What is the leadership’s basis for authority in each party?
• What is the organizational structure and composition of each party?
• What are the parties’ main strategies for mobilization and recruitment?

Conflict issue
• What is the conflict issue(s) at stake?
• What are the parties’ official and publicly stated positions with regard to the conflict issues?
• What are the parties’ underlying interests and needs with regard to the conflict issues?
• Are there any significant intra-party divisions with regard to the conflict issues?

Conflict behaviour
• Which conflict behaviours are the parties pursuing in order to reach their objectives? (different violent and non-violent strategies)
• Have there been any relevant changes in conflict strategies over time and space?
• Have there been phases of escalation and de-escalation?
• Are some individuals, groups or regions more likely to be targeted for violence than others?

Conflict attitudes
• Is there a systematic pattern of negative perceptions and established stereotypes based on, for example, ethnicity, region, religion, and so on?
• Are the parties showing signs of de-individuation and dehumanization in their perception of themselves and others?
• Has there been a polarization of the conflict at group level or at society level?

Gender-responsive SSR
This set of questions can help guide the integration of a gender perspective into SSR. The questions emphasize key issues, such as who has
what security needs, who controls what resources and who is listened
to. The questions also highlight the importance of not assuming that
men or women are homogenous groups with the same security needs,
perspectives and experiences. How gender roles are influenced by other
identity factors, such as for example age, ethnicity and social class, needs
to be considered in order to assess how to support gender-responsive SSR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DON'T ONLY ASK</th>
<th>ALSO ASK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What needs?</td>
<td>Whose needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What interests?</td>
<td>Whose interest?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do people do?</td>
<td>Who does what and when?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What resources?</td>
<td>Who controls the resources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many women?</td>
<td>Which women?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many men?</td>
<td>Which men?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is included?</td>
<td>Who participates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who talks?</td>
<td>Who is listened to?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What security?</td>
<td>Whose security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What perspectives on security?</td>
<td>Whose perspective on security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What information?</td>
<td>Whose information is valuable?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Elroy (2016).

Force Field Analysis

Force Field Analysis is a tool for listing the factors, or forces, for and
against change and grading the impact they have on a desired change.¹⁸
Such an analysis can be used to identify how to move forward with the
change process and in what way the different factors can be strengthened
or weakened. The suggestion is that whenever the factors for change are
stronger than the ones opposing it, the status quo will change.

When conducting a Force Field Analysis, defining the change objective
is a good starting point. For an SSR adviser this would be a reformed se-
curity sector, but the tool can of course also be used for more specific ob-
jectives. Identifying driving and restraining forces would be the second

¹⁸. Force Field Analysis was originally developed in the 1940s by the social psychologist, Kurt Lewin.
step. What are the factors that support or resist change? The third step is to grade the impact the different factors are having on the change objective. The fourth is to identify ways to strengthen the driving forces, and weaken the restraining forces or add new driving forces. A Force Field Analysis can be carried out using a pro forma (see Figure A1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driving Forces</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Constraining Forces</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Change Objective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reforming the Security Sector)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A1 Pro forma for carrying out Force Field Analysis.

Conflict Mapping

Mapping is a technique used to illustrate the relevant actors, their respective relationships and the important issues at stake. Drawing this essential information into a graph helps to create a better understanding, clarify where the power lies and identify openings for intervention or action. A conflict map can serve to answer questions such as: Who are the actors? What are the relationships between all these actors?

The first step in this type of mapping is to decide on a conflict issue. For an SSR adviser the mapping could be used to understand a broader conflict issue, for example land rights or power sharing, that might affect the reform process. It could also be used for a specific conflict issue within the reform process, for example gender mainstreaming in SSR, clarification of mandates or moving a function from one actor to
another. The second step is to draw the actors as circles using relative size depending on their power. Finally, draw lines between the actors using the symbols in Figure A2. An example of a conflict map is shown in Figure A3.

Figure A2 Symbols for graphically mapping a conflict

- Circles indicate parties to the situation; relative size = power with regard to the issue.
- Straight lines indicate links, that is, fairly close relationships.
- A double connecting line indicates an alliance.
- Dotted lines indicate informal or intermittent links.
- A square or rectangle indicates an issue, topic, or something other than people.
- Arrows indicate the predominant direction of influence or activity.
- Lines like lightning indicate discord, conflict.
- A double line like a wall across lines indicates a broken connection.
- A shadow shows external parties which have influence but are not directly involved.

Source: Adapted from Fisher et al. (2000).
From such a map it is possible to identify the issue at hand and the relations between the different actors. This will assist the adviser to identify possible interventions or the type of advice needed to move the issue forward.

Figure A3 A conflict map
Functions Mapping: the Matrix

When embarking on SSR it will soon become obvious that there are a multitude of actors with different and sometimes overlapping mandates. As part of an SSR process a security sector with clearly delineated areas of responsibility should be established. An easy way to illustrate the different actors’ functions, and where there might be gaps or overlaps is to use the matrix at Figure A4. The suggested actors and functions are not exhaustive and should be viewed as examples.

Figure A4 Actors/functions matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Public order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Crime prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential guard</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence service</td>
<td>Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs service</td>
<td>Prison security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections service</td>
<td>Border security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juciciary</td>
<td>Arrest and detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management service</td>
<td>Judicial decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution service</td>
<td>Drug enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customary justice systems</td>
<td>Anti-riot capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The matrix is used to plot the mandates of the different security sector actors. Once the gaps and overlaps have been identified, this can form the basis for identifying the change needed within the security sector and for future advice.

Stakeholder Analysis
A stakeholder analysis will help to identify the main stakeholders and the interests they represent. Once the stakeholders have been identified, there will be a need to prioritize among them and to decide the extent to which and in what way they should be interacted with. One way of doing this is to do a reverse stakeholder analysis. A power/credibility grid (see Figure A5) can be used to identify how to engage with different stakeholders. Two questions determine their credibility:
- What reputation does the actor have because of its actions and attitude during the conflict?
- What is the current stance of the actor towards security, stability and SSR at large?19

Figure A5 A power/credibility grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Credibility</th>
<th>High Credibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Actors with low power and low credibility (ignore)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Actors with low power and high credibility (reinforce capability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Actors with high power and low credibility (neutralize or incentivize)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Actors with high power and high credibility (engage)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Identifying the actors that are of importance to the reform process will help the adviser to prioritize who to engage with and how to engage.

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